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Stellingen - Theorems - Stellungsnahmen - Théorèmes 
1. Policy-making with respect to the control of contagious animal disease outbreaks should always 
consider all impacts on the most affected stakeholders. (Ditproefschrift) 
2. As long as international agreements allow importing countries to ban live pigs and pork for an extra 6 
months from countries that have used vaccination to control a Classical Swine Fever epidemic, an 
exporting country like the Netherlands should avoid this measure. (Dit proefschrifl) 
3. Decisions on strategies to control Classical Swine Fever epidemics should be made as a function 
of the pig densities in the infected areas. (Dit proefschrifl) 
4. During an epidemic of a contagious animal disease killing and rendering capacities should be 
prioritised for stamping-out infected premises and for preventive slaughter of suspected herds. 
(Dit proefschrift) 
5. Scientists and decision-makers are better able to weigh the various control strategies for an 
epidemic if they have both epidemiological and economic models available. (Dit proefschrift) 
6. Scientific truth, which I formerly thought of as fixed, as though it could be weighed and 
measured, is changeable. Add a fact, change the outlook, and you have a new truth. Truth is a 
constant variable. We seek it, we find it, our viewpoint changes, and the truth changes to meet it. 
(William J. Mayo, 1861-1939) 
7. Et kann een keng Omelett maachen ouni d'Äer ze briechen. (Luxemburgse spreekwoord) 
8. Rien de plus fort que la nature, rien de plus vulnérable, (uit een Kalender) 
9. Im Ausland zu wohnen und zu arbeiten führt zu neuen Erfahrungen, und manche 
Alltagsgewohnheit des Gastlandes gibt Grund zum Staunen, zur Belustigung oder sogar zur 
Verärgerung. Fördert aber auch das Vergessen von weniger guten Eigenschaften des 
Heimatlandes, mit dem Ergebnis für Aussenstehende, dass zu Hause „immer" alles besser ist. 
10. Wanneer je beroepsmatig in een voor jou vreemde taal communiceert gebeult het, vaker dan in je 
moedertaal, dat je niet correct begrepen wordt. 
Stellingen behorende bij de proefschrift "Economic welfare analysis of simulated control 
strategies for CSF epidemics ", Marie-Josée Mangen, Wageningen, 24 April 2002. 
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Abstract 
Mangen, M.-J.J., 2002. Economic welfare analysis of simulated control strategies for 
Classical Swine Fever epidemics. PhD Thesis, Wageningen University, pp. 188, English, 
Dutch and German summaries. 
A sector-level and trade market model and a generic, spatial, temporal and stochastic 
epidemiological model are used to simulate the epidemiological and economic effects of 
different measures to control classical swine fever (CSF) epidemics in different regions in the 
Netherlands. The control measures include the current EU legislation (stamping-out infected 
herds; tracing contact herds and installing quarantine zones), preventive slaughtering or an 
emergency vaccination strategy with delayed destruction and intra-community trade as 
additional control measures. In addition, the effects of supplementary animal welfare 
measures to interrupt piglet production during a CSF epidemic are analysed. Different trade 
scenarios are simulated: a partial trade ban for the quarantine zones only or a total export ban 
cn all Dutch live pigs. Aggregating the welfare changes of the different stakeholders (pig 
producers, consumers and government) provides results on the net welfare effect for the 
Dutch economy. 
Economic and epidemiological results suggest that measures to control CSF epidemics 
should be dependent on geographical circumstances. In a sparsely populated pig area, the 
measures defined by EU legislation are appropriate, whereas in a densely populated area 
additional control measures, e.g. emergency vaccination and/or preventive slaughter, are 
heeded. The current political climate favours preventive slaughter for the Dutch situation, 
furthermore, the option of supplementary animal welfare measures to interrupt piglet 
production during the epidemic is rejected on economic grounds. Results indicate that 
rendering capacities should be reserved for carcasses from infected and preventively 
slaughtered farms, and used to destroy pig carcasses slaughtered for animal welfare reasons 
only if capacity permits. 
Keywords: Classical swine fever; contagious disease; epidemiological model; sector-level 
market and trade model; simulation; economic welfare analysis; densely and sparsely 
populated areas; supplementary animal welfare measures; the Netherlands. 
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met InterCSF en C++. Ondanks je nieuwe baan en je "dikke buik", wist jij nog tijd te vinden om mij 
bi helpen bij het opsporen van mijn eigen programmeer fouten. Monique van harte bedankt voor de 
hulp bij het programmeren van het "EpiKotz"-gedoe, zonder jouw hulp zou ik er vandaag nog mee 
tjezig zijn. Mebei ook van harte bedankt voor al die andere korte of lange discussies, al dan niet over 
het werk. Ik ben blij jullie als mijn paranimfen bij deze promotie terzijde te hebben. 
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bedankt voor de duizend en één klusjes die jullie voor mij gedaan hebben. Tom Neil, Christa 
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gezellig gemaakt. Jullie van harte bedankt 
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houfreg sid op déi grouss Schwester, och wann déi grouss Schwester heiansdo fatzeg kann 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Classical swine fever 
Classical swine fever virus (CSFV) is a highly infectious virus. Natural hosts of CSFV are 
domestic pigs and wild boar. The virus is relatively stable in moist excretions and fresh meat 
products, including ham and salami type sausages. However, it is readily inactivated by heat, 
detergents, lipid solvents, proteases and common disinfectants (Moennig, 2000). The 
diagnosis of classical swine fever (CSF, syn. Hog cholera, European swine fever) based on 
clinical signs is often difficult as symptoms may vary considerably, depending on the age 
and/or breed of the affected animals and on the viral strain (Dahle and Liess, 1992; Depner et 
al., 1996; Terpstra, 1997). Usually young animals are affected more severely than older 
animals. Mortality rates may reach 90% in young pigs. Under natural conditions the most 
frequent route by which the CSFV enters its host is oronasal with an incubation period of 7-
10 days. Acute and chronic courses of CSF are known. All courses of the infection have in 
common that the animals are viraemic at least as long as they show clinical signs. Death 
occurs 2-3 weeks after infection (acute course) or after up to three months (chronic course). 
The outcome of transplacental infection of foetuses depends largely on the time of gestation 
and may result in abortions, stillbirths, mummification, malformations or the birth of weak or 
persistently viraemic piglets (carrier piglets). Although carrier piglets may be clinically 
normal at birth, they invariably die from CSF. Survival periods of 11 months after birth have 
been observed (Moennig, 2000). 
1.1.2 World situation 
CSF is a serious, economically damaging disease of swine that can spread in epizootic form 
and can also establish enzootic infections in pig populations. It is classified as an OIE List A 
disease, i.e. every suspected case has to be investigated and once it is confirmed, the outbreak 
has to be notified. Although most countries with significant pig production have statutory 
control measures for the disease, the efficacy of these measures varies in accordance with the 
structure of the sector (contacts, density), the national economy as well as the state of 
development of veterinary and laboratory infrastructure. Though effective vaccines exist, 
they do not on their own bring about disease eradication. Any use of vaccine has 
consequences for the disease status of the country or region (Edwards et al., 2000). The OIE 
defines the requirements for CSF-free status as follows: 
a) Absence of CSF for at least two years in a vaccinated pig population 
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b) Absence of CSF for one year after slaughter of the last affected animal following a 
stamping-out campaign with vaccination 
p) Absence of CSF for six months after slaughter of the last affected animal following a 
stamping-out campaign without vaccination. 
At the beginning of the 21 s t century, CSF is still endemic in many parts of the globe. 
Successful eradication has been achieved in many countries including North America, 
Australasia, and parts of Northern Europe, and many such countries have successfully 
maintained freedom in the absence of vaccination resulting in a totally susceptible swine 
population. By contrast, in most of Africa the situation is uncertain, but the disease is not 
Reported as a problem except in Madagascar (Edwards et al., 2000). 
1.1.3 European Union 
1.1.3.1 History 
When Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the then EEC, the Community took the national 
laws of those 3 countries on imports into account, in particular the import ban (a trade 
barrier) from countries with CSF outbreaks. The new member countries had at that time 
already eradicated the CSF virus and also ceased vaccination. However, a primary objective 
of the European Union (EU) was and is to establish free movement of people, capital, 
services and goods between the Member States. In order to dismantle these barriers to trade 
jthe Community decided in 1980 to eradicate CSF from the whole of its territory by applying 
I a common policy of slaughter and gradual abolition of systematic vaccination for the purpose 
!of prevention. The programme involved Community financial aid and was introduced in 1980 
together with legislation on the control of the disease. The programme was reviewed in 1985 
and since then, the strategy of the non-vaccination policy - eradication of disease and 
j elimination of infection - has been applied. Table 1.1 summarises the number of outbreaks 
inside the EU over time. The vaccination was stopped in all Member States in the early 
1990's (Westergaard, 1991). Despite this, sporadic outbreaks in the domestic pig population 
have occurred in parts of Europe in recent years. CSF is still endemic in the wild boar 
population in certain parts in Europe. Epidemiological field investigations confirmed by 
genetic typing have shown that 59% of the primary outbreaks in German domestic pig herds 
in the 1990's were due to direct or indirect contact with infected wild boar or wild boar meat 
(Fritzmeier et al, 2000). 
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Table 1.1 CSF infected herds from 1960 until 2000 in the EU as well as the date of cessation of 
vaccination for the different member countries. Data were taken from Laevens (1998) 
and from Handistatus II of the OIE (2001). 
Country or country group 
Year NL D B F I South" North" EU 
1960 1519 404 109 392 900 - 0 3324 
1961 1729 2823 215 735 525 - 0 6027 
1962 512 2366 1705 1350 407 - 7 6347 
1963 974 1553 679 662 838 - 2 4708 
1964 782 769 508 722 770 - 0 3551 
1965 1117 341 337 123 439 - 0 2357 
1966 473 1908 184 44 310 - 0 2919 
1967 333 517 283 32 455 - 0 1620 
1968 283 142 317 132 99 - 0 973 
1969 144 139 402 161 38 - 0 884 
1970 917 343 510 132 3 - 2 1907 
1971 338 396 93 15 17 - 1 860 
1972 164 961 40 84 14 - 0 1263 
1973 904 3936 90 62 51 - 0 5043 
1974 162 1226 85 119 11 - 0 1603 
1975 38 200 3 97 3 - 0 341 
1976 42 68 0 47 5 - 0 162 
1977 11 202 1 17 48 - 0 279 
1978 3 349 0 39 62 - 0 453 
1979 0 87 0 28 7 - 0 122 
1980 0 18 7 19 0 - o b 44 
1981 11 4 37 6 5 20 8 91 
1982 65 19 102 8 34 4 1 233 
1983 161 535 26 1 3 e 48 2 1 786 
1984 176 1041 9 19 13 3 0 1261 
1985 36 351 67 2 25 1 0 482 
1986 r 46 80 20 28 0 10 185 
1987 i 41 83 5 13 0 2 145 
1988 0 3 2° 15 12 0" 0 32 
1989 0 6 4 c 8 0 11 0 0 83 
1990 2 118 113 4 1 5 e 0 0 252 
1991 0 6 0 1 15 0 0 22 
1992 5 13 0 1 20 0 0 39 
1993 0 105 7 1 12 0 0 125 
1994 0 117 48 0 25 0 0 190 
1995 0 54 0 0 42 0 2 98 
1996 0 4 0 0 49 0 2 55 
1997 424 44 8 0 55 78 0 609 
1998 5 11 0 0 18 21 0 55 
1999 0 415 0 0 9 0 0 424 
2000 0 174 0 0 3 0 16 193 
a) Column "South" summarises Greece (since 1973) as well as Spain (since 1986) and Portugal 
(since 1986). The date of cessation of vaccination was 1 January 1988 for Greece, 1 July 1988 for 
Spain and 1 July 1989 for Portugal. 
b) Column "North" summarises Luxembourg (from the beginning), Denmark, Ireland and United 
Kingdom (since 1973) as well as Austria, Finland and Sweden (since 1995). All of those countries 
stopped vaccination before 1980. 
c) Preventive vaccination was stopped during the indicated year. 
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j/. 1.3.2 Currently applied EU CSF legislation 
JThe current European-wide CSF legislation assumes that in the case of an epidemic, 
Quarantine zones1 around an outbreak are based on geographical and epidemiological 
principles, and take no account of national boundaries between the Member States. Following 
a limited outbreak, a protection zone is established of a minimum of 3 km radius around the 
disease focus and a further surveillance zone for a minimum 7 km beyond that (i.e. 3-10 km 
|rom the disease focus). Within these quarantine zones the measures include a census of pig 
foldings, official veterinary inspections, and movement controls on pigs. In the case of a 
imore extensive outbreak, and subject to approval by the Standing Veterinary Committee of 
the EU, the control measures are extended as a safeguard to include a buffer zone around the 
quarantine zone. Where multiple disease episodes have occurred in a region, it may be 
appropriate to merge adjacent quarantine zones to achieve control over a wider area. This 
(régionalisation (again based on geography and epidemiology, rather than national territories) 
is used for the following: to apply strict controls to a quarantine area within the EU in order 
to control and eradicate the disease; to prevent spread of disease from the quarantine area; 
and to permit free movement of pigs and pig products outside the quarantine area. Stamping-
out of infected herds and imposing quarantine zones is, in short, the current applied EU 
legislation. Preventive slaughter on neighbouring farms may be applied as an additional 
Control measure. Preventive vaccination is prohibited in the EU and emergency vaccination 
during an epidemic is allowed under certain strict restrictions (see directive 80/217/CEE, 
article 14). Emergency vaccination might have a serious impact on the national economy 
through exports bans of live pigs and pig meat and has not been applied during the last 
twenty years in the EU to eradicate a CSF epidemic in the domestic pig population. 
1.2 Motivation and objectives of the thesis 
Stamping-out of infected herds and imposing quarantine zones is the current EU legislation 
and as such also obligatory for the Netherlands. Yet, sporadic epidemics in the 1990's in 
Belgium and Germany as well as the 1997/1998 Dutch CSF epidemic demonstrated that these 
measures might not always be suitable for a quick eradication of the disease, at least not in 
high-density populated livestock areas2 (DPLA). In the Dutch CSF epidemic only the 
introduction of preventive slaughter as an additional control measure could cut down the 
disease spread (Elbers et al., 1998). In the future the development of a marker vaccine that 
1 Hereafter "quarantine" zones refer to all restricted zones/areas (protection zone (0-3 km) and surveillance 
zones (3-10 km)) in which movement restrictions and control measures are imposed. 
2 In the context of CSF only one livestock species is considered: pigs. 
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permits vaccinated pigs to be distinguished from infected pigs by a serological test, which 
was impossible previously, may offer new opportunities for control. The introduction of a 
marker vaccine during a CSF epidemic in a DPLA had already been suggested by different 
people (Van Oirschot, 1994; Leopold-Temmler, 1996; Vagsholm, 1996; Jorna, 1997) even 
before the vaccine was available on the EU market. Finally, the large-scale slaughtering and 
rendering of healthy growers (25-kg piglets) and fatteners during the 1997/1998 Dutch CSF 
epidemic — a destruction of economic resources and human food — has aroused public 
opinion and ethical opposition, which have forced the EU to revise the CSF legislation. The 
EU authorities, in co-operation with the member states, are currently (2001) working on a 
revised CSF legislation. 
People involved in CSF control strategy decision making are faced with many uncertainties, 
both epidemiological as well as economic and political. Epidemiological uncertainties 
involve the development of the epidemic as well as the expected efficiency of the applied 
control strategies. Economic uncertainties are the direct control costs, but also the indirect 
costs for the different stakeholders affected, whereby political and public uncertainties may 
play a role. The possibility of export bans set by other countries due to economic, political 
and/or public acceptance may result in possible market disruption for the whole sector 
involved. Despite these uncertainties, decision makers have to decide on what control 
strategy to apply. However, where can information be gathered on experience on how to 
behave adequately? Contagious disease outbreaks happen only sporadically, and 
experimenting with control measures would be too costly and too disruptive to the sector 
involved. For these reasons it is preferably to build a model as a representation of the 
"system" and study it as a surrogate for the actual system (Law and Kelton, 1991). In our 
study this "system" has to represent the Dutch pig herd population and also the Dutch pig 
sector and all stakeholders affected by possible trade restrictions. 
Therefore the main goals of this thesis were: 1) to further develop an existing epidemiological 
model that simulates the spread of the virus between farms and permits a comparison of 
control measures of interest; 2) to develop an economic model that calculates not only the 
direct control costs of the animal health authorities but also the indirect costs for Dutch 
society as a whole, whereby different market scenarios are considered; and 3) with the help of 
these models, to analyse possible control strategies that might be applied in an epidemic and 
to give recommendations, on epidemiological and economic grounds, concerning which 
control strategies to apply in future epidemics. 
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1.3 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 focuses on possible emergency vaccination strategies that might be applied during 
in epidemic, using an existing epidemiological simulation model, InterCSFvl. The 
1997/1998 CSF epidemic in the Netherlands is used as an illustration of a possible epidemic 
in which emergency vaccination could have been applied as an additional control measure. 
Wc also use existing economic tools (Meuwissen et al, 1999) in which we implement 
additionally the cost of the vaccine and the vaccine application costs. Requests from the 
public sector and private industry as well as public debate on the use of a marker vaccine 
Curing the 1997/1998 Dutch CSF epidemic determined our decision to start with this subject 
at the beginning of the research project. Consequently, already existing tools were adapted 
for this purpose. The remaining chapters in the thesis use new tools that were developed 
Within this research project. 
Knowledge of Dutch consumer behaviour regarding demand for meat and fish is needed 
before being able to build an economic model to calculate the indirect costs for Dutch society 
as a whole (second objective of this study). Questions that need to be answered are: is there 
an adverse consumer reaction to pork during a CSF epidemic in the Netherlands; are there 
significant meat substitutions for pork; and what are the pork price elasticities? In Chapter 3 
•jve therefore investigate the changing preferences of Dutch consumers for meat and fish 
using a switching almost ideal demand (AID) system (Moschini and Meilke, 1989). 
The economic framework that is developed for the second objective of this study is described 
in the first part of Chapter 4. EpiPigFlow, a micro-economic model, calculates the weekly 
flow of pigs, and thus links InterCSF outputs with a simulation model of the Dutch pig 
hiarket (Dupima). Dupima calculates market prices and trade flows, whereas EpiCost, also a 
micro-economic model, calculates the control programme costs and changes in producer 
iurplus within a quarantine zone. EpiPigFlow and EpiCost are written in C++, whereas 
pupima is written in GAMS. Using the results of EpiCost and Dupima, an economic welfare 
analysis for the Dutch economy is performed in an Excel spreadsheet. In the second part of 
Chapter 4 we calculate the net welfare effect for the Dutch economy for the simulated 
specific 1997/1998 Dutch CSF epidemic, simulating three different trade scenarios. Results 
of the epidemiological simulation model, InterCSFvl, of Jalvingh et al. (1999) were linked 
with the developed economic framework to obtain the net welfare effect for the Dutch 
economy for this specific epidemic. 
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All adaptations made in InterCSF to obtain a more generic epidemiological simulation model, 
InterCSF_v3, are described in the first part of Chapter 5. Development of this model was the 
first objective of this thesis. For the generic study, the epidemic is started in 2 different areas 
in the Netherlands, including the locations and size of the Dutch pig herd population of the 
year 2000. Sensitivity analysis is carried out with InterCSF_v3. In the second part of chapter 
5 we analyse possible control measures for a sparsely populated livestock area (SPLA) and a 
densely populated livestock area (DPLA) in the Netherlands, using the economic tools 
described in Chapter 4 as well as the adapted epidemiological model, InterCSF_v3. Based on 
epidemiological and economic grounds, we give some recommendations (third objective of 
this thesis) on which control strategies to apply in future epidemics in a DPLA or an SPLA. 
In chapter 6 we analyse the epidemiological as well as the economic consequences of the use 
of supplementary measures to reduce later animal welfare problems on farms in an epidemic 
in a DPLA, using the modelling framework developed and described in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Insemination prohibition, forced abortion of pregnant sows and the killing of very young 
piglets are such supplementary measures. We also want to know when to decide to use these 
supplementary measures, whereby our hypothesis was that only in large and long-lasting 
epidemics might these non-ordinary supplementary measures be useful. 
In Chapter 7 we discuss the major findings and the applied method and models as well as the 
shortcomings of those models. We also provide some directions for future research. Finally, 
in the last section of chapter 7 we summarise and discuss the main conclusions and give 
recommendations for future epidemics. 
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Abstract 
Two alternative emergency-vaccination strategies with a marker vaccine that could have been 
applied in the 1997/98 Dutch Classical Swine Fever (CSF) epidemic were evaluated in a 
modified spatial, temporal and stochastic simulation model, InterCSF. In strategy 1, 
vaccination would only be applied to overcome a shortage in destruction capacities (killing 
and rendering). Destruction of all pigs on vaccinated farms distinguishes this strategy from 
strategy 2, which assumes intra-community trade of vaccinated pig meat. 
InterCSF simulates the spread of CSF between farms through local spread and 3 contact 
types. Disease spread is affected by control measures implemented through different 
mechanisms. Economic results were generated by a separate model that calculated the direct 
costs (including the vaccination costs) and consequential losses for farmers and related 
industries subjected to control measures. The comparison (using epidemiological and 
economic results) between the different emergency-vaccination strategies with an earlier 
simulated preventive-slaughter scenario led to some general conclusions on the Dutch CSF-
epidemic. Both emergency-vaccination strategies were hardly more efficient than the non-
vaccination scenario. The intra-community trade strategy (vaccination strategy 2) was the 
least costly of all three scenarios. 
2.1 Introduction 
When all regular measures to eradicate an CSF-epidemic fail, paragraph 14 of the directive 
80/217/EEC of the EU legislation foresees an emergency-vaccination (CEC, 1980). In the 
case of an emergency vaccination, the same directive forces the member state to exclude all 
meat originating from vaccinated pigs (except when heat treated) from the regular pork 
market. In the last decade, some severe CSF-epidemics occurred in the EU, but no emergency 
vaccination was applied. In 1994, the German proposal for an emergency vaccination was 
refused by the European Commission (Blaha, 1994). During the 1997/98 Dutch CSF 
epidemic (hereafter referred as the Dutch CSF epidemic) in the Netherlands, emergency 
vaccination was only proposed at the national level (Jorna, 1997) mainly on ethical grounds. 
The use of a marker vaccine to help control a CSF outbreak seems to be technically feasible 
(Van Oirschot, 1994; Leopold-Temmler, 1996; Vagsholm, 1996; Jorna, 1997), including 
serological test to distinguish infected pigs from vaccinated pigs. Changes in the swine herd 
structure combined with high-density pig populations incur logistic and organisational 
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problems, as well as high costs, when adopting a regular stamping-out policy to eradicate an 
epidemic. Public objections against the destruction (killing and rendering) of healthy animals 
increase as well. Those factors are in favour of emergency vaccination. On the other hand, 
EU policy aims a high animal health status and therefore has adapted a non-vaccination 
policy for the control and eradication of animal diseases of major importance for international 
trade. In brief, the use of vaccine "means" the presence of disease (Westergaard, 1996). 
epidemiological, political and economic advantages and disadvantages have to be analysed 
aW clarified before being able to decide if the use of marker vaccine is a realistic and 
attractive option. We improved the simulation model InterCSF, which was developed to 
stimulate the Dutch CSF epidemic, (Jalvingh et al., 1999) by adding emergency-vaccination 
ES a disease-control mechanism. InterCSF specifically was developed to answer "what-if 
questions (Nielen et al., 1999). Vaccination costs were incorporated in EpiLoss (Meuwissen 
et al., 1999) for the present study, to be able to calculate the direct costs and consequential 
lbsses for farmers and related industries subjected to control measures. 
The main goal of this chapter was to analyse the epidemiological and economic consequences 
of two possible emergency-vaccination campaigns that could have been used in the Dutch 
CSF epidemic. They are compared with an earlier simulated preventive-slaughter strategy 
(Nielen et al. 1999), which we will call (in this chapter) the "non-vaccination" (NV) scenario. 
2.2 Material and methods 
.2.1 General outline 
jnterCSF is a spatial, temporal and stochastic simulation model (Jalvingh et al., 1999). 
JnterCSF simulates disease spread from day to day from infected farms through 3 contact 
jypes (animals, vehicles, persons) and through local spread up to 1000 m. All Dutch pig 
farms are known by their geographical co-ordinates. The main disease-control mechanisms 
that influence the disease spread in InterCSF are: diagnosis of the infected farms, 
depopulation of infected farms, quarantine zones1, tracing and preventive slaughter (see 
Appendix I for more details). 
Hereafter "quarantine" zones refer to all restricted zones/areas (protection zone (0-3 km) and surveillance 
iones (3-10 km) in which movement restrictions and control measures are imposed. 
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2 A fattener is a finishing or fattening pig, also called hog (from 45 kg until killed). 
3 A gilt is a female pig from 20-30 kg live weight until first insemination. 
4 Assuming 21.5 piglets/breeding sow/year, which is equal to 0.059 piglets born/breeding sow/day. We assume 
that a piglet will stay on a sow farm for 70 days. Because pigs need to be 14 days old for vaccination, we will 
have (0.059*56 days =) 3.30 piglets/farrowing place and 1 sow/farrowing place to vaccinate 
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Emergency vaccination was incorporated in the base scenario such that it reflected the start 
situation of the real epidemic as closely as possible. This involved incorporating historical 
data of 37 farms with an infection date before February 4 1997 (detection date of first farm) 
and fixed detection and herd-destruction dates later. New infections were simulated only after 
this date. In our simulations we assumed that after 5 detections in the first week, emergency 
vaccination would be ordered. In a densely populated area epidemiologists expect a large 
epidemic if there are at least 5 detections in the first week. In 1997, the first outbreak 
happened in a very densely populated pig area and 9 outbreaks were notified in the first week 
after the first detection (Elbers et al., 1999). In our simulation, the emergency-vaccination 
campaign was initiated 5 days after the decision on day 6 (assuming 5 days of preparation for 
a vaccination campaign). When the decision to start with the emergency-vaccination 
campaign was taken, all earlier-detected farms from the previous week were identified. In the 
base vaccination scenarios, a vaccination zone with a radius of 3 km was defined for each 
detected farm. To mimic restricted vaccination capacities, all defined vaccination zones were 
put on a vaccination list and all further-defined vaccination zones were listed also. If more 
than one new vaccination zone was defined on the same day, they were sorted depending on 
their pig-farm density, starting with the highest pig-farm density. We further assumed that 
emergency vaccination would be stopped based on certain criteria (defined later on in 
chapter). 
Vaccination zones are vaccinated one by one - not in parallel - by 150 vaccination teams. 
Each vaccination team (1 veterinarian and 4 helpers) was supposed to handle about 2000 pig 
places (fatteners2 and gilts3) or 465 4 farrowing places per day (or various equivalent 
combinations). 
2.2.2 Vaccination effects 
Vaccination has two effects: reduction in virus spread of an infected farm and protection 
against infection of a susceptible herd. 
For virus reduction on an infected farm, two kinds of infected farms were distinguished. The 
first category consisted of infected farms that were never vaccinated and of farms that were 
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first infected and later vaccinated. The second category was farms that were vaccinated and 
became later infected. 
For the first category of infected farms, we assumed no reduction in virus spread. All 
parameters remained as described in Jalvingh et al. (1999). In short, the infectious period 
Started between 5 and 10 days after infection. The infectivity of the farm remained the same 
for the total infectious period, which ended on the day that the farm was depopulated. The 
interval between infection and detection was modelled with a single probability distribution, 
based on observations of the real Dutch CSF epidemic. The selected interval could be 
influenced downward by certain events (see Table 2.1). The detection probabilities of non-
jaccinated farms were used as a base to estimate the detection probabilities for all vaccinated 
farms (Table 2.1). Vaccination as such could also influence detection because infected farms 
could be detected earlier due to clinical inspection on the vaccination day. The detection 
probability depended on the time since infection and the source of infection (Table 2.2). For a 
direct animal contact we defined a higher probability of detection for the first weeks after 
infection than for all other contacts. If an infected farm was not detected during vaccination, 
We assumed that the virus was spread mechanically and massively over the farm during 
Vaccination. After the incubation time of 1 week, the large number of sick animals could 
again lead to a possible earlier detection (Tielen; Personal communication). In both cases, we 
assumed that 2 days after suspicion, the diagnosis was established. For all other events, more 
time consuming tests are necessary; so, we defined 7 days after suspicion before diagnosis 
Would be given (de Smit et al, 1999). For vaccinated farms infected after vaccination (the 
second category), a reduction in virus spread was expressed by a reduction factor. This 
reduction factor depended on the time interval between vaccination and infection and was 
modelled with a probability distribution, based on EU experiments (Appendix II). The 
reduction factor was multiplied by the probabilities of transmission for a simulated contact 
^nd for local spread. 
| 
^or the farms in the second category, we assumed no change in the latent period but the 
infectious period was reduced to at most 1 month. Only small outbreaks typically are 
expected on vaccinated farms. Assuming that vaccinated pigs show no or few clinical signs 
when infected, detection could only be by serological screening (Table 2.1). 
Susceptible farms also were classified in two categories: non-vaccinated and vaccinated 
farms. We defined a non-vaccinated susceptible farm as one without protection against a 
possible infection, whereas a vaccinated susceptible farm was partly protected. The degree of 
protection depended on the time interval between vaccination and a possible infection and 
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Table 2.1 Probability of detection based on a control event (such as traced contacts, surveillance, preventive slaughter, end-screening and animal welfare 
slaughter) depending on the time since infection and the farm specific vaccination status in a quarantine zone 
Probability of detection by control event (diagnosis date 7 days after event) 
Time since Traced contacts 8 Surveillance Preventive slaughter* b End-screening b Welfare slaughter 6 
infection (3 km radius) a 
(days) NV° V I e N V C rv d v r N V C V I e N V C i v d V I e N V C V I e 
0 - 1 4 0 0.9 0 0 0.9 0 0 0.9 0 0 0.9 0 0 0.9 0 
1 5 - 2 8 1 l 0 0 1 0 1 l 0.5 0.25 l 0.5 0 l 0.5 
2 9 - 4 2 1 l 0 0.25 1 0 1 l 1 0.5 l 1 0 l 1 
> 4 2 1 l 0 1 1 0 1 l 1 1 l I 1 l 1 
a) Based mainly on clinical inspection. 
b) Based mainly on serology. 
c) NV: No vaccination; farm already has an (undetected) infection (Jalvingh et al., 1999). 
d) IV: Vaccination of a farm already infected (but not yet detected). 
e) VI: Vaccination of a farm which later becomes infected. 
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was expressed as a protection factor, modelled b y a probability distribution (Appendix II). 
Similar to the reduction factor, the protection factor was multiplied by the probabilities of 
transmission for a simulated contact and for local spread. However, if an infectious pig was 
moved to a susceptible vaccinated farm, the protection factor was not considered. W e 
assumed that this farm always became infected but could hardly ever become infectious. 
Table 2.2 Probability of detection due to vaccination, relative to the time since infection on an 
(undetected) infected farm and depending on the source of infection 
Jims between infection Probability of detection related to vaccination (diagnosis date 2 days later) 
entrance and Vaccination day 3 Vaccination day" 1 week after 
| vaccination vaccination 
(days) 
0 - 1 4 0.25 0.05 0.9 
1 5 - 2 8 0.9 0.5 0.95 
2 9 - 4 2 0.99 0.9 1 
> 4 2 0.99 0.99 1 
a) Farm infected by direct animal contact. 
lj») Farm infected by transport or person contact. 
In the EU field experiments, horizontal transmission was significantly reduced 3 weeks after 
vaccination for both marker vaccines (Anonymous, 1999). In our base emergency-
vaccination scenarios, w e assumed that max imum protection and reduction was reached after 
21 days. For sensitivity analysis, this t ime interval was reduced b y 5 days to 16, as well as 
increased by 5 days to 26 days (Appendix IT). In an additional analysis, only 1 week was 
assumed to be needed to build up the max imum protection level (simulating a live-virus 
vaccine). 
2.2.3 Delayed-destruction alternatives 
ÎThe first emergency-vaccination strategy (called "delayed-destruction" (DD)), assumed no 
political acceptance of vaccinated pig meat as fresh meat (i.e. the current E U policy). 
Vaccination would only be applied to overcome a shortage in destruction (killing and 
rendering) capacity, created by regularly applied control measures . Because vaccination will 
reduce the risk of virus spread the destruction of the vaccinated farms can be postponed until 
destruction capacity is available. All pigs in the vaccination zone needed to be destroyed 
^slaughtered and rendered) before the end-screening could be applied to declare the region 
^ree again of CSF. All pigs older than 14 days were vaccinated once. W e assumed that 
25 
Chapter 2 
vaccinated pigs had maximum protection for at least 6 months. If they were not slaughtered 
within 6 months, the pigs would be re-vaccinated to keep maximum protection. 
As soon as a vaccination zone was defined, all farms inside this vaccination zone were put on 
the preventive-slaughter list. Priorities were set to deal with the insufficient destruction 
capacities. First, all farms located in the regular preventive-slaughter radius (1 km) and 
contact farms were destroyed. This group was further split up. Farms not predestined for 
vaccination had the highest priority, followed by farms where vaccination was not yet applied 
and finally vaccinated farms. In the category of the vaccinated farms, higher priority was 
given to farms without maximum protection. The second category consisted of farms lying in 
the vaccination zone (0-3 km), but outside the regular preventive-slaughter zone (0-1 km). 
Here again, the highest priority was given to non-vaccinated farms, followed by vaccinated, 
not maximum-protected farms and finally maximum-protected farms. Those priorities are 
handled over all the zones, whereby inside a subgroup, the farms of an older zone had priority 
to be destroyed. The decision criterion for stopping emergency vaccination depended on the 
delay caused by destruction capacities. The number of farms notified for preventive slaughter 
(including vaccinated farms) was divided by the daily destruction capacity to obtain the 
number of days needed for destruction of all those farms. When the delay was < 3 days 
during a period of 14 days, no new vaccination zones were installed. 
The installation of a breeding prohibition in a defined vaccination zone and the culling of 
newborn piglets on the vaccinated farms (not simulated as such) allowed the assumption that 
the pig population on vaccinated farms retained maximum protection. The implementation 
costs for both control measures were considered when calculating the costs and losses. 
In the base scenario (DD-0), we assumed maximum vaccine protection in 21 days, 5 days of 
preparation, a 1 km preventive-slaughter zone and a vaccination radius of 3 km for each 
detected farm. In alternative scenarios (Table 2.3), we assumed that time to build maximum 
protection was reached in 1 week, 16 days or 26 days. In further sensitivity analysis, the time 
needed to prepare the emergency-vaccination campaign was changed from 5 days to 2 days 
(alternative I), to 8 days (alternative IT) or to 25 days (alternative in). In alternative TV, the 
vaccination radius was reduced to 1 km instead of the 3 km, and alternative V assumed a 500 
m regular preventive slaughter radius. 
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Table 2.3 An overview of the various alternatives for both emergency vaccination strategies: the 
Delayed Destruction strategy (DD) and the Intra-Commumty Trade strategy (ICT) 
Assumption DD - x a ICT - x 
Preparation time 5 days 0 (base) 0 (base) 
2 days I I 
8 days II n 
i 25 days III m 
Vj accination radius 3 km 0 (base) 0 (base) 
1 km rv rv 
Preventive-slaughter radius 1000 m 0 (base) -
500 m V -
Applying preventive slaughter No - 0 (base) 
Yes - VIb 
a) x stands for 21 (base) respectively 7,16 or 26 days needed to build up maximal protection. 
b) Preventive slaughter is only applied to non-vaccinated farms in a radius of 1 km. 
2J.2.4 Intra-community trade alternatives 
For the second emergency-vaccination strategy (the intra-community trade strategy (ICT)), 
we assumed that after removing the quarantine zone, pig meat originating from vaccinated 
pigs could be sold on the EU market. However, we assumed that for the vaccination zones, a 
so-called "post-vaccination zone" was installed for 4 months at the moment the quarantine 
zone was lifted. All movements were allowed, except that live pigs could leave this zone only 
directly to slaughter in specific slaughterhouses. This supplementary measure should 
convince all trading partners that no live carrier piglets could leave the vaccination zone to 
spread the disease, in case an infected sow was overlooked during the serological screening. 
In the ICT strategy, emergency vaccination was stopped when there were less than two new 
detections during the previous 4 weeks. 
In the ICT strategy, all pigs older than 2 weeks in a vaccination zone (0-3 km) were 
vaccinated once similar to the DD strategy. In addition, we imposed (for the duration of the 
quarantine zone in a vaccination zone) that all newborn piglets and also all breeding sows 
Would be re-vaccinated. These measures would assure a maximally protected pig population. 
•|he emergency-vaccination capacities were not influenced by the continued vaccination, 
because we assumed that the local veterinarians carried out the re-vaccinations. A further 
assumption was that maximum protection of vaccinated farms would last for the total 
ttration of a post-vaccination zone. After the ending of the post-vaccination zone, all farms st their protection. 
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With the ICT strategy, vaccination reduces the susceptible pig population so preventive 
slaughter is optional and not applied in the base scenario. If preventive slaughter is applied, 
only non-vaccinated farms would be destroyed (alternative VI, Table 2.3). 
For the base scenario (ICT-0), maximum protection was reached in 21 days, no preventive 
slaughter was applied, a vaccination radius of 3 km was installed for each detected farm and 
5 days of preparation were needed before the start of the emergency-vaccination campaign. 
Alternative scenarios were simulated for sensitivity analysis, similar to DD (Table 2.3). 
2.2.5 Vaccination costs 
Related to vaccination were various additional control costs, above the cost per dose vaccine 
per pig. They consisted of preparation, travel and bio-security costs for the vaccination teams, 
and costs for the application of the vaccine. In case of the ICT strategy, the continued 
vaccination caused some more costs. Table 2.4 summaries all vaccination related costs in 
detail. 
All sows on vaccinated farms should be tested to reduce the probability that a carrier piglet 
goes undetected before an area can be declared CSF-free. Despite this, we used the same 
lump sum (for comparison reasons) for serological costs as Meuwissen et al. (1999). Further 
we assumed that the discriminatory test would cost the same as the conventional one. 
2.2.6 Comparison of alternatives 
To compare the alternatives, both epidemiological and economic parameters were used. 
InterCSF simulated the spread and the control of the epidemic, whereby different events 
(summarised in Appendix HI) related to economic costs and losses could occur. Vaccination 
was added as a new event. Breeding prohibition and killing of newborn piglets were applied 
only for the DD strategies. For each individual farm subjected to control measures, InterCSF 
wrote events per day to an event-output file. This event-file was used as input for EpiLoss, 
which calculated the total costs and losses for the epidemic (Meuwissen et al., 1999). 
Vaccination related costs (actually direct costs) were considered for comparison reasons as a 
separate cost factor. 
Similar to Nielen et al. (1999), a two-tailed, two-sample Student's t-test with unequal 
variance was performed on mean final outcomes of the 100 replications per scenario, to test 
whether alternatives varied significantly from each other or from the non-vaccination 
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scjenario (NV). To correct for multiple comparisons, a Bonferroni correction was applied on a 
significance level of 0.05 (Jones and Rushton, 1982). Final outcomes that were compared 
were the mean total losses and the mean total number of infected farms, detected farms, 
preventively slaughtered farms and vaccinated farms. Testing was performed using SPSS 
sqftware (version 8.02). 
Table 2.4 The vaccination-related costs 
Description of the costs € /farm or pig 
1. Bio-security cost and transport during the emergency vaccination: 
Material needed for a farm visit (Overalls, sterile materials (no re-use)) a 
Preparation needed for a farm visit (1/2 h * (25.0 € /h + 17.5 % B.T.W.)" 
1 hour for transport and hygiene measures ( 4 helpers (33.6 € / h a ) 
and 1 veterinarian (74.4 € /h*)) 
2.i Vaccine and vaccination application during the emergency vaccination: 
- jVaccine 
- Application (2000 pigs/ vaccination group/ 8 hours) 
(4 helpers * 33.6 € /h" * 8 h + 1 vet. * 74.4 € / h b * 8) 
3.1 Costs for continued vaccination (only for ICT) d: 
- Vaccine 
- Vaccination application 
- Veterinary visit (20.42 € /farm") 
- Bio-security cost (no helpers) (45.4 € /farm 3) 
~ 45.4 € /farm 
16.8 €/farm 
213.3 €/farm 
Total: ~ 272 €/farm 
2.27 € /p ig 
0.83 € /pig 
Total: 3 .10€ /p ig c 
2.27 € /pig 
0.45 € /p ig 
0.07 € /p ig 
0.16 € /p ig 
Total: 2.95 € / p i g e 
a) Consulting specialist from Animal Health Service, Boxtel, The Netherlands (1999). 
b) Royal Netherlands Veterinary Association (1998). 
c; It will be 3.10 € /fattener or gilt place and 13.34 € /farrowing place (1 breeding sow + 3.30 
piglets). 
d) Assuming an average sow herd of 150 breeding sows. Vaccination of new-born piglets and re-
insemination of breeding sows will probably happen only once per month. In that case 292 pigs 
(piglets and breeding sows) will be re-vaccinated each month. 
e) 2.95 € /treated pig * 0.065 treated pigs/day = 0.19 € /farrowing place/day; 0.065 treated pigs = 
0.006 breeding sow/ day + 0.059 newborn piglets/sow/day. 
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Real Dutch CSF epidemic Key features (median for simulations) 
or simulated scenario Number of farms Duration Costs 
detected infected preventive si. (in days) (106€) 
Real Dutch CSF epidemic 429 ? 1247 >365 2124 
Simulated Dutch epidemic 374b 464b 743b 306 1137c 
Non-vaccination scenario 70 99 450 164 590c 
a) The preventive-slaughter scenario from Nielen et al. (1999) is in this chapter called the "non-
vaccination scenario" (NV). 
b) Numbers differ slightly from Jalvingh et al. (1999), due to some minor adaptations of InterCSF. 
c) Numbers are slightly higher than in Jalvingh et al. (1999) and Nielen et al. (1999), because 
quarantine zones had been erroneously lifted 1 day too early for some farms in the initial EpiLoss. 
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23 Simulation results 
Nielen et al. (1999) compared the real Dutch CSF epidemic with various alternative 
eradication strategies, all simulated with the InterCSF model (Jalvingh et al., 1999). All 
simulated strategies were performed 100 times, in which the simulation time was set at 
maximum 1 year. The most-effective scenario according to Nielen et al. (1999) was to start 
preventive slaughter in a radius of 1 km from the day of the first detection (the so-called 
"preventive-slaughter scenario"; in this chapter called the "non-vaccination scenario" (NV)). 
Complete results were shown in Nielen et al. (1999) and are partly shown in Tables 2.5 and 
2.7. In the real epidemic, preventive slaughter of the neighbouring farms was only applied for 
the first 2 detected farms, stopped and re-started two months later for all newly detected 
farms (LNV, 1998). Table 2.5 recalls the most important key features of the real epidemic, 
the simulated epidemic and the NV. We chose the NV as the base scenario with which to 
compare all emergency-vaccination strategies. In the future, preventive slaughter would most 
likely be applied from the beginning making this scenario the best comparison for our 
simulated emergency-vaccination scenarios. 
In Table 2.6, we compare the two base emergency-vaccination strategies with the NV 
scenario and with each other. Furthermore, all emergency-vaccination alternatives were 
compared to the corresponding base emergency-vaccination strategies. In total, 38 t-test 
comparisons were performed, which set the P-level for a significant difference between 
means to 0.001316 (0.05/38). 
Table 2.5 Some key features of the real Dutch CSF epidemic, the median of the simulated 
epidemic and the median of the non-vaccination scenarioa (Jalvingh et al, Nielen et al., 
1999) 
2.3.1 Delayed destraction alternatives 
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Compared to the NV scenario, DD strategies (Tables 2.6 and 2.7) reduced both the number of 
infected and detected farms, but not significantly. The duration of the epidemic was sharply 
reduced (for example, the median decreased from 164 days to 108 days for DD-21-0). The 
number of preventively slaughtered farms was significantly increased by a factor of almost 
four. The total costs and losses were comparable, except for the extreme replications. In the 
case of DD, the worst cases showed smaller epidemics. The composition of the cost factors 
varied between the NV scenario and the DD scenario. The direct costs for preventive 
slaughter in the case of the DD vaccination scenario were nearly three-times higher. The 
consequential losses for the farmers increased, but the direct cost for animal welfare slaughter 
measures was sharply reduced. Compensation paid to the farmers for the breeding 
prohibition, as well as vaccination costs, were extra costs compared to the NV scenario. 
The results of the different DD alternatives, including the base version (DD-21-0) of this 
scenario, are shown in Tables 2.6-2.9. There was no significant difference in the size of the 
epidemic, when maximum protection was changed from 21 days to 7, 16 or 26 (Tables 2.6 
an|d 2.8). The effect of preventive slaughter according to the vaccination-related priorities was 
apparently greater than the vaccine efficacy. 
Injthe base DD scenario (DD-21-0), we assumed 5 days of preparation before the emergency 
vaccination actually started. In alternatives I, II and III, we assumed respectively 2, 8 and 25 
days to prepare an emergency-vaccination campaign, following the decision on day 6. A 
longer preparation time only showed a larger epidemic for the worst iterations (Table.2.8). 
There was no significant difference in the number of detected farms, the number of infected 
fains, the number of preventively slaughtered farms or in the costs when comparing the 
simulated alternatives with the base DD scenario (Tables 2.6 and 2.8). Comparing 
alternatives I, II and III with the NV scenario, the number of preventively slaughtered farms 
were always significantly higher. 
By changing the vaccination radius from 3 km to 1 km (alternative IV), the number of 
detected farms was slightly but not significantly higher compared to the base DD scenario 
(Tfables 2.6,2.8 and 2.9). Except for the worst iterations, the duration of the epidemic was the 
sajme (results not shown), but the number of preventively slaughtered and vaccinated farms 
was significantly lower leading to lower costs (compared to the base DD scenario). The 1-km 
v£.ccination alternative was significantly less costly than the NV scenario (1-km preventively 
slaughter) mainly due to the shorter duration of the epidemic. 
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Scenario 97/98 simulated 
CSF epidemic 
NV DD-21-0 ICT-21-0" 
Non-vaccination scenario 
N V C I,D,P,C - d - -
Delayed destruction alternatives 
DD-21-0 I,D,P,V,C r,p,v - -
DD-7-0 P,P,V n.s.f -
DD-16-0 P,P,V n.s. -
DD-26-0 r,p,v n.s. -
DD-21-I f,P,V n.s. -
DD-21-II P,P,V,CE n.s. -
DD-21-III r,p,v Ie -
DD-21-IV v,c P,V, Ce -
DD-21-V I'.P.V n.s. -
Intra-community trade alternatives 
ICT-21-0 I,D,P,V,C P,P,V,C P,C -
ICT-7-0 f,P,V,C - I,D,C 
ICT-16-0 rvp,v,c - n.s. 
ICT-26-0 - n.s. 
ICT-21-I r",p,v,c - n.s. 
ICT-21-II f,P,V,C - n.s. 
ICT-21-ni P,V,Ce - I,D,V,C 
ICT-21-IV P.P.V.C - P,De,V 
ICT-21-VI P,P,V,C - P 
a) Bonferroni corrected significance level for the two-tailed test was 0.001316, based on 38 
comparisons for P < 0.05. 
b) In case of ICT, preventive slaughter is with one exception (alternative VI) never applied. 
c) Vaccination was not applied in the simulated Dutch CSF epidemic and in the NV scenario. 
d) Not tested. 
e) If the Bonferroni corrected significance level was not applied, this parameter would have been 
significant at a = 0.05. 
f) None of the compared parameters were significant for a =0.05 (n.s. = not significant) or for the 
Bonferroni-corrected significance level a =0.001316. 
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Table 2.6 Results of multiple comparisons (t-tests) between the results of the basic scenario, non-
vaccination and the different emergency vaccination alternatives as calculated in 
InterCSF. The compared mean outcome parameters were: the number of infected farms (I), 
the number of detected farms (D), the number of preventive-slaughtered farms (P), the 
number of vaccinated farms (V) and the total losses (C), applying the Bonferroni 
corrected significance level a. Significantly different parameters are shown for 
comparison. 
Table 2.7" Companson of me non-vaccine with the two base^^emergency-vaccination strategies, delayerf ueBtraction (DD-0) and intra-
community trade (ICT-0) (maximum protection is reached on day 21) 
Scenario 
Epidemiological and economic 
characteristics 
NV DD-21-0 ICT-21-0 
Mean 5% 50% 95% Mean 5% 50% 95% Mean 5% 50% 95% 
Number of farms : 
Detected 120 47 70 232 68 48 58 92 74 57 68 133 
Infected 166 69 99 349 76 54 64 113 75 57 68 133 
Preventive slaughtered* 566 342 450 1210 1335 1084 1177 1930 - - - -
Duration of epidemic (days) - 114 164 344 - 99 108 177 - 236 b 258b 322 b 
Route of infection: 
Local 107 29 54 222 32 15 25 52 32 18 29 63 
Animal contact 2 0 0 9 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 
Transport contact 12 0 4 41 4 0 1 18 3 0 1 14 
Personal contact 8 0 4 19 2 0 2 6 2 0 2 6 
# Vaccinated Farms - - - - 1240 958 1038 1602 1243 1043 1135 1961 
# Infected farms vaccinated - - - - 32 20 28 38 32 21 30 56 
# Vaccinated farms infected - - - - 7 3 6 12 10 5 9 19 
Start of vaccination0 - - - - - 11 11 11 - 11 11 11 
Decision to stop with vaccination0 - - - - - 96 102 154 - 78 101 164 
Direct costs in 106 € : 
Stamping out infected herds 10 5 7 14 7 5 7 10 11 8 10 15 
Preventive slaughter" 69 45 59 116 153 130 141 184 - - - -
Animal welfare slaughter 347 226 290 677 201 157 169 250 305 253 290 423 
Breeding prohibition - - - - 6 4 5 7 - - - -
Costs of organisation 59 39 49 112 44 36 39 54 46 39 44 66 
Consequential losses in 106 € for : 
Farmers 73 43 61 157 88 70 78 106 31 24 29 51 
Related industries 154 103 127 277 141 115 123 170 114 99 107 155 
Vaccination costs in 106 € - - - - 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 8 
Total losses in 106 € 712 465 590 1349 644 522 567 769 514 429 484 708 
a) In case of DD, preventive slaughter includes all vaccinated farms. 
b) Includes 120-day post-vaccination zone. 
c) The criteria to start or to stop respectively, installing new vaccination zones was fulfilled (days after 1s t detection). 
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Table 2.8 Number of farms detected and preventive slaughtered for different simulated emergency-
vaccination scenarios 
Scenario # Detection ¥ Preventive slaughter3 Costs 106€ 
50% 5% - 95% 50% 5% - 95% 50% 5% - 95% 
Delayed destruction scenarios b 
DD-21-0 58 48- 92 1177 1084-1930 567 522-769 
DD-7-0 57 49-111 1174 1086-2051 560 522- 988 
DD-16-0 58 48-135 1176 1084-2860 568 522-1155 
DD-26-0 58 48- 93 1176 1084-1925 567 522- 806 
DD-21-I 54 45- 79 1161 1076-1845 561 519- 831 
DD-21-H 60 50- 80 1189 1088-1518 566 522- 751 
DD-21-ni 58 47-141 1267 1107-3049 595 530-1617 
DD-21-IV 63 51-193 422 374-1082 451 405- 812 
DD-21-V 59 49-110 1175 1083-2279 573 526- 962 
Intra-community trade 
ICT-21-0 68 57-133 c - 484 429-708 
ICT-7-0 59 50-95 - - 370 330-538 
ICT-16-0 66 56-102 - - 477 420-687 
ICT-26-0 69 58-133 - - 486 434-710 
ICT-21-I 64 53-117 - - 481 415-720 
1CT-21-H 73 61-125 - - 489 432-702 
ICT-21-III 113 92-169 - - 554 487-909 
ICT-21-IV 77 61-146 - - 500 428-747 
lCT-21-Vr 66 55-100 258c 237-307° 491 443-669 
a) In case of DD, preventive slaughter includes all vaccinated farms. 
b) All farms in a defined vaccination zone (0-3 km) will be slaughtered from day 6 onwards, if 
destruction capacities are available, independent of the vaccination preparation time. Except for 
alternative I until III this will be always 5 days extra. It will be 2 days for alternative I, 8 days for 
alternative II and 25 days for alternative UJ. 
c) In case of ICT, preventive slaughter is only applied in strategy VI, where in only non-vaccinated 
farms can be preventively slaughtered. 
2.3.2 Intra-community trade alternatives 
The results of the different ICT alternatives, including the base version (ICT-21-0) of this 
scenario, are shown in Tables 2.6-2.9. In comparison to the NV scenario, the ICT base 
scenario was significantly cheaper (assuming no cost and losses for the post-vaccination 
zone). Preventive slaughter was not applied in the ICT scenario avoiding the large 
compensation costs. Furthermore, the consequential losses of the farmers were smaller 
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compared to the NV scenario. No difference could be found for the number of detected and 
infected herds, except for the worst iterations. The same was true for the duration of the 
epidemic, when deducting the 120 days post-vaccination zone (Tables 2.6 and 2.7). 
Comparing the ICT base scenario with the DD base scenario, no farms were preventively 
slaughtered. Furthermore, the costs were significantly lower. 
There was no significant difference in the size of the epidemic when the maximum protection 
hvel was varied from 21 days to 16 or 26 days (Tables 2.6 and 2.8). However, when 
n|aximum protection was reached in 7 days, the epidemic was shorter with a significantly 
leaver number of infected and detected premises. This alternative was consequently less 
costly than the simulated base ICT. In comparison with the NV scenario, all three alternatives 
ere significantly less costly. 
"There was no significant difference when comparing alternatives I and II of the intra-
community trade with the base ICT (Tables 2.6 and 2.8). A slight (not significant) tendency 
of a decreased (increased) epidemic was found if the preparation time decreased (increased) 
by 3 days. However, alternative III (25 days preparation time) caused a significantly larger 
epidemic with significantly more detected, infected and vaccinated farms (as well as 
increased costs and losses). Alternatives I and II were significantly cheaper, when comparing 
With the NV scenario in contrast to scenario III. 
liable 2.9 Comparing direct costs and losses of the base scenario with alternative IV for the intra-
community trade strategy (ICT) and for the delayed destruction strategy (DD). 
Scenario DD-21-0 DD-21-IV ICT-21-0 ICT-21-IV 
50% 5- 95% 50% 5 - 95% 50% 5 - 95% 50% 5 - 95% 
Stamping out infected 7 5-10 8 6-12 10 8-15 12 9-18 
hjerds 
Preventive slaughter" 141 130-184 56 48-89 - - - -
Welfare slaughter 169 157-250 202 181-391 290 253-423 301 255-443 
Ereeding prohibition 5 4-7 0.5 0.5-0.5 - - - -
(josts of organisation 39 36-54 36 33-68 44 39-66 45 39-69 
Consequential losses in 106 € for : 
Farmers 78 70-106 
Related industries 123 115-170 
Vaccination costs 3 3-4 
Total losses 567 522-769 
a^  In case of DD, preventive slaughter includes all vaccinated farms. 
44 38-97 29 24-51 31 24-59 
103 95-178 107 99-155 111 99-160 
0.5 0.5-0.9 5 5-8 1.4 0.9-2.3 
451 405-812 484 429-708 500 428-747 
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A 1-km vaccination radius significantly reduced the number of vaccinated farms (for example 
the median decreased from 1135 vaccinated farms to 284 (result not shown)). The number of 
infected and detected farms was slightly higher (not significant) compared to the base (Tables 
2.6,2.8-2.9). 
Applying preventive slaughter in ICT alternative VI showed no difference in the 
epidemiological parameters and did not increase the total costs significantly (Tables 2.6 and 
2.8). 
2.4 Discussion 
Although the EU regulations currently prohibit routine vaccination against CSF, it is 
expected that the development of a marker vaccine will lead to a reassessment of the non-
vaccination principle (Laddomada and Westergaard, 1999). Therefore, the main goal of our 
simulations was to analyse different possible emergency-vaccination campaigns, which could 
have been applied in the Dutch CSF epidemic. The vaccination alternatives were compared 
with the NV scenario discussed in Nielen et al. (1999). The NV scenario was considered to be 
the most effective that could have been reached with the regular control measures. 
2.4.1 Comparison of vaccination strategies 
The results of the significance testing should be used with caution as with more replications, 
even-smaller differences between alternatives would have become significant. The duration 
of the epidemic could not be tested in the current simulations because the epidemics were 
always stopped at 365 days. Other useful parameters not tested (such as the cost factors) 
could mostly be explained by changes in underlying parameters. 
The main goal of any emergency-vaccination strategy (reduced number of infected herds) 
were reached in both emergency-vaccination scenarios compared to the NV strategy. The DD 
strategy seemed to be the most-effective strategy for reducing duration and size of an 
epidemic. 
A shorter epidemic would lead to a reduction in direct costs paid for animal welfare slaughter 
measures and for organisation. For the DD strategy the reduction was countered by the higher 
preventive-depopulation costs (all vaccinated farms) as well as the higher consequential 
losses for farmers. Vaccination costs were only of minor importance. Except for the 95 t h 
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percentile (DD was less costly), no overall difference could be found between a DD scenario 
and the NV strategy. 
ICT entirely relies on a reliable and easy-to-handle serological test. Presuming no hindrance 
on the EU market for pig meat originating from vaccinated pigs and no extra cost and losses 
fi|r the post-vaccination zone, ICT was significantly cheaper than NV or DD. The vaccination 
c6sts were more than compensated by the reduction in the direct costs paid for preventive 
slaughter and in the consequential losses. Furthermore, the numbers of infected and detected 
farms were on average smaller (but not significantly) for ICT than for NV. The worst-case 
iterations for ICT were never as severe as for the NV scenario. An ethical as well as an 
economic advantage of this strategy, compared to NV and also to DD, is that (except for 
ahimal welfare slaughter in the quarantine zone) no healthy pigs need to be destroyed. 
The effectiveness of the DD strategy was mainly due to the applied preventive depopulation 
of the vaccination zones in which farms with the highest risk had the highest priority. When 
simulating a NV scenario with 3-km preventive-slaughter radius but without a classification 
ijito risk types the average epidemic increased from 120 to 209 detected farms (results not 
shown). So, the effectiveness of the DD scenario was partly the result of the classification 
into risk types and partly based on the reduced virus spread due to vaccination. The latter 
effect is mainly of importance in large epidemics and severely limited destruction capacity. 
A small change in the effectiveness of the vaccine (16, 21, 26 days to maximum protection) 
had no extra influence on the epidemic for either emergency-vaccination strategy. Only a 
v|ery-effective vaccine (maximum protection in 7 days) significantly reduced the epidemic for 
the ICT scenario. The 7 days refers more or less to the effectiveness of the conventional non-
njiarker CSF vaccine, as has been used historically in Dutch epidemics (Brus, 1976; Tielen, 
1977). 
We presumed a fast implementation based on clear criteria about where and when to start an 
emergency-vaccination campaign (> 5 detections in the 1 s t week) combined with a short 
preparation time of 5 days. A longer delay (alternative III) had a negative effect especially in 
the case of the ICT alternative. This effect was much lower for the DD alternative because 
tins scenario also depended on risk-based depopulation as a control measure from day 6 
c-nwards. 
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Changing the preventive-slaughter radius from 1000 m to 500 m in the DD scenario had no 
negative effect, because the 500-m preventive slaughter was only applied during the first 
week of the epidemic, followed by a 3-km vaccination and preventive-slaughter zone. 
Applying preventive slaughter as an additional measure in the ICT scenario showed no 
significant effect on the course of the epidemic. The main effect was to change the 
composition of total cost: higher consequential losses for farmers; extra depopulation costs; 
lower costs for animal welfare slaughter. 
A reduction in the vaccination radius from 3 km to 1 km was significantly cheaper than the 
NV scenario; for DD due to a reduced number of preventively slaughtered farms, for both 
DD and ICT due to reduced vaccination costs. However, potentially the control of the post-
vaccination zone would become more difficult (thus, costly) for ICT. 
2.4.2 Model constraints 
A discriminatory diagnostic test with a specificity of less than 1 could lead to the detection of 
false positive farms. As a consequence, new quarantine zones would be installed and healthy 
pig farms would be slaughtered out. High sensitivity is required, because we want to detect 
all infected farms. In the current simulations, we assumed a specificity of 1 (simplification 
reasons) whereas the sensitivity was based on the current conventional diagnostic test. So in 
our simulation, we detected nearly all infected farms but we would never "find" false positive 
farms. 
The addition of vertical transmission (the sow conveys the infection to its unborn offspring) 
would have meant a complete overhaul of the transmission structure in the model (Jalvingh et 
al. 1999), and was excluded. In the case of ICT, vertical transmission could lead to an 
underestimation of the epidemic. We assumed for vaccinated and later-infected farms an 
infectious period of only 1 month (which does not take into consideration the birth of carrier 
piglets) whereas all other infected farms remained infectious until being slaughtered. 
We assumed that only vaccinated and later-infected farms would show a reduction in virus 
spread (further research is needed). Infected and later vaccinated farms were supposed to stay 
infectious until detection without any reduction in infectivity. Because those farms had a high 
probability of being detected earlier due to vaccination, their effect on the outcomes is rather 
small. Vaccination activities also could lead to earlier detection of infected farms, but the 
effect on the simulation outputs was rather small (results not shown). 
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We assumed maximum protection of all vaccinated farms during the 120-day post-
vaccination zone. This is an over-estimation because the number of not-vaccinated pigs will 
increase in that period. The duration of maternal immunity against transmission was not 
modelled, but would reduce the above over-estimation. At removal of a post-vaccination 
zone, the protection level of all vaccinated farms was set to zero, leading to an 
underestimation of the vaccination effect. 
No reduction in the effectiveness of the vaccine in the case of maternal immunity of the 
pglets was assumed. For simulation at the animal level, the effect of maternal immunity 
against virus transmission needs to be quantified. InterCSF simulates at the herd level. 
Vaccination has some disadvantages and possible hazards as it may engender a false sense of 
security (leading to relaxation of other control measures and/or less-strict sanitary behaviour 
of people involved) (Anonymous, 1997). In our simulations, we presumed no relaxation. 
The high number of required diagnostic tests could lead to a delay in diagnosis. This effect 
was not considered as such in our simulation model. We assumed minimum 49 days instead 
of 42 days before removing the standstill, to mimic a waiting period for the laboratory results. 
Simulating the actual Dutch CSF epidemic, we knew in advance that we would have a large 
epidemic in a very densely populated area. So, the decision to start an emergency-vaccination 
campaign was based in the current study only on a single criterion (i.e. 5 detections in the 
first week). In a more-generic model, further criteria may be compared (such as the pig 
density or the total number of outbreaks in relation to the length of the epidemic). 
214.3 Economic model constraints 
The breeding prohibition was not simulated, but the compensation paid to the farmers was 
calculated in EpiLoss. Because a decreasing pig population was only considered for fattening 
farms in a quarantine zone (Meuwissen et al., 1999), the total depopulation costs could have 
bfeen overestimated (especially in large epidemics) in the case of DD. To be able to compare 
With NV, we accepted this slight overestimation by not adapting EpiLoss. 
Serological costs were only incorporated as a lump sum per tested farm derived from the 
Efutch CSF epidemic. Serological cost calculations based on farm size and type would allow 
better and more-detailed comparisons of different simulated alternatives. 
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The direct costs for animal welfare slaughter measures were based on average pig prices over 
the year 1997 because no market reaction was simulated. In a real epidemic, compensation 
paid for animal welfare slaughter measures is based on weekly fluctuating slaughter prices. In 
the case of a large epidemic, the demand and the supply of growers5 and fatteners will 
certainly be interrupted or distorted (which would lead to large price movements (see 
Asseldonk et al., 2000)). Large price changes would mainly influence the direct costs of 
animal welfare slaughter measures, but also the consequential losses of the farmers subjected 
to control measures (such as higher repopulating costs). Consumer behaviour is not always 
rational, and a severe reaction against vaccinated meat could lead to a drastic price drop (not 
simulated). 
EpiLoss is based on partial budgeting and calculates only the cost and losses of farms and 
related industries subjected to control measures. Benefits were not considered (such as higher 
profits of pig farmers outside the quarantine zones or profits of the pharmaceutical industry). 
To control a post-vaccination some organisational costs will be involved. Farmers situated in 
a post-vaccination zone may be restricted in their choice to sell their pigs resulting in lower 
weekly pig prices than paid outside the zone. The current zero cost assumption is therefore 
too optimistic. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Emergency vaccination (assuming a reliable diagnostic test and no relaxation of other control 
measures) seemed to be an effective strategy for reducing the size of an epidemic. 
Emergency-vaccination alternatives were at least as effective as the optimal NV scenario. 
The worst iterations were never so severe as in the case of the NV scenario. The large number 
of preventively slaughtered farms in the DD strategy is a negative aspect of the DD strategy 
compared to the NV strategy. This effect mainly reduces the positive effect of a shorter 
epidemic. If we compare the ICT strategy with the NV strategy, emergency vaccination is 
certainly the tool to choose. Vaccination costs (which are of minor importance compared to 
all other costs and losses) are mainly in competition with the cost of preventive slaughter, 
assuming no extra costs and losses for the post-vaccination zone. ICT avoids the destruction 
of a large number of healthy pigs, which can still be used for human consumption. 
5 A grower is a piglet of20-45 kg 
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Appendix I Chronological order of all control measures except vaccination in case 
of a newly detected CSF outbreak in InterCSF (Jalvingh et al., 1999) 
Time Measure 
S art on 2 n d day 
Day of detection - Infected farm will be put on slaughter list and destroyed (slaughtered 
| and rendered) as soon as capacities are available (highest priority) 
- Movement standstill is imposed on the protection (0-3 km) and on the 
surveillance zone (3-10 km)a; fewer person contacts (50%) are allowed. 
Animal contacts and vehicles contacts are forbidden. 
Farms within a certain radius could be subjected to preventive 
slaughter, limited by destruction capacity (killing and rendering 
capacities). Preventive slaughter could lead to an earlier detection. 
Surveillance (clinical inspection) of all farms in the protection zone (0-3 
km), which may lead to earlier detection. 
Tracing farms that had contact with the infected farm. Traced farms are 
put on surveillance (clinical inspection), which may lead to earlier 
detection, or may be subjected to preventive slaughter. 
Start buying-out schemes of fatteners and growers for animal welfare 
reasons (referred through out the chapter as animal welfare slaughter) in 
the quarantine zone until the quarantine zone is lifted. Welfare slaughter 
may lead to earlier detection. 
Start of serological end-screening of all farms situated in the quarantine 
zone, if no additional farm was detected during those last 35 days. 
If there is no new detection in a quarantine zone, the quarantine zone is 
lifted up. 
"a| Surveillance and protection zone with imposed movement restrictions (movement standstill) are 
referred through out the chapter as quarantine zones, 
b) We assumed 49 days instead of 42 days, to mimic a waiting period for the laboratory results. 
Start on day 28 th 
Ejarliest on day 35 th 
Earliest on day 49 t h 1 
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Appendix II The calculated reduction and protection factors 
In horizontal-transmission experiments co-ordinated by the EU, animals in groups of 10 were 
vaccinated with one of two alternative vaccines and 5 of each group were inoculated with 
CSF 7, 10, 14 or 21 days after vaccination. From the data generated by these experiments, 
parameters of the standard SIR model were estimated (Klinkenberg et al., 2000). These 
parameters were used to calculate the reduction in total infectivity of a herd depending on the 
time between vaccination and infection. Results showed that for both vaccines, 21 days was 
the time from vaccination until maximum protection of the individual animal. The relative 
decline of the estimated between-animal transmission parameter was used as protection 
factor. To see what a faster or slower working vaccine would do, time scales of protection 
and reduction curves were changed. Reference point of these changes was the maximum-
protection date of the individual animals (21 days) which was changed to 7, 16 or 26 days. 
Because the vaccines do not differ in their ability to reduce horizontal transmission, we used 
the average of the estimated parameters from both vaccines. The applied reduction and 
protection factors are shown in figures II-l and II-2. 
Figure II-l. Reduction factor for the probability of transmission from a vaccinated farm, related to 
the time interval between vaccination and subsequent infection. Vaccine efficacy was 
maximum at 7 (A), 16 (B), 21 (C) or 26 (D) days after vaccination. 
7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 
Interval (days) 
-A (7)' •B(16) -C(21) •D (26) 
42 
Emergency vaccination strategies 
Appendix II The calculated reduction and protection factors (suite) 
Figure II-2. Reduction factor (called "protection factor") for the probability that a vaccinated farm 
became infected, related to the time interval between vaccination and a possible 
infection. Vaccine efficacy was maximum at 7 (A), 16 B), 21 (C) or 26 (D) days after 
vaccination. 
9 11 13 IS 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 
Interval (days) 
-A (7)- •B (16) -C(21) •D (26) 
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Appendix ID Control measures, related events in EpiLoss, and implications of the 
events 
Control measures Related events Implications 
Compulsory measures 
Stamping-out - Depopulation Herd is destroyed, buildings empty till 
restocking 
- Restocking Restarting the farm 
Quarantine zone - Start quarantine zone - No supply and delivery of animals 
allowed 
- End quarantine zone Supply and delivery of animals allowed 
Preventive slaughter - Depopulation - Herd is destroyed, buildings empty till 
restocking 
- Restocking Restarting the farm 
Additional measures 
Animal welfare - Start welfare slaughter Animals for which measure applies are 
slaughter destroyed 
- End welfare slaughter End of destruction of animals under 
consideration 
Breeding prohibition - Start breeding Prohibition of insemination of sows 
prohibition 
- End breeding Insemination of sows allowed 
prohibition 
Vaccination measures 
Vaccination - Apply vaccination All pigs on the farm older than 14 days 
are vaccinated once, which may be 
repeated after 6 months 
Continued vaccination may be included 
during the time of the quarantine zone 
for breeding sows and newborn piglets 
(only applied in the ICT strategy). 
- End quarantine zone Vaccination stops 
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Abstract 
The changing preferences of Dutch consumers for meat and fish are investigated using a 
switching almost ideal demand system. Structural change in demand between January 1994 
and May 1998 is decomposed into underlying trends, temporarily irreversible preference 
shifts triggered by the BSE crisis of March 1996, and a 'panic' reaction against beef in the 
month of the crisis itself. Preference shifts due to the BSE scare reduced expenditure shares 
for beef, minced meat and meat products by 2.5, 3.3 and 7.9 percentage points respectively. 
There were offsetting gains in the shares of pork, prepared meat and fish. Taking underlying 
trends also into account, changing preferences over the whole period reduced beefs share by 
4.9 percentage points and increased those of poultry, prepared meat and fish by 4.1, 4.9 and 
5.2 percentage points respectively. 
3.1 Introduction 
Various studies have indicated that observed demand shifts from beef to poultry and fish 
since the 1970's are not caused entirely by changes in relative prices or income (Eales and 
Unnevehr, 1988, Moschini and Meilke, 1989, Reynolds and Goddard, 1991, and Rickertsen, 
1996) but are also partly due to changes in underlying consumer preferences. 
Apart from Eales and Unnevehr (1988), most studies have disaggregated meat only by animal 
type and have not considered the product type. By contrast, our study recognises that 
consumers increasingly choose between products (such as traditional cuts, prepared and 
processed meats) rather than simply between type of animal (e.g. beef, pork). 
The Dutch budget shares of prepared meat, poultry and fish have increased in the period 1994 
- 1998, contrary to those of beef, pork, minced meat and meat products (see Figure 3.1). The 
observed changes in consumption may be due to changes in relative prices and income alone 
or to changes in other potential important demand variables. 
Advertising and health concerns as well as quality changes, new products and the socio-
economic composition of the population may have affected the demand for meat and fish. 
This chapter reports an attempt to separate the direct effects of economic factors (prices and 
income) from changes in the underlying demand structure using a switching Almost Ideal 
Demand (AID) System, including a trend and seasonal effects. 
46 
Preference Shifts for Meat and Fish 
Figure 3.1 Product shares in total Dutch meat and fish expenditure (January - December 1994 to 
June 1997-May 1998) 
A| major objective of the study in this chapter was to investigate whether there has been 
(temporarily) irreversible structural change in consumers' demand for meat and fish that 
could be attributed to the adverse publicity for beef linked specifically to the 1996 BSE 
scare1. This crisis, a media spectacle, started on 20 March 1996, when Stephen Dorrell, 
Secretary of State for Health in the British government, announced the possibility of a link 
between BSE and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans. Up to that moment, there had 
b;en no reported cases of BSE in the Dutch cattle population. The following day, the Dutch 
government declared restrictions on the movement of cattle imported from Britain and on 27 
March the EU took action by imposing an export embargo on British beef meat (EU, 1998). 
The compulsory slaughter of all imported British calves being fattened in the Netherlands 
W|as subsequently imposed (see Appendix IV). In this chapter we attempt to disentangle the 
iihpact on demand of these events from other underlying demand changes. 
3l2 A switching AID system 
The AID model (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) has frequently been used in demand studies 
fifwr meat and fish2. In this study, we use a switching AID system following the approach of 
Moschini and Meilke (1989). Time trends are included to capture underlying trends in 
1 For studies of the impact of BSE on beef demand in earlier periods, see Burton and Young (1996,1997) and 
Burton et al (1998) (for the UK), and Leeuwen (1998) (for the EU). 
2 For example, Chen and Veeman (1991), Eales and Unnevehr (1988), Moschini and Meilke (1989), Reynolds 
ajidGoddard (1991), Rickertsen (1996). 
I 
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unmodelled variables, as well as thirteen dummies (since 4-weekly data are used) to capture 
seasonal fluctuations within the year. The inclusion of a structural shift in the model and a 
dummy variable for the month of the crisis itself reflects our original hypothesis that the BSE 
scare could have had both reversible and irreversible effects on consumers' buying habits. 
Demand may not adjust fully in response to contemporaneous changes in prices and income, 
due to established habits (Alessie and Kapteyn, 1992). In an empirical model, partial 
adjustment is more likely the shorter the unit time period. To allow adjustment to take longer 
than four weeks, the basic AID specification was made dynamic by including the full set of 
lagged shares, with appropriate homogeneity restrictions on their parameters to avoid 
multicollinearity. 
In the basic specification of the model, wit, the i-th good's expenditure share at time t, is 
given by: 
m 
wu =«,. + Pih, + (<p, +Kih,)T + z,DBSE + Y,(0uc+rilthl)Dk 
where P t is a price index defined as: 
n m 
InP, =a0 + !{(«,- +Piht) + {<pi +Ktht)T + XiDBsE + H<% + 7ikh)Dk}^Pu + 
i=\ *=i ( 2 ) 
[ » n 
-E liPy + 8ljht)\n.pit ]npJt 
r'=l v'=l 
In equations (1) and (2), x is the total per capita expenditure on all meats and fish included in 
the system; pj denotes the per unit price of good j , (n=l,..., 8); T is a trend variable; Dk are 
dummy variables (k=l, ...13), D BSE is a dummy variable taking the value 1 during the month 
of the media scare, and ctj , pi, 0y, yy, cpi; K i , , Pi , 5;, 5jj, Xi and vy are parameters. The 
lagged shares do not appear in the price index on the grounds that habit persistence is a 
disequilibrium adjustment process applied to the share equations after they are derived from 
the cost function (see Bewley, 1986, pp.43-59). The estimated parameters therefore denote 
short-run (current-period) responses. h t denotes the time path of the structural change given 
by 
h, = 0 for t = i,...,r1; h, =[ f for r = r, + l , - , r 2 , 0<A<1 
and h, = 1 for t = r2+l,...,T. (3) 
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In! equation (3), n is the end point of the pre-structural change period and 12 the starting point 
off the post-structural change period. The transition path between the two structures may be 
non-linear, and it may be either abrupt or gradual, depending on the size of %2 - %\, as well as 
on the parameter X. 
Adding-up (I), homogeneity of degree zero in prices and total expenditure (II) and Slutsky 
symmetry (III) restrictions are imposed on the model. They imply the following parameter 
restrictions: 
(i) Z ^ = 1 ; m d 
i 
ZA =1*. =5>, =5>, =Zw =Z*« =Z/« =Z4 =2X =Z*. =Z", =<* 
I 1 I / ƒ i i i i i i 
(IJ) ZAy=Z^=° fOT V-
(III) JS^fij,; and < ^ = ^ for V,.,y 
Ajddifional restrictions imposed to avoid multicollinearity are: 
Z^=Z^=° 3 ^ Z"* = °-
Restrictions to ensure concavity of the cost function are not imposed. However, we check the 
compensated own-price elasticities for a negative sign, which is a necessary condition for 
concavity. When estimating the model, cto was set to zero (Moschini et al., 1994, Rickertsen, 
1996). 
3.3 Data and empirical implementation 
Prices and quantities consumed at home of the different meat and fish groups were collected 
from 4400 consumption panel households by the Gesellschaft fur Konsumforschung (GfK) in 
Dongen (Netherlands) and raised to the level of total Dutch demand. Dutch population figures 
w|ere taken from monthly statistics collected by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek and 
adjusted to a 4-weekly basis. 
In this formulation, the seasonal effects represent deviations from the average seasonal effect, which is itself 
e<j(ual to zero. 
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The meats were disaggregated according to their retail classification into the following 
groups: beef, pork, lamb, poultry, minced meat, prepared meat and processed meat. The first 
three categories comprise traditional cuts of each animal type. Fish was considered as one 
group, regardless of whether it consisted of prepared fish dishes or ordinary fresh fish. The 
minced meat group is composed of 55 per cent pure minced beef meat, 40 per cent of a 
mixture of half beef and half pork and 5 per cent of poultry, veal or other non-beef origin 
(PVE, 1998a). Despite the fact that mince meat is 75 per cent beef, it is useful to distinguish 
between mince meat and traditional beef cuts since mince meat is a lower quality product, 
whose price is well below that of the beef category, and the prices of the two categories are 
only moderately correlated. Moreover, with relevance to the BSE scare, consumers are less 
able to assess the quality and composition of mince meat, or verify from which part of the 
beef animal it comes. The prepared meat consists of frying and cooking sausage, schnitzel, 
loins, shoarma, cordon bleu, hamburgers and other prepared meat. In the meat product group, 
all kinds of spreadable sausage, as well as cooked and raw ham, liver products, smoked and 
dried fat and bacon are included (GfK, 1998). About 80 per cent of meat products are derived 
from pork. The greater part of the remainder is poultry. Meat products play an important role, 
along with cheese, as sandwich filling. Sandwiches are the preferred lunch snack in the 
Netherlands. 
This product grouping reflects the assumption that, when choices are driven by relative prices 
of individual retail lines, consumers are more likely to substitute between meats in the same 
retail category (e.g. sausage for hamburger, both of which are prepared meats) rather than 
between retail lines of the same animal type (e.g. roasting chicken for spreadable chicken 
liver pate, which are in different product groups). This assumption appears reasonable given 
that these retail categories group meat lines that are likely to be eaten in similar 
circumstances or that embody similar degrees of convenience in preparation (e.g. various 
traditional cuts of pork in one category, pork satay sticks and beef sausages - both ready-to-
cook prepared meats - in another). It has been pointed out by a referee that when substitution 
occurs because of fears over the safety of beef rather than as a response to relative price 
changes, there is the possibility of some substitution between beef and non-beef products in 
the category "prepared meat", which our approach would not capture. However, since for 
many items in this category it is impossible for the consumer to be certain of the origin of the 
meat (e.g. sausages, hamburgers), a risk averse consumer who wanted to avoid eating beef 
could well opt to switch out of this category altogether rather than trying to substitute with 
another product from within the same group. Ideally, we would disaggregate this category 
into "prepared beef meat" and "prepared non-beef meat" to test for structural change in the 
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preferences for these two types of prepared meat. Unfortunately, it is not permitted by the 
d^ta. 
amongst the meat products, the shortest series was for poultry, where statistics were 
available only from January 1994. Since 4-weekly fish data began only in January 1995, the 
fish statistics were extrapolated back to January 19944. This extrapolation increases the 
usable data set by another year and allows us to search for structural change over a longer 
ppriod. 
We used the SUR estimation procedure in SAS to estimate the parameters for the AID 
njiodel5. The eighth equation for meat products was dropped to avoid singularity of the 
estimated error covariance matrix. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Identifying structural change 
the data set contains 57 observations, starting in the first week of January 1994 and finishing 
in the week ending 17 May 1998. The break-points (n, x2) can either be set a priori or 
determined by searching over the sample in order to locate the structural breaks empirically. 
Our objective was to identify the structural change, if any, by empirical methods. Adding-up, 
symmetry and homogeneity restrictions were imposed when searching for structural change. 
the search for the most likely break points involves estimating the switching system for 
various combinations of break points. The end of the first regime, xi, was allowed 
successively to be any observation in the data set from observation 15 to 55. For each xi, the 
starting point of the second regime, x2, was then allowed to be any subsequent period. The 
rjair of break points that produced the lowest residual sum of squares (RSS) for the model, 
when estimated by maximum likelihood methods, was selected as having the greatest 
empirical support. 
In the model given by equations (1) and (2) and with A=l (linear time path of the structural 
change) the most likely break points were identified as xi = 26 and x2 = 54, which implied a 
4 Details of the extrapolation method, based on regression analysis, are available on request. 
51 We tested for endogeneity of prices and expenditure in each equation, using the test developed by Spencer and 
I^ erk (1981). In every case, endogeneity was rejected. 
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structural shift between the beginning of January 1996 and the end of January 1998. 
However, when the time path of the structural change was allowed to be non-linear, the 
optimal combination of X, i\ and x2 was found for X=0.69, n = 29 and x2 = 50. This 
specification locates the beginning of the parameter shift in the same month that the BSE 
crisis broke, and allocates over 12 per cent (nearly 20 per cent) of the parameter shift (which 
took 21 months to complete) to the first four (eight) weeks of the scare. 
To compare these two alternatives, a non-nested test was performed (Davidson and 
Mackinnon, 1981). The test used was the J-test, whereby Ho is: 
= / / ( * , A ) + *o, i=l , - ,7 (4) 
and the alternative hypothesis is: 
Hi:w,=g,(Z,rl) + eu i=l,...,7 (5) 
where W j is the vector of the i-th share, X and Z are matrices of observations on exogenous 
variables, |3; and y ; are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and the error terms soi and E H are 
assumed to be normally and independently distributed. To test Ho using the J-test, the 
following system is estimated: 
w, = (l-a)f,(X,p,) + ag,•+£, i=l,...,7 (6) 
whereg,. = g,(Z,f.)and y t is the maximum likelihood estimate of y j . Under Ho, a is zero. 
Rejection of H 0 with the J-test does not allow us to accept Hi as being the better model. To 
test Hi, the test has to be done again, with the roles of Ho and Hi reversed. It can happen that 
both hypotheses are accepted or rejected. 
Table 3.1 The J-test 
fi(X,ßO(Ho) gi(Z,y¡) Restricted RSS Nonrestr. RSS Calc.Chi-Sq.
a 
26,54 (>=1.00) 29,50(^=0.69) 0.000329 0.000243 118.06 
29,50 (X=0.69) 26,54 (AM.00) 0.000330 0.000287 54.70 
a) x2 for a=5% (1%) is 3.84 (6.63) 
The J-test reported in Table 3.1 does not allow us to accept one version in preference to the 
other, although rejection of the model with X=1.00, x¡=26 and x2=54 is stronger. This does 
not contradict our preference, based its greater plausibility, for the model with non-linear 
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parameter changes that begin in the month of the BSE scare itself. It is this model (29,50, 
A.FO.69) that is reported in greater detail below. 
3J.4.2 Tests of the chosen specification 
Adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry restrictions were imposed on the system. The 
necessary condition for concavity was not fully satisfied, although the two elasticities (out of 
1J6) with a positive sign were not significantly different from zero even at very high 
significance levels6. 
Symmetry and homogeneity were rejected by the data (see Appendix V). Rejection could be 
due to possible omitted variables (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) or data errors. Even if 
symmetry and homogeneity (which are derived from the theory of the individual consumer) 
do not hold at the level of aggregate demand, it is desirable to impose them as it reduces the 
number of parameters to be estimated and forces the demand elasticities to be mutually 
consistent. 
The specification incorporating the structural change chosen above was tested against simpler 
versions of the model using nested tests. Table 3.2 reports the results of testing simpler 
versions (obtained by imposing k exclusion restrictions) against the preferred model. Two 
alternative chi-square statistics are reported. In all cases, the restrictions were rejected at the 5 
r)er cent significance level. 
Table 3.2 Testing the chosen specification against simpler versions 
Excluding URSS RRSS k LR LM x2 
(a=0.05) 
0.000329 0.000946 49 414.5 255.8 66 
0.000329 0.000504 7 167.9 136.5 14 
0.000329 0.000491 14 157.4 129.6 24 
0.000329 0.003525 168 930.3 355.5 199 
0.000329 0.001131 84 484.6 278.1 106 
0.000329 0.000125 91 525.1 289.3 114 
No dynamics 
No BSE-dummy 
No time trend 
No 4-week dummies 
No structural change imposed 
cm 4-week dummies 
Ho structural change imposed 
on trend and on dummies 
No structural change 0.000329 0.001790 133 664.5 320.1 161 
6 These elasticities are fish (before structural change) and poultry (after structural change). 
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The R2 and the Durbin Watson values were also considered in order to evaluate the model 
specification (see Appendix VI). In all cases, these statistics are satisfactory and do not signal 
problems of fit or serial correlation with any particular equations. The estimated parameters 
of the chosen specification and their standard errors are summaries in Appendix VTI. 
3.4.3 Elasticities 
The short-run own-price, r\u, cross-price, r|jj, and the expenditure elasticities, 8 j , are calculated 
by 
r\i} =(—)[(#, + + + M +<PJ +^A)T+t,j3jk hPl}]-a>9 (7) 
wi t = i 
where coy is the Kronecker delta, which is 1 if i=j and 0 if is*j, and 
1 + ( A ± M 2 ( 8 ) 
The approach of Klein (1953) was used to calculate the t-values of the price elasticities. 
Short-run elasticities were calculated for the period before and after the parameter shift7, 
using the average estimated shares and other data means for the relevant sub-period. h t was 
set equal to zero in the first period, and to one in the second. 
After the structural change, the elasticity of demand for beef with respect to meat and fish 
expenditure increased from 1.41 to 2.78, whereas poultry meat changed from being a normal 
good to an inferior good (see Table 3.3). An expenditure elasticity greater than one indicates 
that a meat is a 'relative luxury', in so far as its percentage change exceeds the percentage 
increase in expenditure on meat and fish. The elasticity for meat and fish as a group, with 
respect to total consumer expenditure, was estimated (using results from Terris-Prestholt and 
Kersbergen (1997) and Sun and Koppelman (1998)) to be 0.334. This allows us to calculate 
pre- and post-structural change elasticities of beef with respect to total consumer expenditure 
of 0.47 and 0.93 respectively. 
The increase in the expenditure elasticity for beef can be partly explained by the fact that the 
decrease in demand for beef meat was accompanied an increased demand for expensive cuts, 
7 We took the last thirteen observations (equivalent to one year) as the post-structural change period as there 
were only eight observations left after the second break points. 
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such as roasting beef, entrecote and beefsteak (PVE, 1998c). Moreover, when beef demand is 
lower, a given increase represents a larger percentage change. It must be stressed that these 
elasticities represent the ceteris paribus response to an income change, holding preferences 
constant. For interest, the last two columns of Table 3.3 report the expenditure elasticities 
obtained from the model estimated without a parameter shift, although this specification was 
rejected on statistical grounds (see Table 3.1). These figures are closer to typical estimates 
obtained with annual data over longer periods, but we suggest that such models are inadequate 
for estimating elasticities for shorter periods characterised by preference volatility. 
Ajve calculated that, on average, 76 per cent of the change in the expenditure elasticities is due 
to structural parameter changes, the rest being due to changes in data averages. 
Table 3.3 Short-run expenditure elasticities (t-ratios in italics) 
Before the After the No structural change 
structural change structural change 
t(e,b) E i " t ( B i ' ) 6i t ( S i ) 
1.41 2.51 2.78 2.85 1.71 7.89 
-0.31 -0.73 0.76 1.19 0.65 4.35 
-10.28 -1.90 -6.64 -0.78 -0.59 -0.48 
2.06 3.63 1.87 2.25 1.29 6.70 
-1.07 -2.29 -1.76 -2.42 0.35 1.81 
1.15 2.36 -1.42 -2.13 0.88 4.66 
-1.83 -1.66 -2.40 -1.66 0.69 2.81 
2.40 5.22 2.98 5.02 1.16 11.51 
Beef meat 
Pork meat 
Sheep meat 
Minced meat 
Prepared meat 
Poultry 
Fish 
lyleat products 
a) a = after; 
b) b = before. 
All own-price elasticities have the correct sign, except for fish in the first period and poultry 
ih the second period, but these estimates are not significant. After the structural change, the 
own-price pork elasticity and the own-price meat product elasticities became significant. The 
demand for minced meat and meat products became more price-elastic, whereas beef and 
poultry became insensitive to price changes. Since the pre- and post-structural change 
elasticities were calculated at the sub-sample means for each period, part of their change is 
due to differences in average budget shares and prices. We calculated that, on average, 71 per 
cent of the change in the price elasticities is due to structural parameter changes, the rest 
being due to changes in data averages. The full set of own- and cross-price elasticities, before 
and after structural change are summaries in Appendix VIII. 
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3.4.4 Estimated trends and dummy effects 
The underlying trend (cpj) in demand for meat products decreased over the whole period, 
contrary to the trend in demand for prepared meat. 
The structural change that began with the BSE scare influenced the underlying trends 
significantly in the cases of pork, sheep meat and prepared meat, as shown by the values of K i 
in Table 3.4. By contrast, this structural change significantly altered the intercept of the share 
equations ( p i ) against beef and in favour of poultry. 
The reversible (one-period) impact of the BSE crisis was strongly negative for beef demand 
and also for prepared meat, but caused a rise in the share of poultry meat and meat products, 
as shown by the parameters %i in Table 3.48. 
Table 3.4 Estimated parameters for trend (^and Ki), structural change in intercept (pi), 
and BSE dummy (j&) (t-ratios in italic) 
Beef Pork Sheep Minced 
Meat 
Prepared 
Meat 
Poultry Fish Meat 
Products 
(pi -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0017 
-0.02 0.48 1.51 0.19 3.31 1.06 1.68 -2.50 
-0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0010 0.0000 0.0025 
-1.46 -2.92 -2.40 0.85 -2.84 1.40 0.07 1.89 
Pi -0.3326 0.0666 -0.0307 -0.0688 0.0529 0.4415 0.1118 -0.2406 
-2.97 0.62 -1.31 -0.79 0.61 5.32 1.39 -1.61 
Xi -0.0244 -0.0030 -0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0102 0.0175 -0.0053 0.0311 
-4.91 -0.59 -1.82 -0.76 -2.75 4.17 -1.10 2.73 
The set of seasonal dummies was not rejected when tested. However, relatively few seasonal 
effects were significant. In the period before the structural change, minced meat share 
increases during early summer to early autumn, whereas its share decreases during the colder 
months. In December, the higher pork share was offset by a decrease in the shares of minced 
meat and prepared meat. The share of poultry rose significantly in December. In the period 
after the structural change, the December increase for pork disappears and that for poultry 
increases. 
BSE dummies of one, two and three periods were tried. The data strongly supported a reversible effect lasting 
only one period (25.03.96 to 21.04.96). 
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31.4.5 Effects of the structural change 
Structural change can be summarised by its bias. The bias of the structural change is the 
change in the expenditure share of each category between the two regimes that is due to 
factors other than the economic variables price and expenditure. This involves calculating the 
shares in the two sub-periods with the economic variables set at their overall sample means, 
"fhe share differences are then due only to the parameter changes, which represent changes 
associated with preferences. If the structural change reduces the demand for good i, then it is 
tjiased against that good. 
Table 3.5 Bias of the structural change 
Without trend With trend 
Bias Budget shares Bias Budget shares 
Before After Before After 
Beef meat -0.025 0.1218 0.0971 -0.049 0.1220 0.0732 
Pork meat 0.052 0.1400 0.1915 0.022 0.1361 0.1580 
Sheep meat 0.010 0.0003 0.0099 0.007 -0.0030 0.0040 
Minced meat -0.033 0.1140 0.0812 -0.020 0.1126 0.0928 
prepared meat 0.050 0.0876 0.1380 0.049 0.0689 0.1178 
ifoultry -0.000 0.1305 0.1301 0.041 0.1242 0.1649 
Fish 0.025 0.0522 0.0773 0.052 0.0398 0.0913 
fj/Ieat products -0.079 0.3536 0.2748 -0.102 0.3995 0.2980 
Table 3.5 reports two calculations of bias. The first reflects only the changes in structure due 
to the parameter shift between the two periods. Since the shift began in the period of the BSE 
scare, we can interpret this bias as due to the irreversible component of the BSE effect. These 
changes were most strongly biased against beef, minced meat and meat products, and in 
favour of pork, prepared meat and fish. The second calculation of bias includes an additional 
component of preference change, namely the underlying structural change as picked up by 
the time trend that was in operation during the whole period from t=l to t=57. We see that the 
i^nderlying trends reinforce the BSE-related biases against beef and meat products, and in 
favour of fish. On the other hand, in the case of pork and prepared meat, the underlying 
trends work in the opposite direction to the BSE-related shift but without offsetting the BSE-
related preference shift. 
The figures in Table 3.5 show that, ceteris paribus, preference changes triggered by the BSE 
s;care reduced the expenditure share of beef, minced meat and meat products by 2.5, 3.3 and 
¡7.9 percentage points respectively, and increased the shares of pork, prepared meat and fish 
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by nearly 5.2, 5.0 and 2.5 percentage points respectively. When the preference changes 
picked up by the underlying trends are included, the ceteris paribus shift in preferences over 
the whole period reduced the shares of beef, minced meat and meat products by 4.9, 2.0 and 
10.2 percentage points respectively, and increased the shares of pork, prepared meat, poultry 
and fish by over 2.2,4.9,4.1 and 5.2 percentage points respectively. By comparison, over this 
period the actual beef share fell by just 1.4 percentage points, and that of poultry rose by only 
0.3 per cent, indicating how changes in prices and total meat and fish expenditure acted to 
counteract the effects of preference changes. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions 
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the idea that the observed meat and fish 
demand patterns of the four and a half years studied cannot be fully explained by changes in 
prices and income alone. The hypothesis of constancy of the parameters of a richly specified 
AIDS model for seven meat categories and fish was rejected against a more general time-
varying parameter model. 
Part of the effect of the BSE crisis was a short-run negative impact on beef demand and 
prepared meat, and in favour of poultry and meat products (largely pork) that disappeared 
after one period. Rapid and effective action by the Dutch government helped to some extent 
to restore consumer confidence in the product's safety. 
However, in contrast to the finding by Schifferstein et al. (1998) of no change in the image of 
beef meat amongst Dutch meat consumers surveyed 1995 and 1997, our results show that the 
BSE scare also triggered a uni-directional shift in preferences that was mainly biased against 
beef, minced meat and meat products, and in favour of pork, prepared meat and fish. Over 12 
per cent of this shift occurred in the same period as the BSE scare, but the shift took 21 
months to complete. In order to see whether it is reversible in the longer term, this study 
should be repeated in 2-3 years' time. 
The combined effect of the underlying trends and the irreversible component of the BSE 
effect was against beef, minced meat and meat products, and in favour of pork, prepared 
meat, poultry and fish. Health concerns could perhaps partly explain the shift to white meat 
and fish. However, other evidence suggests an important reason for these changes is probably 
the consumer's increased preference for convenience. Verbeke and Viaene (1998) found that 
socio-cultural changes in Belgium have increased demand for easy and quick to prepare meat 
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dashes, and greater variety. In 1990, about 20% of Dutch households owned microwave 
ovens, whereas this figure had risen to 50% in 1996 and 67 % in 1997 (Hammink, 1997, 
1998). Poultry meat, prepared meat and some pork cuts are quick and easy dishes. Herring, 
smoked or fried fish and prepared fish dishes, which are also easy to prepare, compose the 
larger part of Dutch fish demand (GfK, 1998). Supermarkets recognised this trend towards 
convenience products and have adapted the range of meat lines they offer in order to cater for 
it) (PVE, 1998b). Thus we conclude that convenience reasons have also played an important 
p^rt in the observed structural changes. 
After the irreversible BSE-related parameter shift, pork, minced meat and meat products 
became more price-elastic. Thus, the lower pork prices recorded at the end of the period 
boosted actual demand for pork meat more than they would have before the structural change 
took place. By contrast, beef and poultry demand became insensitive to price changes. 
The implications of these results are particularly relevant for the beef industry, indicating the 
need for quality adjustment in production in order to satisfy the demand for beef as a 
"luxury" meat, an increased effort in promotion and marketing and more attention to the 
development of prepared beef meat lines. 
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Appendix IV A short history of the BSE-crisis in 1996 
Date Events Source 
20.03.96 The British government announces a possible link between BSE and EU, 1998 
CJD disease. 
21.03.96 The Dutch agricultural ministry imposes a movement restriction on LNV, 1996 
all imported British cattle. 
27.03.96 The European Union imposes an export embargo on British beef EU, 1998 
meat and products derived from beef meat. (96/239/CE) 
27.03.96 The Dutch agricultural ministry decides to slaughter and render all LNV, 1996 
imported British calves being fattened in the Netherlands. 
03.04.96 The Dutch agricultural ministry appoints an extra Commission, to LNV, 1996 
control the preventive slaughter of all imported British calves. 
10.04.96 Start of slaughtering of some 64 000 British calves in the veal sector LNV, 1996 
in the Netherlands. 
Appendix V Testing the chosen model for symmetry and homogeneity 
URSS RRSS k LR x 2 (a=0.05) 
Imposing symmetry and 0.00003 0.000329 56 885.2 74 
homogeneity 
Imposing homogeneity 0.00024 0.000329 14 126.9 24 
Imposing symmetry 0.00010 0.000329 42 465.5 58 
Appendix VI R2 and Durbin Watson of the chosen model 
Beef Pork Sheep Minced Prepared Poultry Fish 
Meat Meat 
R2 0.99 0.98 0.88 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.97 
DW 2.35 2.04 1.88 2.37 2.07 1.90 1.96 
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Appendix VII The estimated parameters 
Beef Pork Sheep Minced Prepared Poultry Fish Meat 
meat meat products 
ccj 0.0955 -0.0831 -0.0004 0.0384 -0.1769 0.5184 0.1031 0.5050 
0.84 -0.47 -0.01 0.34 -1.46 4.65 1.07 1.68 
P -0.3326 0.0666 -0.0307 -0.0688 0.0529 0.4415 0.1118 -0.2406 
-2.97 0.62 -1.31 -0.79 0.61 5.32 1.39 -1.61 
P , 0.0490 -0.2158 -0.0395 0.1129 -0.2104 0.0176 -0.1683 0.4545 
0.72 -3.06 -2.09 1.87 -4.43 0.31 -2.57 3.04 
5, 0.1403 0.1766 0.0154 -0.0223 -0.1011 -0.3232 -0.0633 0.1776 
1.51 2.08 0.61 -0.28 -1.54 -4.88 -0.75 1.03 
0.0155 0.0272 0.0023 -0.0035 0.0641 0.0319 0.0096 -0.1471 
0.32 0.76 0.29 -0.10 1.73 1.01 0.46 -1.79 
0.0272 -0.1108 -0.0057 -0.0245 0.1171 -0.0372 0.0343 -0.0004 
0.76 -1.84 -0.58 -0.57 2.87 -1.02 1.11 0.00 
0.0023 -0.0057 0.0011 0.0178 -0.0064 -0.0132 0.0002 0.0039 
0.29 -0.58 0.40 2.20 -0.73 -2.17 0.04 0.20 
-0.0035 -0.0245 0.0178 -0.0203 0.1235 0.0241 -0.0412 -0.0761 
-0.10 -0.57 2.20 -0.35 3.29 0.71 -1.81 -0.91 
0.0641 0.1171 -0.0064 0.1235 -0.0604 -0.1790 -0.0045 -0.0544 
1.73 2.87 -0.73 3.29 -1.26 -5.65 -0.15 -0.65 
0.0319 -0.0372 -0.0132 0.0241 -0.1790 -0.0110 -0.0411 0.2255 
1.01 -1.02 -2.17 0.71 -5.65 -0.25 -2.74 3.45 
0.0096 0.0343 0.0002 -0.0412 -0.0045 -0.0411 0.0946 -0.0520 
0.46 1.11 0.04 -1.81 -0.15 -2.74 2.91 -0.72 
-0.1471 -0.0004 0.0039 -0.0761 -0.0544 0.2255 -0.0520 0.1005 
-1.79 0.00 0.20 -0.91 -0.65 3.45 -0.72 0.41 
-0.0603 0.0213 0.0171 -0.1308 -0.1224 -0.2089 -0.0235 0.5074 
-0.53 0.27 0.91 -1.74 -1.50 -2.53 -0.35 2.93 
0.0213 0.0341 0.0133 0.0802 0.0020 0.2225 0.0970 -0.4706 
0.27 0.36 0.75 1.08 0.03 3.00 1.62 -297 
0.0171 0.0133 0.0018 -0.0432 -0.0060 -0.0345 0.0029 0.0486 
0.91 0.75 0.29 -2.57 -0.38 -1.81 0.17 1.34 
-0.1308 0.0802 -0.0432 -0.1215 -0.2804 0.0753 0.0700 0.3504 
-1.74 1.08 -2.57 -1.19 -4.42 1.04 1.21 2.40 
-0.1224 0.0020 -0.0060 -0.2804 0.0721 -0.1158 0.0809 0.3696 
-1.50 0.03 -0.38 -4.42 0.55 -1.45 1.25 2.76 
-0.2089 0.2225 -0.0345 0.0753 -0.1158 0.1175 -0.0786 0.0225 
-2.53 3.00 -1.81 1.04 -1.45 0.96 -1.07 0.13 
-0.0235 0.0970 0.0029 0.0700 0.0809 -0.0786 -0.1767 0.0280 
-0.35 1.62 0.17 1.21 1.25 -1.07 -2.03 0.19 
0.5074 -0.4706 0.0486 0.3504 0.3696 0.0225 0.0280 -0.8558 
2.93 -2.97 1.34 2.40 2.76 0.13 0.19 -1.89 
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Appendix VII The estimated parameters (suite) 
Beef Pork Sheep Minced 
meat 
Prepared 
meat 
Poultry Fish Meat 
products 
-0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0017 
-0.02 0.48 1.51 0.19 3.31 1.06 1.68 -250 
K i -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0014 0.0010 0.0000 0.0025 
-1.46 -2.92 -2.40 0.85 -2.84 1.40 0.07 1.89 
X i -0.0244 -0.0030 -0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0102 0.0175 -0.0053 0.0311 
-4.91 -0.59 -1.82 -0.76 -2.75 4.17 -1.10 2.73 
Sim 
1 -0.0055 0.0183 0.0005 -0.0165 0.0248 0.0056 0.0143 -0.0416 
-0.73 2.11 0.25 -255 4.17 0.93 1.98 -2.33 
2 0.0060 0.0062 0.0005 -0.0139 0.0015 -0.0141 0.0138 0.0000 
1.08 1.11 0.35 -2.96 0.37 -3.22 2.53 0.00 
3 -0.0034 -0.0150 -0.0030 -0.0083 -0.0087 0.0098 0.0006 0.0280 
-0.63 -2.56 -2.23 -1.87 -2.03 2.21 0.12 2.32 
4 0.0028 0.0019 0.0002 -0.0046 -0.0107 -0.0030 0.0014 0.0119 
0.96 0.62 0.28 -1.66 -4.86 -1.30 0.50 1.62 
5 -0.0099 -0.0064 -0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0017 0.0053 -0.0019 0.0171 
-3.26 -1.80 -0.12 -0.89 -0.67 220 -0.64 2.32 
6 0.0025 -0.0136 -0.0006 0.0009 -0.0021 0.0020 -0.0034 0.0143 
0.80 -3.13 -0.62 0.31 -0.84 0.71 -1.14 1.70 
7 -0.0133 -0.0186 -0.0019 0.0173 -0.0030 0.0104 -0.0125 0.0216 
-1.99 -2.55 -1.05 3.08 -0.57 1.89 -1.85 1.32 
8 -0.0007 -0.0169 -0.0017 0.00259 -0.0097 -0.0022 -0.0203 0.0256 
-0.08 -1.64 -0.69 3.37 -1.31 -0.30 -2.31 1.17 
9 0.0065 0.0112 0.0048 0.0238 0.0229 -0.0080 0.0008 -0.0620 
0.78 1.34 2.17 3.18 3.39 -1.12 0.10 -3.33 
10 0.01S8 0.0053 0.0026 0.0007 0.0066 -0.0183 0.0053 -0.0180 
2.93 1.04 1.81 0.17 1.84 -4.32 1.04 -1.50 
11 0.0022 0.0021 -0.0006 0.0043 0.0046 -0.0061 -0.0015 -0.0050 
0.70 0.52 -0.75 1.43 1.86 -2.18 -0.55 -0.63 
12 0.0029 -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0067 -0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0082 
0.71 -0.10 -1.56 -1.86 -0.02 -0.53 -0.14 0.82 
13 -0.0059 0.0261 0.0008 -0.0206 -0.0244 0.0204 0.0038 -0.0001 
-0.96 4.05 0.48 -3.95 -6.75 5.09 0.72 -0.01 
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Appendix VII The estimated parameters (suite) 
Beef Pork Sheep Minced 
meat 
Prepared 
meat 
Poultry Fish Meat 
products 
Yin. 
1 i -0.0167 0.0040 0.0003 0.0101 -0.0126 0.0172 0.0011 -0.0034 
-1.72 0.37 0.12 1.22 -1.47 1.91 0.14 -0.14 
2 -0.0028 0.0108 0.0011 -0.0024 0.0123 0.0017 0.0028 -0.0234 
-0.39 1.43 0.58 -0.39 1.92 0.24 0.38 -1.27 
3 -0.0019 0.0153 0.0022 0.0003 0.0131 0.0036 -0.0002 -0.0324 
-0.30 2.18 1.33 0.06 2.26 0.64 -0.04 -2.12 
4 -0.0112 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0052 0.0083 0.0210 0.0105 -0.0236 
-1.67 0.10 -0.29 -1.05 1.65 3.91 1.95 -1.89 
5 -0.0043 0.0118 -0.0016 -0.0075 0.0126 0.0022 -0.0036 -0.0095 
-0.80 2.39 -1.11 -1.67 2.93 0.44 -0.70 -0.77 
6 -0.0209 -0.0063 -0.0029 -0.0009 -0.0270 -0.0166 -0.0074 0.0820 
-1.80 -0.54 -0.97 -0.09 -2.58 -1.36 -0.64 3.18 
7 0.0222 0.0065 0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0364 0.0043 0.0026 
2.62 0.65 1.27 -0.06 -0.22 -5.14 0.54 0.12 
8 0.0054 0.0100 0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0217 0.0025 0.0064 
0.55 0.93 0.37 -0.11 -0.34 -2.46 0.26 0.24 
9 0.0093 -0.0292 -0.0051 -0.0062 -0.0263 -0.0197 -0.0258 0.1029 
0.81 -2.20 -1.64 -0.58 -2.76 -1.93 -2.24 3.91 
10 -0.0098 0.0027 -0.0015 0.0128 0.0011 0.0126 -0.0034 -0.0144 
-1.62 0.46 -0.87 2.34 0.25 2.56 -0.53 -0.97 
11 0.0105 -0.0024 0.0023 -0.0091 -0.0019 -0.0022 0.0046 -0.0018 
1.41 -0.33 1.30 -1.48 -0.32 -0.27 0.71 -0.10 
12 0.0041 0.0090 0.0037 0.0033 0.0129 0.0125 0.0013 -0.0468 
0.49 1.01 1.75 0.46 1.48 1.44 0.16 -2.35 
13 0.0161 -0.0329 -0.0017 0.0064 0.0117 0.0257 0.0135 -0.0387 
1.14 -2.80 -0.53 0.60 1.00 2.26 1.05 -1.29 
0.3199 0.3185 0.0650 -0.3689 0.5076 -0.5705 0.0964 -0.3680 
1.52 1.62 1.12 -1.94 3.04 -3.04 0.49 -0.84 
0.0537 0.3391 0.0011 0.1402 0.3351 -0.6977 0.1913 -0.3628 
0.28 1.69 0.02 0.79 2.52 -4.61 1.09 -0.85 
0.0859 -2.3075 -0.1201 0.7121 -3.1209 2.3564 -0.3501 2.7442 
0.10 -2.27 -0.51 0.89 -3.90 3.06 -0.47 1.37 
-0.3273 0.1110 -0.0418 0.5140 0.3132 0.4141 -0.2849 -0.6984 
-1.18 0.40 -0.52 1.97 1.49 1.67 -1.08 -1.12 
-0.2647 0.7185 0.0072 -1.0005 0.6868 -0.4236 0.4587 -0.1823 
-0.75 2.04 0.08 -3.13 2.38 -1.56 1.43 -0.26 
-0.2322 0.0804 -0.0614 -0.0897 0.0181 -0.0743 -0.3406 0.6997 
-1.32 0.44 -1.18 -0.53 0.14 -0.56 -2.01 1.76 
0.2233 -0.0182 0.0244 -0.0789 0.5546 -0.0934 -0.0462 -0.5657 
1.06 -0.09 0.43 -0.42 3.33 -0.57 -0.24 -1.25 
0.1414 0.7582 0.1256 0.1715 0.7055 -0.9109 0.2753 -1.2665 
0.55 2.63 1.97 0.73 3.40 -3.81 1.30 -2.43 
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Appendix VIII Short-run elasticities 
Before the structural change 
The uncompensated elasticities 
Beef Pork Sheep Minced 
meat 
Prepared 
meat 
Poultry Fish Meat 
products 
Beef -0.894 0.246 0.017 -0.038 0.600 0.027 0.031 -1.396 
-2.88 0.95 0.50 -0.15 2.08 0.07 0.75 -2.40 
Pork 0.237 -1.739 -0.031 -0.120 0.495 0.543 0.364 0.561 
0.55 -1.93 -0.19 -0.16 0.69 0.95 0.65 0.28 
Sheep 1.262 -2.202 -0.646 5.341 -3.701 2.851 1.408 5.966 
0.23 -0.35 -0.44 0.92 -0.63 0.56 0.50 0.38 
Minced -0.090 -0.177 0.164 -1.213 1.333 -0.395 -0.512 -1.168 
meat -0.19 -0.31 1.41 -2.25 2.62 -0.81 -1.16 -0.87 
Prepared 0.744 1.048 -0.056 1.260 -1.936 -0.547 0.202 0.354 
meat 0.75 0.94 -0.24 1.23 -1.86 -0.69 0.24 0.12 
Poultry 0.261 -0.307 -0.112 0.200 -1.486 -1.180 -0.364 1.839 
1.07 -7.02 -2.29 0.72 -5.07 -3.69 -2.49 3.48 
Fish 0.317 0.436 0.013 -0.631 -0.544 0.971 0.929 0.343 
0.23 0.28 0.04 -0.46 -0.36 0.77 0.70 0.08 
Meat -0.529 0.069 0.007 -0.264 0.064 -0.126 -0.326 -1.291 
products -7.5« 0.17 0.10 -0.70 0.19 -0.27 -1.42 -7.57 
The compensated elasticities 
Beef Pork Sheep Minced 
meat 
Prepared 
meat 
Poultry Fish Meat 
products 
Beef -0.724 0.478 0.022 0.112 0.743 0.193 0.115 -0.938 
-2.33 1.68 0.38 0.43 2.38 0.63 0.57 -7.76 
Pork 0.200 -1.790 -0.032 -0.153 0.463 0.506 0.346 0.460 
0.28 -1.98 -0.19 -0.21 0.64 0.92 0.62 0.23 
Sheep 0.024 -3.894 -0.682 4.245 A.746 1.633 0.798 2.621 
0.00 -0.61 -0.47 0.75 -0.79 0.34 0.77 0.77 
Minced 0.158 0.162 0.171 -0.994 1.542 -0.151 -0.390 -0.498 
meat 0.55 0.28 1.47 -1.84 2.96 -0.34 -0.89 -0.38 
Prepared 0.615 0.872 -0.060 1.146 -2.045 -0.674 0.138 0.007 
meat 0.62 0.78 -0.25 1.12 -7.95 -0.87 0.16 0.00 
Poultry 0.400 -0.118 -0.108 0.323 -1.370 -1.044 -0.296 2.213 
1.64 -0.37 -2.21 1.15 -4.89 -3.86 -2.16 4.54 
Fish 0.096 0.134 0.007 -0.827 -0.731 0.753 0.820 -0.254 
0.07 0.08 0.02 -0.60 -0.48 0.63 0.62 -0.06 
Meat -0.240 0.463 0.016 -0.009 0.308 0.158 -0.184 -0.512 
products -0.63 1.11 0.22 -0.02 0.87 0.36 -0.81 -0.55 
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Appendix VIH Short-run elasticities (suite) 
After the structural change 
The uncompensated elasticities 
Beef Pork Sheep Minced Prepared Poultry Fish Meat 
meat meat products 
Beef -1.197 0.845 0.192 -1.324 -0.556 -3.379 -0.552 3.188 
-0.97 0.72 0.66 -1.27 -0.34 -1.78 -0.40 0.89 
Pork 0.272 -1.532 0.046 0.356 0.745 1.391 0.877 -2.911 
0.30 -3.64 0.48 0.89 1.52 2.75 2.12 -2.27 
S heep 5.165 0.752 -0.134 -7.787 -3.921 -7.781 2.804 17.540 
0.59 0.11 -0.06 -1.06 -0.46 -0.90 0.34 0.73 
Minced -1.183 0.727 -0.239 -2.396 -1.515 0.119 0.072 2.543 
meat -1.46 1.10 -1.34 -3.12 -1.90 0.13 0.09 1.18 
Prepared -0.866 0.456 -0.127 -1.299 -0.886 0.039 1.331 3.115 
meat -0.37 0.23 -0.24 -0.71 -0.31 0.01 0.55 0.45 
Poultry -1.708 0.942 -0.392 0.869 -2.328 2.171 -0.377 2.244 
-0.80 0.52 -0.80 0.52 -1.06 0.89 -0.17 0.36 
Fish -0.633 1.189 0.026 0.538 1.136 1.509 -1.404 0.039 
-0.20 0.47 0.04 0.22 0.37 0.47 -0.42 0.00 
Meat 1.376 -1.043 0.176 0.791 0.978 -1.124 -0.542 -3.589 
P roducts 3.36 -2.31 2.14 2.22 2.57 -1.53 -1.69 -5.25 
The compensated elasticities 
Beef Pork Sheep Minced Prepared Poultry Fish Meat 
meat meat products 
Beef -0.902 1.291 0.201 -1.036 -0.242 -3.028 -0.362 4.078 
-0.73 1.05 0.69 -1.02 -0.15 -1.66 -0.27 1.14 
Pork 0.352 -1.410 0.048 0.435 0.830 1.487 0.929 -2.670 
0.44 -3.14 0.51 1.16 1.70 3.14 2.24 -1.90 
S heep 4.460 -0.312 -0.155 -8.476 -4.669 -8.618 2.352 15.417 
0.54 -0.04 -0.07 -1.36 -0.55 -1.08 0.29 0.55 
IS linced -0.985 1.027 -0.233 -2.202 -1.304 0.355 0.200 3.142 
r ïeat -1.26 1.28 -1.31 -3.56 -1.71 0.47 0.26 1.29 
F repared -1.053 0.173 -0.132 -1.482 -1.085 -0.183 1.210 2.551 
meat -0.45 0.09 -0.25 -0.82 -0.39 -0.07 0.50 0.37 
oultry -1.859 0.714 -0.397 0.721 -2.488 1.992 -0.474 1.789 
-0.86 0.40 -0.81 0.44 -1.13 0.80 -0.22 0.28 
ftish -0.888 0.804 0.019 0.289 0.865 1.207 -1.567 -0.729 
-0.29 0.31 0.03 0.12 0.28 0.37 -0.46 -0.08 
1 
leat 1.692 -0.566 0.185 1.100 1.313 -0.748 -0.339 -2.638 
a roducts 4.15 -0.91 2.32 4.40 5.51 -1.40 -1.25 -3.24 
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Chapter 4 
Abstract 
The Dutch pig market is simulated during a CSF epidemic in the Netherlands. A sector-level 
market model and a spatial, stochastic epidemiological simulation model are used, and the 
control measures prescribed by European Union legislation are implemented. Welfare 
changes of producers and consumers, and government costs, are calculated. In a medium-
sized epidemic, Dutch pig producers' surplus increases by EUR 454 mn without export 
restrictions, although producers within quarantine areas lose. Consumer surplus falls by EUR 
463 mn. With a ban on live pig exports, pig producers' collective loss is EUR 251 mn 
whereas consumers gain EUR 111 mn. Government costs are also lower when exports are 
banned. The net welfare effects for the Dutch economy relative to a non-epidemic situation 
are EUR -297 mn and EUR -394 mn respectively, without and with an export ban. 
4.1 Introduction 
Classical swine fever (CSF), known in the US as hog cholera, is a viral disease of pigs. In 
countries where CSF is endemic, it is common practice to vaccinate pigs against the disease 
to avoid serious losses. However, pigs vaccinated with the conventional vaccine cannot be 
distinguished from infected pigs. Therefore, importing countries do not usually allow the 
import of live pigs or fresh pig products from countries that vaccinate against CSF (Moening, 
2000). 
CSF has been largely eradicated from the EU pig population. Current EU policy requires 
rapid control measures involving slaughter of infected and at-risk animals, and quarantine 
zones1. Vaccination is banned. Trading partners may close their borders on sanitary grounds 
depending on the control measures used. A partial or total export ban for live pigs and fresh 
pig products would have a disastrous impact on the Dutch pig sector (Buijtels and Burrell, 
2000). 
Various studies have looked at the costs related to an incidental outbreak of a contagious 
animal disease. Garner and Lack (1995b), and Mahul and Gohin (1999), calculated the 
economy-wide costs, whereas Berentsen et al. (1992) used a partial equilibrium approach to 
estimate only a subset of the indirect costs. Other studies have evaluated eradication 
1 Hereafter "quarantine" zones refer to all restricted zones/areas (protection zone (0-3 km) and surveillance 
zones (3-10 km)) in which movement restrictions and control measures are imposed. 
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programmes for endemic animal diseases (Ellis, 1972; Ebel et al., 1992; Miller et al, 1996; 
Attdersson et al., 1997). 
Trjis study reports the welfare effects of a small, medium and large CSF epidemic in the 
Netherlands. A partial equilibrium model encompassing the whole chain is used. Welfare 
effects are calculated under three different trade scenarios. In all scenarios, quarantine zones 
are set up around infected farms. In the first scenario, producers outside the quarantine zones 
continue to trade with foreign countries. In the second scenario, trade in live pigs stops. The 
third scenario adds the assumption that 50 % of the export demand for live pigs (now banned) 
is switched to demand for exported pig meat. 
This research estimates the net welfare effects of an outbreak and their distribution over 
different groups. It allows us to investigate whether a trade ban exacerbates the consequences 
of an outbreak, and to consider whether additional control measures to reduce an epidemic 
might be economically justified. 
4.2 Simulating the 1997-8 Dutch CSF epidemic 
The primary outbreak of CSF was confirmed on 4 February 1997. The last confirmed case of 
6 March 1998 brought the number of farms where infection was detected to 429. 4 February 
w^s also the starting date for our simulations. The 37 farms that were already infected but not 
detected before 4 February in the real epidemic were considered as fixed events and were the 
starting point for all the simulated scenarios (Jalvingh et al, 1999). 
4.2.1 EU minimum measures in the case of CSF 
Once CSF is detected on a pig farm, all pigs on the farm are slaughtered and rendered. 
Farmers receive compensation equal to the value of the animal as estimated by a government 
assessor. A ban on all animal transport is imposed within a quarantine zone of 10 km radius 
for at least 42 days. Restocking of the infected farm is not allowed till the quarantine zone is 
lifted. 
Veterinary measures, such as clinical inspection and serological screening, are used for all 
farms in the quarantine zone. Earlier contacts with the infected farm are traced and the 
contact farms inspected. If no new infected farms are detected after all farms have been 
serologically tested, then the quarantine is lifted. 
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4.2.2 Extra control measures applied in the Dutch 1997-8 epidemic 
Preventive slaughter is the destruction of the pigs on all neighbouring farms in a fixed radius 
(500 to 1000 m) around a detected farm in order to reduce the spread of the virus to other 
farms. As with infected farms, compensation is paid for the slaughtered pigs depending on 
their estimated value and restocking of the farm is not allowed until the quarantine zone is 
lifted. Under EU legislation, preventive slaughter is an optional control measure. In the 1997-
8 Dutch CSF epidemic (hereafter referred as the "Dutch CSF epidemic"), preventive 
slaughter (26 farms) was applied within a radius of 1 km around the first two infected farms 
and was reintroduced after 2 months (Pluimers, 1999). 
4.2.3 Animal welfare slaughter measures 
In the Dutch CSF epidemic, the prolonged duration of quarantine zones led to animal welfare 
problems. To avoid overcrowding and to reduce the risk of illegal animal movements, 
buying-out schemes were used for 25-kg-ready-to-deliver piglets and for 120-kg-ready-to-
deliver pigs (hereafter referred to as animal welfare slaughter). These healthy pigs were 
bought at current market price and were slaughtered and rendered. As no animal transport or 
restocking was allowed inside a quarantine zone, fattening farms remained empty if the 
quarantine zone lasted for longer than 4 months. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Model structure and content 
The modelling framework comprises five parts and is summarised in Figure 4.1. A spatial, 
dynamic, stochastic, epidemiological model (InterCSF) simulates the spread of the disease 
and the control measures, a micro-economic model (EpiPigFlow) calculates the weekly flow 
of pigs, a micro-economic model (EpiCosts) calculates the control programme costs and 
changes in producer surplus within a quarantine zone, a simulation model of the Dutch pig 
market (DUPIMA) calculates market prices and trade flows, and an Excel worksheet 
calculates the other welfare effects. The first three models are written in C++ whereas 
DUPIMA simulates in GAMS. 
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Figure 4.1 The modelling framework 
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4.3.2 Epidemiological simulation model (InterCSF) 
InterCSF (Jalvingh et al., 1999) depicts all Dutch pig farms, their geographical co-ordinates, 
their farm type (multiplier, finisher, multiplier-finisher or breeding stock farm) and farm size. 
InterCSF simulates the daily spread of CSF between farms by contact (animals, vehicles, and 
persons) and through local spread (neighbouring farms within 1000 m of an infected farm 
have a higher potential risk of infection). The median of the simulation model was calibrated 
on the number of detected cases in the first year of the Dutch CSF epidemic (Jalvingh et al., 
1999). InterCSF allows us to simulate the main disease-control mechanisms that influence 
disease spread. Our simulations assume virtually the same disease control measures as were 
applied in the Dutch CSF epidemic. 
4.3.3 EpiPigFlow 
The main task of EpiPigFlow is to convert daily farm-level output from InterCSF to weekly 
input for the market module, DUPIMA. To calculate the piglet flow during an epidemic, 
EpiPigFlow aggregates to a weekly basis the piglets that would have been supplied from 
inside a quarantine zone, or that could not be supplied from outside a quarantine zone due to 
earlier depopulation, and subtracts them from average weekly 1996 piglet supply. Dutch 
demand for piglets (DPN) in DUPIMA is corrected for the fact that there is no demand for 
25-kg piglets from fattening farms within quarantine zones. 
DUPIMA assumes that the national supply of hogs2 (SHN) is equal to the national demand 
for piglets (DPN) 17 weeks before, corrected for 2 % hog mortality. Since piglets purchased 
17 weeks earlier on the market and now situated in a quarantine zone cannot be supplied on 
the hog market, a further correction has to be made. However, some farms have not only a 
multiplier unit but also a fattening unit. On such a farm, piglets may pass to the fattening 
operation even within a quarantine zone. If the quarantine zone is lifted in time, these hogs 
may be supplied onto the market. The correction factors for both these cases are calculated in 
EpiPigFlow. 
On average, 0.0593 piglets per day per sow place are weaned and sold. A newborn piglet 
takes 70 days to become a 25-kg-piglet, and the fattening period for a hog (25 to 110/120 kg) 
is a further 120 days, whereas the rearing period for a gilt (25 to 110-120 kg) is assumed to be 
155 days. Hogs equal to 1/120 of all hog places are delivered each day to the hog market, and 
2 A fattening pig (from 25 kg to 120 kg) is called hog, fattener or finisher. 
3 0.059 piglets weaned or sold per sow per day = 21.5 piglets sold per sow per year. 
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their places are filled with 25-kg-piglets. Restocking of a previously depopulated farm is 
assumed to occur gradually. For example, 1/120 of all fattening places of the farms concerned 
are repopulated per day. For sow places, the farm's normal 25-kg-piglet supply is restored 
only after a minimum of 196 days4. 
4.3.4 DUPIMA 
DUPIMA (Dutch Pig Market) is a sector-level partial equilibrium simulation model, adapted 
from Buijtels and Burrell (2000). Imports and exports of live animals occur at both levels in 
the vertical production chain, and pig meat is allocated between domestic and export markets. 
Unlike Buijtels and Burrell (2000), all foreign prices are endogenous. 
We assume that in the short run the Dutch piglet supply is completely inelastic. Long 
production lags (minimum 4 to 6 months) and the need for an expansion permit (taking over 
1 year to obtain) restrict expansion in the short run. The production lags, uncertainty about 
how long a quarantine zone will last and the animal welfare slaughter compensation on the 
basis of the actual weekly pig market prices, will all encourage farmers to continue in 
production. 
DUPIMA depicts the structure of the Dutch piglet market in the following equations: 
where SPN = Dutch supply of piglets, BS = number of breeding sows, SPI = supply of piglets 
imported into the Dutch market, DPN = Dutch demand for piglets from fatteners, DPE = 
export demand for piglets; PPN = price of piglets on the Dutch market, PHN = price of hogs 
on the Dutch market, PPI = price of piglets in a representative import source, PPE = price of 
piglets in a representative export destination. Zj are other exogenous factors (including List A 
disease outbreaks in the EU, feed price, seasonal effects, time trends) and n = 1 and/or 2 
lagged periods. The unit time period is one week. 
4 196 days, assuming that on average a sow will first be inseminated 11 days after purchase, the pregnancy lasts 
115 days and the rearing period for a piglet is 70 days. 
SPN, = / , ( B S , . 2 6 , ZiO 
SPI, = / 2 ( P P N , , P P I T , Z 2 T ) 
DPN, = / 3 ( P P N T , P H N T , Z 3 , ) 
DPE T = / 4 ( P P N „ P P E T , Z 4 t ) 
SPN, = DPN, + DPE, - SPI, = / 5 (PPN,, PHN„ PPI, PPE,, Z 2 T , Z 3 „ Z 4 T ) 
P P I , = / 6 ( P P N „ PPN,. N , PPI,.N, ZJO 
P P E , = f7 (PPN,, PPN,_N, PPE,_N, Za) 
(1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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Equation (5) is the equilibrium condition for the piglet market, which implicitly defines the 
Dutch piglet price: in each weekly period, the piglet price on the Dutch market adjusts to 
equate total demand, net of imported supplies, to the domestic supply of piglets, which is 
assumed independent of current price. Thus, the model assumes a virtual market where all 
piglets are marketed. This is only an approximation to the Dutch situation, where about a 
quarter of piglets remain for fattening with the producer who bred them (Backus et al., 1994). 
The structure of the Dutch hog market is as follows: 
where SHN = supply of hogs from within the Netherlands, SHI = import of hogs, SCI = 
import of pig meat (converted to pig carcasses5), DHE = export of hogs, DCE = export of pig 
meat (converted to pig carcasses); PHN = price of hogs on the Dutch market, PHI = price of 
hogs in a representative import source, PHE = price of hogs in a representative export 
destination. Equation (14) is the equilibrium condition for the hog market. 
4.3.4.1 Estimated demand relationships 
The behavioural equations were econometrically estimated with monthly data6 as import and 
export statistics were available only on a monthly basis (until 1996 and thereafter only 
quarterly). Because the Dutch CSF epidemic greatly increased and then severely reduced pig 
prices, we decided to estimate the model with data from 1992-1996 only. The model was 
converted to a weekly basis post-estimation. 
Dummy variables for outbreaks of List A pig diseases were included in the model. Piglet and 
hog feed prices were tested in the model in equation (3), but both were rejected on statistical 
grounds. Cattle prices and chicken prices were also dropped from the equation after statistical 
5 A pig carcass equals 87 kg pig meat. 
6 If not indicated others, the Commodity Board for Livestock, Meat and Eggs (PVE) supplied the data. 
SHN, = (l-m)*DPN,.i7 
SHI, = / 8 (PHN,, PHI,, Z7 t) 
SCI, = / 9(PHN„PHI t ,Z 8 t) 
DCN, = / 1 0 (PHN„Z 9 t ) 
DHE, = /„(PHN,,PHE,,Z 1 ( ),) 
DCEt = / 1 2(PHN,,PHE t ,Z n ,) 
SHN, = DCN, + DHE, + DCE, - SHI, - SCI, 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
= ƒ I 3 (PHN,, PHI, PHE,, Z7„ Z 8 t, Z 9 , , Z 1 0 t , Z l l t ) 
PHI,= ƒ, 4 (PHN,, PHN,.n, PHI,.n, Z I 2 t) 
PHE,= ƒ 1 5 (PHN,, PHN,.n, PHE,.„, Z 1 3 t) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
74 
Welfare effects of controlling the 97/98 CSF epidemic 
tests. Monthly dummies and a time trend were retained if significant, but were not active in 
the simulation model. 
Equations (1) and (8) were not estimated econometrically. Equations (2), (3), (4), (9), (10), 
(11), (12) and (13) were estimated in a block by Iterative Three Stage Least Squares, using all 
the predetermined (exogenous and lagged endogenous) variables as instruments. All 
functions are linear. The foreign price equations (6), (7), (15) and (16) were estimated 
separately by Ordinary Least Squares. 
Parameter estimates and elasticities are available on request. The signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients are all satisfactory, as are for the most part the t-ratios although much of the 
variation remains unexplained. 
4.3.4.2 Calibration ofDUPIMA 
The simulation model was first calibrated on monthly 1996 data. In order to reproduce the 
1996 data as closely as possible, we adjusted several intercepts and estimated price 
parameters. The price elasticity for domestic carcass demand was increased from -0.35 to -
0.75. (Note that in Chapter 3 we estimated the own-price elasticity for pork at retail level to 
be -1.53.) It was also necessary to increase the price responses of exported carcass demand 
and piglet demand in order to capture the 1996 fluctuations. 
The simulation model was first calibrated on monthly 1996 data. When the monthly model 
was converted to a weekly basis, it was tested on weekly 1996 data (where available), after 
which small adjustments to some intercepts were made. Non-negativity constraints on trade 
flows were imposed when simulating. 
4.3.4.3 Simulated scenarios and assumptions 
In 1998 we surveyed 10 "experts" from the Dutch pig sector on the likely trade policy 
reactions to a Dutch CSF epidemic with and without emergency vaccination as an extra 
control measure. The results of this survey are summarised in the Appendix IX and more 
information are available on request. The survey strongly indicated that the European Union 
would accept the concept of régionalisation, i.e. quarantine zoning of whole provinces. This 
means that the most likely market scenario would be a regional rather than national export 
ban on all live pigs. If emergency vaccination were to be used, an export ban on pig meat 
originating from vaccinated pigs would certainly be added. The experts believed that the 
Dutch government would avoid control measures such as emergency vaccination that conflict 
with EU policy, so as to prevent total closure of the Dutch market. 
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Therefore, we assume that there will be either trade restrictions on quarantine zones only (no 
trade in live pigs and of pig meat from these areas (scenario Q)) or that, in addition, there will 
also be a ban on all live pig exports. In the second case, we simulated two different scenarios. 
In the first (Q + exp) the demand for exported pig meat (DCE) is unaffected, whereas in the 
second (Q + exp + switch), some of the demand for live hogs (now unavailable) switches to 
exported pig meat. In this case, the intercept of DCE increases by half the average number of 
live hogs exported each week in a non-epidemic situation. 
At the beginning of an epidemic a total export ban on live pigs for at least 1 week will always 
occur. Subsequently, if regionalisation is accepted and if the authorities keep the epidemic 
"under control", provinces without quarantine zones would be allowed to export live pigs 
(scenario Q). If the Netherlands does not succeed in controlling an epidemic or uses control 
measures that are not approved by other EU partners, a total export stop on live pigs would 
follow. In the Dutch CSF epidemic, a ban on all live pig exports was imposed for most of the 
epidemic (Q + exp). The extent of any export switch from live hogs to pig meat is unknown. 
The consequences of a full export ban are probably somewhere between the two export 
scenarios shown (with and without switch). 
4.3.4 EpiCost 
EpiCosts is an adapted version of EpiLoss (Meuwissen et al., 1999). Farm-level serological 
costs and clinical inspection, which were calculated as a lump sum in Meuwissen et al. 
(1999), are represented here by a fixed component per farm plus a component depending on 
the number of animals on the farm per visit and on the number of visits. Except for small 
adaptations, all other government expenditures are calculated as in Meuwissen et al. (1999). 
Further details on EpiCosts are available on request. 
4.4 Economic Welfare Analysis 
We assume a vertical framework of factor and product markets, in which all prices, except 
those of piglets, hogs and pork, are constant. Following Just et al. (1982), producer surplus 
includes only the quasi-rents accruing to inputs used in fanning. Quasi-rents accruing to 
marketing inputs are included along with the surplus of the final consumer in "consumer 
surplus". The welfare effects for the Netherlands are measured in comparison with the 
simulated (non-epidemic) market situation in 1996. 
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In the Dutch CSF epidemic, the EU budget financed 50 % of organisation costs and 
veterinary compensation payments and 70 % of compensation payments for animal welfare 
slaughter measures (LNV, 1998). Other payments are funded partly by the Dutch government 
and partly by the Dutch farm sector via contributions. In the Dutch CSF epidemic, the 
contribution from the industry was very small. Therefore, to simplify we include it with 
Dutch government expenditure. 
Government expenditure is calculated by EpiCosts. The compensation payments for animal 
I welfare slaughter are calculated using the simulated weekly prices obtained from DUPIMA. 
4.4.1 Consumer surplus (CS) 
The slaughterhouses and the processing industry operate under competitive conditions, which 
force them to keep their margin fixed in the short-run. It is assumed that this margin is equal 
to average cost per pig slaughtered and processed (PVE, 1999)1. A further assumption is that 
the slaughterhouses are distributed over the Netherlands in proportion to pig density. The 
number of pigs slaughtered (Q P S = SHN+ SHI - DHE) was compared with a simulated non-
epidemic situation(o). For AQ P S > 0, ASS (surplus for slaughterhouses) = AQP S * MSo; and 
for AQPS < 0, ASS = AQ P S * (MS0 - variable costs saved). Changes on the hog market are 
directly transferred to the wholesale price. An asymmetric price reaction (as was found for 
the German pork market by Cramon-Taubadel, 1998), is not considered in this study. 
At retail level, we assume for simplification reasons a fixed marketing margin (MR). When 
estimating econometrically, using monthly data for 1992-1999, we could not find any 
significant dynamic margin adjustment. In the given calculations the marketing margin was 
equal to average marketing margin of 1996. Besides we assume no noticeable effect on the 
profit of food retailers in the Netherlands8. Therefore welfare changes of retailers were 
assumed to be zero. Dutch retail demand for pig meat is then derived from the Dutch demand 
for pig carcasses (DCN)9. The change in the surplus of the final consumer (ACS) is given by 
ACS = (-(Pi - P0) * Qo) - (0.5* (Pi - P0) * (Qj- Qo)), assuming that the Dutch demand for pig 
carcasses (DCN) equals the Dutch demand for pig meat, converted at the rate 1kg pig carcass 
= 0.6 kg pig meat at retail level (PVE, 2000). The consumer price per kg pig meat is derived 
from the hog price per kg pig carcass and the margins of the slaughterhouses and the retailer. 
7 Due to a lack of data, we estimate the change in welfare surplus of slaughterhouses by reduction in number 
slaughtered * average fixed cost per pig at normal capacity. 
8 This fact was not contested by people from the field when unofficially discussed. 
9 1kg pig carcass is assumed to yield 0.6 kg pig meat at retail level (PVE, 2000). 
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1 0 In 2000 only 688 of all 16 606 Dutch pig farms were categorized as "breeding" pig farms (Mounts et al, 2001). 
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We assume further that a CSF epidemic does not change consumer tastes for pork. This 
assumption is supported by the findings of Chapter 3, where we found no evidence of a taste 
shift that might have been due to the Dutch CSF epidemic. 
4.4.2 Producer surplus (PS) 
Producers belong to one of three subcategories (piglet producer, hog producer and breeding 
stock producer). In any given week, producers in each of these categories may be outside or 
inside a quarantine zone. Producers outside a quarantine zone fall into two subcategories: a) 
those whose pigs are sold on the pig market; b) those whose farms were depopulated in a 
quarantine zone that has now been lifted and who are now restocking. There are three sub-
categories of producers inside a quarantine zone: a) those whose pigs are slaughtered and 
rendered by animal welfare slaughter measures; b) those whose pigs are slaughtered and 
rendered because the farm is newly detected or in a newly defined preventive slaughter zone 
and c) those with 100 % idle capacity because their farm was depopulated or emptied by 
animal welfare slaughter and restocking is forbidden. These sub-categories are summarised in 
Table 4 . 1 . The changes in their surpluses are calculated separately. 
For the first category outside a quarantine zone, the change in producer surplus for piglets is 
equal to APSP = ( P p u - Pp0,,) * SPi,t, assuming all input costs are fixed. In the case of hog 
producers, the cost of the piglet purchased 17 weeks ago is endogenous in our model. 
Therefore, the change in producer surplus for hog producers is equal to APSH = (APH, -APP,. 
iv) * QHi,t- For simplification, we assume that the prices for breeding stock10 remain constant 
during the epidemic. As a consequence, the change in producer surplus of breeding stock 
farms outside a quarantine zone is assumed to be zero. For the second category outside a 
quarantine zone, the change in producer surplus is equal to APS = (- Po,t + variable costs 
saved) * number of pigs not supplied, as the farm is still restocking. 
Inside a quarantine zone, the changes in producer surpluses for piglets and hogs slaughtered 
and rendered under animal welfare slaughter are similar to the calculations done for pigs 
traded on the market, except that when pigs are kept longer than necessary, an allowance is 
made for extra variable costs, mainly feed costs. For breeding stock farms, we simulated the 
EU legislation, that is breeding stock bought under animal welfare slaughter schemes are 
compensated at the fattening pig price, which implies a loss for the breeding stock producers. 
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Pigs slaughtered and rendered because the farm was either infected or because the farm was 
preventively slaughtered, are compensated at their average market value in a regular year 
(non-epidemic situation). The change in producer surplus is assumed to be zero. 
Table 4.1 Subgroups of piglet, hog and breeding stock producers 
! Subgroupsa 
/. Outside a quarantine zorur 
a) Normal pig production. Pigs are sold on the market. 
b) After Ufting the quarantine zone restrictions: Restocking empty places. Has not 
yet ready-to-market animals to deliver the pig market. 
II. Inside a quarantine zone 
a) Current production continues: Animal welfare slaughter (with or without 
delay) of ready-to-market animals; weekly pig market prices are paid for pigs 
slaughtered and rendered under this measure. Thereafter hog farms become 
empty (switch to He) 
b) Infected and depopulated, or preventive slaughtered; average non-epidemic 
values are paid as compensation. Thereafter, no production (switch to Ex). 
c) Production interrupted (idle production); no compensation was paid. 
a) Farms may switch weekly between categories. From subcategory I they may switch to II and 
back. Inside II they may switch from a) to b) to c) or directly from a) to c). When switching from 
I to II farms may enter either a) or b), and only if they were in Lb) they may directly switch to 
n.c). 
b) Only a not depopulated piglet producer may switch without interruption from Ha) to I.a). All 
I other farms will switch to Lb) when quarantine zone restrictions are lifted. Only after the farm is 
fully repopulated and back in a normal cycle may a farm in Lb) switch to I.a). 
If quarantine zones in which animal welfare slaughter measures are applied lasted more than 
4 months, hog stables are empty as restocking is forbidden. Furthermore, depopulated farms 
(detected or preventively slaughtered farms) are not allowed to repopulate until the 
quarantine zone is lifted, after which it takes time before pig farms are back in their normal 
production cycle. The change in the producer surplus for all those farms is: APS = (- Po + 
saved variable costs) * Q D , whereby QD = "theoretical" number of ready-to-deliver pigs on 
depopulated farms. 
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4.5 Results 
InterCSF was used to perform 100 replications of the Dutch CSF epidemic. All replications 
began by identifying the same 37 infected farms, but thereafter the epidemics developed 
differently according to the stochastic specification of the model. To summarise the results 
according to size of epidemic, two alternative definitions of size were used: length of the 
epidemic in days and the number of detected farms. 
All replications were ranked according to each of these criteria. The average of the three 
replications centred on the 10 th, 50 t h and 90 t h represent "small", "medium" and "large" 
epidemics respectively. Table 4.2 summarises the key parameters for small, medium or large 
epidemics according to each criterion. 
4.5.1 Welfare changes of main participants 
The total changes in producer and consumer surplus, as well as the changes in Dutch 
government expenditure and the net welfare effect, are given in Table 4.3 for both size 
categorisations and for the three export market assumptions. Recall that "consumer surplus" 
is the net change in surpluses downstream from the producer. 
When foreign trade continues from non-quarantine zones, the reduction in national supply is 
not matched by a fall in total demand. Therefore, prices outside quarantine zones arise. 
Hence, producers collectively gain and consumers lose. With an export ban, a segment of 
demand is removed from the Dutch market. When the epidemic is small, the fall in demand 
outweighs the reduction in supply due to quarantine zones and so prices fall. Producers lose 
surplus. However, if there is a switch in export demand from live animals to pig meat, the 
price falls are reversed at the expense of consumers and the cost of compensation payments 
to the government budget. 
4.5.2 Distribution of welfare changes among pig producers 
The changes in the surpluses of piglet, hog and breeding stock producers depend on whether 
the farms are situated inside a quarantine zone or not (see Table 4.4). An overall gain to pig 
producers hides the fact that producers outside a quarantine zone gain, in contrast to those in 
quarantine zones. Moreover, pig producers inside a quarantine zone are not a homogeneous 
group, being either piglet, hog or breeding stock producers. Since piglet producers that are 
not depopulated continue in production and sell their ready-to-deliver piglets for animal 
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Table 4.2 Categorisation of the simulations according to different size criteria. 
Length of the 
epidemic 
(days)a) 
# infected and 
detected farms 
# preventively 
slaughtered 
farms 
# farms in a 
quarantine zone 
Size of epidemic defined by the length of epidemic (days) 
Small epidemic 
Qt» 259 164 241 3860 
10b) 262 355 752 7826 
l l b ) 262 187 538 6047 
Average 261 235 510 5911 
STD 2 104 257 1986 
Medium epidemic 
49b) 306 458 1100 9789 
50"' 307 577 1166 9045 
51b ) 307 296 662 5956 
Average 307 444 976 8263 
STD 1 141 274 2033 
Large epidemic 
89b) 428 304 1267 11507 
90b) 435 483 1738 12389 
9 1 b ) 446 2467 2583 17621 
Average 436 1085 1863 13839 
STD 9 1200 667 3305 
Size of epidemic defined by the number of infected and detected farms 
Small epidemic 
9b) 271 193 300 4073 
10c) 317 197 383 4795 
299 199 539 6866 
Average 296 196 407 5245 
STD 23 3 121 1450 
Medium epidemic 
4 9 0 302 288 592 5870 
50c) 397 289 1130 7863 
5 , c ) 279 294 672 7152 
Average 327 290 798 6962 
STD 61 3 290 1010 
Large epidemic 
89c) 290 537 994 8564 
90c) 374 541 1887 8290 
9 1 c ) 458 566 2401 17330 
Average 374 548 1761 11395 
STD 84 16 712 5142 
a) An epidemic is finished when the quarantine zone for the last detected infected farm is lifted. 
b) Ranking of simulation according to length in days. 
c) Ranking of simulation according to the total number of detected farms 
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welfare slaughtering, they may gain as well. Depopulated piglet farms surfer losses due to 
idle production, for which they receive no compensation. If prolonged, these losses may lead 
to closure of the pig business depending on the individual financial situation. For specialised 
fattening farms (hog producers), animal welfare slaughter leads to empty stables after a few 
months. Idle capacity, whether due to depopulation of detection, preventive slaughter or 
animal welfare slaughter may cost some hog farmers their business. 
Table 4.3 Changes in producer surplus, consumer surplus and government expenditures (* 106 
EURO) for small, medium and large epidemics. 
Scenario A Producer A Consumer A Govern- Net welfare 
surplus surplus ment effect 
Size of epidemic defined by the length of epidemic (days) 
Small epidemic 
Medium epidet 
Large epidemic 
Q 412 -386 -247 -221 
Q + Exp -226 115 -218 -329 
Q + Exp + switch 42 -9 -228 -195 
nie 
Q 502 -552 -358 -407 
Q + Exp -73 -76 -318 -467 
Q + Exp + switch 204 -201 -330 -326 
Q 529 -815 -577 -863 
Q + Exp -50 -263 -515 -827 
Q + Exp + switch 276 -398 -532 -660 
Size of epidemic defined by the number of infected and detectedfarms 
Small epidemic 
Q 415 -402 -251 -238 
Q H HExp -277 150 -220 -346 
Q H H Exp + switch 12 15 -229 -202 
Medium epidemic 
Large epidemic 
Q 454 -463 -289 -297 
Q + Exp -251 111 -254 -394 
Q + Exp + switch 52 -30 -265 -243 
Q 506 -665 1^50 -609 
Q + Exp -100 -136 -400 -636 
Q + Exp + switch 208 -273 -415 -419 
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In our calculations, animal welfare slaughter on breeding stock farms caused losses since 
breeding pigs were compensated at the same rate as fattening pigs. So, as in the Dutch CSF 
epidemic, the government may also opt in the future to pay higher compensation to avoid 
[ creating an incentive for smuggling breeding stock out of a quarantine zone. However, this 
also creates an incentive to declare all pigs on breeding stock farms as breeding stock, 
whereas in reality only a proportion of the female piglets will become replacement gilts and 
only a very small fraction of the male piglets are used as breeding boars. 
4.5.3 Government expenditure 
Table 4.5 shows that government expenditure to control the epidemic increases with the size 
of the epidemic, on both definitions of size. The total amount paid to compensate for animal 
welfare slaughter depends not only on the number of pigs slaughtered but also on the actual 
weekly market pig price as simulated in DUPIMA. All other government expenditure 
depends only on the number of pigs slaughtered and/or of farms in quarantine zones, since 
the cost per pig in these categories are independent of the simulated market price. 
Animal welfare slaughter compensation is the biggest part of all government expenditure on 
control programmes. These payments are strongly related to the length of the epidemic and 
the number of farms in quarantine zones. For the same epidemic length, more farms per week 
in quarantine zones led to higher animal welfare slaughter compensation due to higher 
weekly market pig prices. Reducing the compensation paid per pig under animal welfare 
slaughter or breaking its link with market price would decrease these costs, but could increase 
non-compliance. Measures to reduce the length of an epidemic will be more successful in 
limiting the compensation payments for animal welfare slaughter. Reducing the number of 
: farms in quarantine zones by reducing either the duration of an imposed quarantine zone 
and/or the radius of a quarantine zone may be another measure to reduce the cost of animal 
welfare slaughter, but those two measures may increase then the risk of spreading the virus. 
More epidemiological research is needed here. 
4.5.4 The marketing chain and final consumers 
When exports are banned, slaughterhouses gain as more animals are slaughtered domestically 
(see Table 4.6). This matches the reality of the Dutch CSF epidemic, whereas final 
consumers always lose surplus. However, the relative sizes of these changes depend on the 
size of the epidemic and the trade situation, and so the net welfare change downstream from 
the producer may be positive or negative. 
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Table 4.4 Changes in producer surplus of piglet, hog and breeding stock producer (*106 EURO) for small, medium and large epidemics. 
A PS of piglet producer A PS of hog producer A PS of breeding stock producer A Total PS 
Scenario Outside Q Inside Q Outside Q Inside Q Outside Q Inside Q A Total PS 
Size of epidemic defined by the length of epidemic (days) 
Small epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Medium epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Large epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
262 
-81 
-23 
362 
23 
82 
480 
84 
152 
28 
-18 
-9 
41 
-22 
-10 
93 
-3 
15 
Size of epidemic defined by the number of infected and detectedfarms 
Small epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Medium epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Large epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
272 
-102 
-39 
305 
-89 
-22 
415 
32 
98 
34 
-19 
-9 
31 
-25 
-14 
60 
-15 
-1 
368 
172 
351 
436 
334 
512 
483 
498 
699 
378 
167 
361 
435 
241 
442 
468 
404 
599 
-221 
-269 
-249 
-304 
-371 
-345 
-477 
-572 
-536 
-240 
-291 
-270 
-285 
-343 
-320 
-394 
•474 
-443 
-26 
-30 
-29 
-32 
-37 
-36 
-50 
-57 
-55 
-28 
-32 
-31 
-31 
-35 
-34 
-42 
-48 
-46 
412 
-226 
42 
502 
-73 
204 
529 
-50 
276 
415 
-286 
12 
454 
-251 
52 
506 
-100 
208 
a) Assuming that the price of breeding stock remains constant. A PS of breeding stock producer outside a quarantine zone (Q) is equal to zero. 
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Table 4.5 Government expenditure (* 106 EURO) for small, medium and large epidemics. 
Scenario Organisation costs for Compensation payments for Total 
costs 
Financed by: 
Depopulation Control of Welfare 
quarantine slaughter 
Detected 
farms 
Preventive Welfare 
slaughter slaughter 
NL EU 
Size of the epidemic defined by th e length of epidemic (days) 
Small epidemic 
Q } { 579 726 247 479 
Q + Exp 7 18 67 21 34 483 630 218 412 
Q + Exp + switch 514 661 228 433 
Medium epidemic 
Q } { 813 1042 358 684 
Q + Exp 13 23 90 34 69 678 907 318 589 
Q + Exp + switch 719 948 330 618 
Large epidemic 
Q } { 1319 1681 577 1104 
Q + Exp 21 38 133 58 112 1110 1472 514 958 
Q + Exp + switch 1169 1531 532 999 
Size of epidemic defined by the number of infected and detected farms 
Small epidemic 
Q } { 597 740 251 489 
Q + Exp 6 18 70 19 30 493 636 219 417 
Q + Exp + switch 525 668 229 439 
Medium epidemic 
Q } { 674 847 289 558 
Q + Exp 8 21 78 23 43 559 735 254 478 
Q + Exp + switch 594 767 265 502 
Large epidemic 
Q } { 1035 1314 450 864 
Q + Exp 15 30 108 40 86 869 1148 400 748 
Q + Exp + switch 917 1196 415 781 
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Table 4.6 Changes in welfare surplus of slaughterhouses/processing industry, retailer and final 
consumer (*106 EURO) for small, medium and large epidemics. 
Scenario Slaughterhouses/ 
Processing industry 
Retailer Final 
consumer 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Medium epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
Large epidemic 
Q 
Q + Exp 
Q + Exp + switch 
-22 
85 
83 
-26 
81 
80 
-47 
48 
47 
-365 
39 
-84 
-517 
-126 
-248 
-752 
-306 
-446 
-380 
65 
-437 
30 
-110 
-618 
-184 
-319 
TotalCS 
Size of the epidemic defined by the length of epidemic (days) 
Small epidemic 
Q -21 0 
Q + Exp 76 0 
Q + Exp + switch 75 0 
Medium epidemic 
Q -36 0 
Q + Exp 49 0 
Q + Exp + switch 48 0 
Large epidemic 
Q -63 0 
Q + Exp 43 0 
Q + Exp + switch 42 0 
Size of epidemic defined by the number of infected and detectedfarms 
Small epidemic 
-386 
115 
-9 
-552 
-76 
-200 
-815 
-263 
-404 
-402 
150 
15 
-463 
111 
-30 
-665 
-136 
-273 
4.6 Assessment of the assumptions made 
4.6.1 Pig producer 
Assuming gradual restocking of a depopulated farm may be an oversimplification. Small hog 
producers in particular tend to populate their hog farms all at once (all-in all-out system), 
although larger farms tend to have a more continuous flow of tradable pigs. Sow farms are 
mostly limited by expensive farrowing places. 
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In the case of depopulation, pig farmers receive the assessed value of their stock. This value 
is defined for each pig and depends on age, weight, stage in the production cycle with 
reference to the current market value (RW, 2000). The value paid should allow the farmer to 
buy an equivalent animal. When restocking, farmers may face prices that are higher or lower 
than the compensation they received. In our analysis, we assume they can restock at the same 
price they received as compensation. Extra costs due to more health problems when restarting 
farms, more likely with sow farms, were also not considered. 
Assuming that breeding stock prices stay constant may underestimate the restocking costs for 
piglet producers, especially when large quarantine zones are lifted at the same time and many 
depopulated sow farms start to restock. However, if gilt prices rise, breeding stock farms will 
make extra profit. These effects will cancel each other out, and the welfare changes for 
producers as a whole will not be affected. 
Our analysis assumes that animal welfare slaughter of breeding stock (piglets and gilts) is 
compensated at the same rate as fattening pigs, as per EU legislation. In the Dutch CSF 
epidemic, animal welfare slaughter compensation for breeding stock was paid at a higher rate 
to increase farmers' co-operation and to avoid creating an incentive for smuggling animals 
out of a quarantine zone. In this case, the costs for the breeding stock producer would be 
lower than calculated here; on the other hand, the government expenditure would be higher. 
4.6.2 Intermediate and final consumers 
Slaughterhouses are not distributed over the Netherlands in strict proportion to the pig 
population. Their losses or gains depend strongly on whether they are situated inside or 
outside a quarantine zone. For slaughterhouses situated outside a quarantine zone, our 
assumptions are correct as in the case of a total export stop they may have more pigs to 
slaughter than they would do in a non-epidemic situation. Slaughterhouses inside a 
quarantine zone cannot slaughter pigs, except if they participate in animal welfare slaughter 
measures. Those last categories of slaughterhouses will experience losses (fixed costs cannot 
be covered), whether there is an export stop for live pigs or not. 
The assumption that there are no gross substitutes for pig meat may be too simple, even 
though this agrees with the findings of Chapter 3, where we found no significant substitution 
for pig meat in the meat and fish category. If there are rationing effects that are not fully 
represented by price changes, there may be spillover effects onto markets for other meats. 
87 
Chapter 4 
4.6.3 Other stakeholders 
In this study we ignore the welfare effects on other European pig producers, slaughterhouses, 
retailers and final consumers. However, they too will experience a welfare change if pig price 
rises when Dutch pig supply falls. 
In the first days of a newly imposed quarantine zone, non-pig producers situated inside the 
zone needed extra permission to move their animals. This may have caused extra costs for 
them. In our study we assume that all prices, especially beef, chicken and sheep meat remain 
constant. If this is not the case, non-pig-producers may also experience a welfare change. 
The feed industry may experience losses if many pig farms stay empty, leading to a reduction 
in feed sold. For a small epidemic without animal welfare slaughtering, however, the feed 
industry may benefit from the epidemic by selling extra feed to pig farmers inside a 
quarantine zone that are forced to keep their ready-to-deliver-hogs longer than usually. 
Breeding organisations will have extra costs due to extra hygiene measures and the lack of 
semen demand from depopulated farms. Veterinarians in quarantine zones may also have 
losses as the number of pigs to treat may be reduced; on the other hand, they may participate 
in the control programme and earn extra money. 
4.7 Discussion and conclusion 
Our analysis yields some important conclusions. First, as long as trade continues from non-
quarantine zones, producers collectively gain from the epidemic, assuming the package of 
control measures that were used in the most recent CSF outbreak. This result is independent 
of the size of the epidemic. It occurs because producers outside quarantine zones benefit from 
the higher prices caused by lower supply, and because the loss of some producers inside a 
quarantine zone is moderated by compensation payments for animal welfare slaughter. With 
a trade ban on live pigs and no increase in exports of pig meat, market price is weaker and so 
the gain of non-quarantined producers no longer outweighs the losses of other producers; 
collectively, producers lose. However, the total producer loss in this situation is inversely 
related to the size of the epidemic: the larger the epidemic, the greater the shortfall in 
marketable supply and hence the smaller the downward pressure on market price. 
Although a trade ban changes producers' collective gain to a loss, the net welfare loss 
increases by far less due to the offsetting changes in consumer surplus and programme cost. 
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Therefore, although a trade ban - assuming no switch in export demand to pig meat - is bad 
news for the industry, policy makers should also be aware of the offsetting welfare changes 
| downstream. 
Another slriking finding is that the share of the costs going to compulsory EU measures 
(depopulation, setting up of a quarantine zone) is small relative to the cost of optional 
measures (preventive and animal welfare slaughter). In particular, the major share of animal 
welfare slaughter compensation in total control cost is worth noting. We note also the 
significant contribution from the EU budget, without which the net welfare losses for the 
Netherlands would have been much greater. 
Finally, our analysis strongly indicates that additional control measures to reduce the length 
of an epidemic and/or the number of detected farms could well be economically rational. For 
example, with a trade ban, the net welfare loss of a large epidemic is EUR 636 million 
whereas that of a medium epidemic is just EUR 394 million. If the Dutch authorities had used 
additional measures costing less than EUR 242 million that guaranteed a small epidemic, net 
welfare would have suffered less. 
Additional control measures to keep the epidemic "small" in scale would be to start 
preventive slaughter immediately (rather than after 2 months) or to use emergency 
vaccination. Nielen et al. (1999) show that immediate preventive slaughter reduces the 
median length of the epidemic by half. Another extra control measure might be emergency 
vaccination. In Chapter 2, we simulated two alternative emergency vaccination strategies, 
assuming the availability of a marker vaccine, a reliable diagnostic test and political 
acceptance. Whether or not vaccinated animals are subsequently slaughtered, emergency 
vaccination could shorten the length of the epidemic by more than 50 %. Both these 
additional control measures would have produced a "small" epidemic rather than a "medium" 
or "large" epidemic. A smaller epidemic lowers the welfare costs for producer and 
consumers, as well as reducing government expenditure. Ethical and animal welfare 
objections against preventive slaughter, left out of consideration in our analysis, would also 
be less intense. Clearly, more analysis is needed to examine the cost and benefits of various 
additional measures to reduce the epidemic. 
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Appendix IX Average probabilities, most likely outcomes and economic impacts of 
various market scenarios 
Market scenarios Total Commerical Authorities Most Economic 
n=10* n = 7 n = 3 likely impact 
Average Average Average n=10 a 1-3b 
probability probability probability 
I. No application of an emergency vaccination during a CSF epidemic 
a) There is only an export ban on live pigs. This could be: 
-national 22 23 20 1.0 1.6 
- regional by EU & national by Third countries 39 43 30 4.0 2.2 
-regional 39 34 20 5.0 2.5 
n. Application of an emergency vaccination with a marker vaccine during a CSF epidemic, agreed by the EU 
a) What will happen with the pig meat originating from healthy vaccinated pigs? 
-destroyed 7 6 10 
-heat treated 17 21 5 
0.0 
0.5 
1.3 
1.4 
-sell inside NL 51 41 73 6.5 2.0 
-no ban 26 31 12 3.0 2.9 
b) Will there be a national or regional export ban on live pigs and/or on pig meat? 
- national ban on both 18 22 10 1.0 2.4 
- regional by EU & national by Third 24 27 17 1.0 2.5 
countries on both 
- regional ban on pigs only 29 28 32 
- regional ban on both 29 23 42 
5.0 
3.0 
2.5 
1.5 
c) Will there be a national or regional export ban on live pigs and on pig meat?" 
i) There will be a national export ban on live pigs, whereas on pig meat there will be: 
- national ban 2 2 4 0.0 1.1 
-regional ban 14 16 12 3.0 1.7 
- only "vaccinated" meat 10 10 8 0.0 1.8 
ii) There will be a regional export ban by EU and a national export ban by Third countries on live pigs, whereas on 
pig meat there will be: 
-national ban 5 3 10 0.0 1.3 
-regional ban 20 19 20 0.5 2.3 
- only "vaccinated" meat 21 25 14 3.5 2.2 
i) There will be a regionalexport ban on live pigs, whereas on pig meat there will be: 
- national ban 2 2 0 0.0 1.3 
-regional ban 21 14 35 1.0 2.2 
- only "vaccinated" meat 6 9 0 1.0 2.4 
d) Possible boycotts due to an emergency vaccination with a marker vaccine in the Netherlands: 
All Third countries 60 58 63 d 1.9 
Northerly EU-member-states 28 32 22 d 1.8 
Third countries & northerly EU states 24 26 21 d 1.7 
British retailer 42 40 45 d 2.4 
German consumer 29 27 33 d 2.0 
Asia boycotts EU 19 8 40 d 1.8 
in. Application of an emergency vaccination with a marker vaccine without the permission of the EU 
6 5 9 d 1.1 
a) Representatives from the Dutch ministries (3), large Dutch slaughterhouses companies (2), pharmaceutical 
industry working on a marker vaccine against CSF (2) and three people, considered to represent Dutch pig 
farmers were responding; in total 10 people. 
b) The economic impact on the Dutch pig chain could be very large (1), large (2) or small (3). 
c) 9 experts were responding. 
d) Each scenario could get a probability between 0 and 100%, independent of others. 
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Abstract 
The paper examines the importance of pig population density in the area of an outbreak of 
CSF for the spread of the disease and the choice of control measures. A sector-level market 
and trade model and a spatial, stochastic, dynamic epidemiological simulation model for the 
Netherlands were used. Outbreaks in sparsely and densely populated areas were compared 
under four different control strategies and with two alternative trade assumptions. 
Results indicate that the obligatory control strategy required by current EU legislation is 
enough to eradicate an epidemic starting in an area with sparse pig population. By contrast, 
additional control measures are necessary if the outbreak begins in an area with high pig 
population density. The economic consequences of using preventive slaughter rather than 
emergency vaccination as an additional control measure depend strongly on the reactions of 
trading partners. Reducing the number of animal movements significantly reduces the size 
and length of epidemics in areas with high pig density. The phenomenon of carrier piglets is 
included in the model with realistic probabilities of infection by this route, but it is found to 
make a negligible contribution to the spread of the disease. 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Aims of the paper 
Epidemics of exotic contagious animal diseases such as Classical Swine Fever (CSF) and 
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) can have a high cost for the national economy. In Chapter 4 
we found negative net welfare effects for the Dutch economy of 243 to 466 mn Euro 
(assuming an export ban on live pigs) for an epidemic comparable to the 1997/1998 Dutch 
CSF epidemic (hereafter "the Dutch CSF epidemic"). The effect of the 2001 FMD epidemic 
on the UK economy in the same year has been estimated at £2.4 - £4.1 bn (Houlder, 2001). A 
large part of these costs is directly related to the size and duration of the epidemic. 
Among the factors determining the spread of an infectious animal disease are the number and 
type of off-farm contacts in the period after a herd becomes infected but before the infection 
is detected and the farm is isolated, and the presence of carrier piglets born on sow farms in 
the course of an undetected minor outbreak. In this paper we study the interaction between 
these factors and the pig population density in the area of the initial outbreak. We hypothesise 
that, if routine off-farm contacts are numerous for apparently uninfected farms or if 
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(undetected) carrier piglets are born on sow farms outside control areas, the risk of a large 
epidemic is greater, and particularly so in areas of high pig density. 
The main goal of this study is to provide decision-makers with insights into the 
epidemiological and economic effects of control strategies for epidemics, given the 
uncertainties related to these factors. Three specific questions are addressed. (1) Should 
different control strategies be used in areas with sparse and dense pig populations? (2) Does 
I reducing the number of direct animal contacts and transport contacts per farm reduce the size 
of the epidemic? (3) What is the effect of carrier piglets on the disease spread? 
We simulated epidemics beginning in either a SPLA or a DPLA1, and assuming four different 
control strategies: the current minimum controls as mandated by EU legislation (EU), 
preventive slaughter in addition to EU (PS), and two options for an emergency vaccination 
strategy: vaccination in addition to PS, with subsequent destruction of vaccinated animals 
(DD), and vaccination in addition to EU with monitored intra-community trade in the meat 
from vaccinated animals (ICT). The economic benefits and costs of epidemics assuming each 
of these four strategies and the two livestock densities were calculated using the economic 
framework described in Chapter 4. In addition, we considered two different trade reactions: a 
partial trade ban for the quarantine zones (protection and surveillance zones) only or in 
addition a total export ban for all Dutch live pigs. This results in 16 different combinations of 
pig population density + control strategy + trade reaction. 
Furthermore, we implemented two alternative sets of assumptions regarding the number of 
direct animal contacts and the number of transport contacts per farm for some of these 
combinations. 
A carrier piglet is infected as a foetus because the mother had an undetected infection. Carrier 
piglets will spread the virus during their whole lifetime. The birth of carrier piglets in a non-
susceptible herd will usually remain undetected. They may, however, become a source of 
infection when they are transported to another farm. Although the phenomenon of carrier 
piglets has always been recognised as a theoretical possibility, it has not previously been 
incorporated into the modelling framework used for analyses of the Dutch CSF epidemic. 
1 SPLA (DPLA) stands for sparsely (densely) populated livestock area. In this study only one livestock species 
is considered: pigs. A SPLA (DPLA) has up to 300 (>300) pigs per square km at regional level (De Vos, 2000). 
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5.1.2 Overview of earlier work 
Simulation of the epidemiological and economic consequences of disease-control strategies 
requires a modelling approach that simulates both the spread of the virus between farms as 
well as the effects of control strategies used and the economic consequences, such as direct 
costs of eradication and indirect costs due to market disruptions and trade restrictions. 
InterCSF2, a spatial, temporal and stochastic simulation model, was developed in 1997 to 
simulate CSF spread and control measures during the Dutch CSF epidemic (Jalvingh et al., 
1999, Nielen et al., 1999). InterCSF simulates daily disease spread from infected farms 
through three contact types (animals, vehicles, persons) and through local spread. All Dutch 
pig farms are known by their geographical co-ordinates, their farm type and their stock 
numbers. The main disease-control mechanisms that influence the disease spread in InterCSF 
are: diagnosis of the infected farms, depopulation of infected farms, movement controls 
within quarantine areas, tracing and preventive slaughter. Jalvingh et al. (1999) introduced 
different types of transport into the model, with transport types and their frequency over time 
specific to different farm types. The source farm type determines the destination farm type 
for a direct animal contact. In Chapter 2, we added emergency vaccination as a control option 
to InterCSF with a gradual non-linear increase over time of protection from vaccination as 
well as limited vaccination capacities. 
Jalvingh et al. (1999), Nielen et al. (1999) and in Chapter 2, we too used EpiLoss (Meuwissen 
et al., 1999) and output from InterCSF to calculate the direct costs of CSF control measures 
on pig farms, as well as the consequential economic losses of pig farmers and related 
industries affected by control measures, assuming fixed average pig prices. 
In Chapter 4 an economic framework was developed to calculate the impact on the Dutch 
economy of epidemics simulated in InterCSF, assuming different trade scenarios (see Figure 
1). In this framework, EpiPigFlow converts the daily output of InterCSF to a weekly flow of 
piglets that becomes an input into DUPIMA, a partial equilibrium model of the Dutch pig 
market. DUPIMA simulates market prices, domestic offtake and trade flows. A second 
micro-economic model (EpiCosts) uses output from InterCSF and the estimated market 
prices from DUPIMA to calculate the expenditure by the animal health authorities to control 
the epidemic. EpiCosts also calculates the changes in producer surplus for pig producers 
2 InterCSF was based on InterSpread, a simulation model for FMD covering disease spread and its interaction 
with control measures. InterSpread was developed in New Zealand by Sanson (1993) and was further adapted 
by Jalvingh et al. (1995). 
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inside quarantine zones. An Excel worksheet combines the results of EpiCosts and DUPIMA 
to calculate the economic welfare changes of producers and consumers (slaughterhouses and 
processing industry, retailer and final consumer), as well as the extra expenditure of the 
Dutch health authorities. The economic welfare changes of the different stakeholders are 
aggregated to determine the net welfare effect for the Dutch economy. 
15.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 Further adaptations for the current work 
For the current study, a more generic version of the InterCSF model was needed, in order to 
predict the course of epidemics and include the possibility of carrier piglets. We next describe 
the most important changes and adaptations of InterCSF, now called InterCSF_v3. 
5.2.1.1 Carrier piglets, minor and major within-herd outbreaks 
Infection of a susceptible herd can lead to a minor (3-5 infected animals) or a major (> 5 
infected animals) within-herd outbreak. The probabilities of a minor or a major within-herd 
outbreak depend on farm type and farm status. For certain events (e.g. detection) we 
distinguish three farm types, according to type of animal: (1) sows and piglets only; (2) no 
sows; (3) sows and finishing pigs. For other events (e.g. disease spread) five farm types, 
defined according to production system, are used: (1) multiplier; (2) finisher; (3) multiplier-
finisher; (4) breeding farm and (5) AI-stations.3 Two farm statuses are distinguished: (1) 
vaccinated or (2) non-vaccinated. For a sow farm with a minor within-herd outbreak, the 
J probability of carrier piglets later on is now included in the model. Farms with a minor 
within-herd outbreak remain susceptible if not vaccinated, and we assume that, with the birth 
of carrier piglets on a susceptible farm, a major within-herd outbreak will occur. Table X-l 
(Appendix X) shows some of the input parameters used. 
5.2.1.2 Infectivity 
Farm type, farm status and farm size (we distinguish small, medium and large farms) are now 
factors that determine the maximum length of infectivity for farms with a major within-herd 
infection. After the infectious period, a farm can infect other farms only via transport of 
carrier piglets. Farms with a minor within-herd outbreak will never be infectious towards 
other farms, except for carrier piglets transported off. Currently a flat infectivity curve is used 
3 The probability of infecting a neighbouring farm by local spread seems to depend on that farm's type 
(preliminary findings of Crauwels, 2001). 
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that is either "0" (not infected) or " 1 " (infected), but other curves (where infectivity varies 
over time) may be incorporated in InterCSF_v3. 
Increased bio-security related to transport contacts may have an impact on virus transmission. 
To reflect that, once an epidemic has started, increased bio-security measures will be taken 
within a quarantine zone, we reduce the probability of infection by 50 % for transport 
contacts for the purpose of welfare slaughter. 
5.2.1.3 Detection 
Because of the distinction between minor and major within-herd outbreaks, the concept of 
detection of an infected herd is changed drastically. By assumption, minor within-herd 
outbreaks are detected by serology only. The period before the first detection of an epidemic 
for major within-herd outbreaks is randomly drawn from a log-normal distribution with a 
minimum of 21 days (3 weeks), a maximum of 100 days (Elbers et al., 1999) and a mean of 
49 days. After the first detected case, all major-within herd outbreaks may be detected based 
on clinical signs, with the interval based on a lognormal distribution with a minimum of 1 
week and a maximum of 12 weeks. The detection probabilities due to clinical signs range 
from 70 % for Al-station to 85 % for multiplier farms (Fritzmeier et al., 2000, and Elbers et 
al., 1999). As in Chapter 2, we assume that vaccinated and later infected farms will never 
show clinical signs, and can only be detected by serology. 
Control events, such as tracing, surveillance, preventive and welfare slaughter, intermediate 
screening, end-screening and vaccination, can all lead to the detection of an infected farm 
(Tables X-2 and X-3 in Appendix X). Sample size, the within-herd outbreak type, the farm 
type and the time interval between infection and the control event affect the probability of 
such detection. The frequency of different control events is based on the Dutch animal health 
authorities guidelines for a future epidemic (RW, 2000). 
5.2.1.4 Adaptations related to emergency vaccination 
Infection of a vaccinated and maximum protected farm will cause only a minor within-herd 
outbreak, with a 50 % lower probability of the birth of carrier piglets than on a non-
vaccinated farm (Dewulf et al., 2001). Vaccinated but not yet maximum protected farms that 
become infected are assumed similar to non-vaccinated farms with a major wilhin-herd 
outbreak. However, the infectious period of vaccinated farms is 30 days (see Chapter 2) and 
carrier piglets will never cause a major within-herd outbreak. After 30 days' infectivity only 
the transport of carrier piglets off the farm can lead towards an infection of another 
susceptible herd. 
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Criteria may be defined to trigger the decision to start an emergency vaccination campaign. 
The first criterion is a minimum pig density around the first detected herd. Other criteria are: 
a minimum number of detected farms in the first week; detection in a DPLA within the 6 first 
weeks; a minimum number of detected farms in 7 days within the 6 first weeks. As soon as 
one of those criteria is fulfilled, emergency vaccination begins immediately. In our 
emergency vaccination simulations in this paper, these thresholds are all set to 0. 
Consequently, emergency vaccination always begins on the day of the first detection. 
¡5.2.1.5 Other adaptations 
In InterCSF_v3, empty farms may be repopulated as soon as the quarantine restrictions are 
lifted. All repopulated farms are considered susceptible again and may become newly 
infected. We further allow that an infected farm that is not detected becomes susceptible 
again after an appropriate time. 
All input parameters were revised, according to the most recent literature and expertise from 
different fields and from different countries. Where no information was available, 
assumptions were made. A new contact matrix is included that will be discussed in section 
2.3, as well as new transmission probabilities based on Stegeman et al. (2002). A detailed 
description of all input parameters used and their sources is available on request from the first 
author/ 
5.2.2 Validation and calibration 
After verification of the newly incorporated mechanisms by consulting literature and experts 
from the field, InterCSF_v3 was newly validated and re-calibrated. Having only one recent 
epidemic in the Netherlands, the simulated output could not be compared with real data. As 
an alternative validation measure, sensitivity analysis was applied by increasing or decreasing 
input parameters before and after calibration (Law and Kelton, 1991). 
InterCSF_v3 was not calibrated on a specific Dutch epidemic, in contrast to the original 
InterCSFvl. We did not know whether to classify the Dutch CSF epidemic as a small, 
medium or worst-case epidemic. However, the long high-risk period, the increased number of 
4 We tried to build in herd-specificity (i.e. finding false positive farms when testing blood samples) by assuming 
that for each false positive farm found new quarantine zones were installed. Decreasing the herd-specificity 
from 100% (base) to 99.9 % slightly increased the length of the simulated epidemic without changing the 
number of infected farms. A specificity of 99% or lower, however, resulted in unrealistic "never ending" 
epidemics. Clearly, a more complex approach is needed than used here. 
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movements the day before the installation of the first movement stand-still zone and the 
infection of two Al-station in this specific epidemic (Elbers et al., 1999) are all reasons for 
assuming that it was rather a worst-case scenario. We therefore calibrated our model such 
that using the contact matrix of Jalvingh et al. (1999), we would obtain - at least in the worst 
case replication - at least as many infected and detected farms as occurred in the Dutch CSF 
epidemic. 
To be able to compare simulated epidemics of InterCSF_v3 with earlier InterCSF results 
(Jalvingh et al., 1999), we simulated the minimum EU strategy with an additional preventive 
slaughter strategy after 3 months. During calibration, we doubled the transmission 
probabilities of Stegeman et al. (2002) (Appendix XI) as discussed in more detail in section 
5.4.1. We also corrected the estimated transmission probabilities of Stegeman et al. (2002) 
for a 15% probability of minor within-herd outbreaks. 
5.2.3 Contact matrix 
Three contact types between pig farms are defined: (1) direct animal contact, (2) transport 
contact and (3) professional contact.5 The contact matrix defines the number of contacts 
between all farm types and is specific for the Dutch situation. After the Dutch CSF epidemic, 
the Dutch authorities adapted the legislation for pig transport with the aim of reducing the 
spread of disease in future epidemics (LNV, 2000). A newly estimated contact structure, 
based on analysis of recent Dutch identification and registration data (Mourits et al., 2001) 
and on new Dutch legislation for pig transports (Regeling varkenslevering, LNV 2000) 
resulted in a lower number of transports off or to the farm for all farm types as well as in a 
slight reduction in indirect contacts. The frequency of professional contacts was assumed 
unchanged. Simulated epidemics using this new contact matrix (see Appendix XLT) are 
compared with the simulated epidemics using the contact structure of Jalvingh et al. (1999). 
5.2.4 Simulating epidemic control with different pig densities 
5.2.4.1 Control strategies simulated 
Different control strategies to control CSF epidemics in both a SPLA and a DPLA are 
simulated with the new InterCSF_v3 model. 
The spread of the virus by semen is not considered in InterCSF_v3. Although two Al-stations became infected 
in the Dutch CSF epidemic, the risk that an Al-station will be infected and remain in production during an 
epidemic is low. Moreover, the risk that a farm will be infected by artificial insemination was estimated, on the 
basis of the Dutch CSF epidemic, to be rather low (Hennecken et al., 2000). 
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Stamping-out infected herds and tracing all contacts with infected herds, in addition to the 
iinstallation of quarantine zones, is the current minimum EU legislation (EU strategy). Inside 
iquarantine zones, surveillance and serological screening are used. In the case of a quarantine 
zone that will last longer than the minimum 42 days, slaughter and rendering of ready-to-
deliver finishers and piglets begins after 4 weeks. 
The preventive slaughter strategy (PS strategy) involves the use of preventive slaughtering on 
farms in a radius of 750 to 1000 m around a detected herd as an additional control measure 
(Nielen et al., 1999). When emergency vaccination is used as an additional control measure, 
we distinguish between the delayed destruction strategy (DD strategy) and the intra-
; community trade strategy (ICT strategy) (Chapter 2). With the DD strategy all vaccinated 
i herds are slaughtered and rendered, whereas with the ICT strategy, pig meat of vaccinated 
pigs may be traded within the EU as soon as the quarantine zone is lifted. 
5.2.4.2 Economic framework 
jWe calculate economic welfare changes for Dutch pig producers and Dutch consumers 
(slaughterhouses and processing industry, and final consumer), and the extra expenditure of 
the Dutch health authorities, using the procedures described in Chapter 4 (see figure 4.1 on 
ipage 71). Retailers' total margins are assumed to be unchanged in all scenarios. As in Chapter 
4, we assume two alternative trade scenarios for each simulated epidemic: a partial ban 
imposed only on the quarantine zone and a total export ban on all live pigs. 
DUPHvIA was originally calibrated on prices and quantities of 1996 (Chapter 4), a year with 
exceptionally high pig prices. We now re-calibrate the model to the last half of 1999 and the 
first half of 2000. During this period, pig prices were recovering but were still at a low level. 
We correct downwards the variable cost saved per finisher not produced, which were based 
on a 5 year average (Snoek et al., 1999), which results in a zero change in producer surplus 
for finisher producers inside a quarantine zone with empty stables. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Carrier piglets 
The number of minor within-herd infections resulting in carrier piglets is very low (Tables 
5.1 and 5.2) and the impact of carrier piglets on the size and the length of an epidemic is of 
minor importance. For sensitivity analysis, we set the probability of carrier piglets on sow 
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Contact structure Old contact structure New contact structure 
(Jalvingh et al., 1999) (Mourits et al., 2001) 
Percentile/ Mean Mean 5% 50% 95% Mean 5% 50% 95% 
# Infected 296 65 231 752 130 51 113 226 
- minor 49 9 38 125 21 9 19 39 
- minor & carrier 1 0 1 5 1 0 0 2 
-major 245 55 190 617 108 41 95 186 
# Detected 254 57 197 638 112 46 98 186 
# Preventive slaughter 324 64 258 887 129 33 98 312 
Duration (days) 245 178 239 321 220 168 214 281 
Infected due to: 
- local spread 244 56 189 645 114 45 99 196 
- animal contact 17 2 12 43 3 0 2 10 
- transport contact 15 2 13 33 3 0 2 7 
- professional 19 2 14 54 9 2 7 19 
5.3.3 Epidemics in a SPLA compared with a DPLA 
5.3.3.1 Epidemiological results 
We simulate CSF epidemics in the Netherlands that start in either a DPLA or a SPLA. For 
each region, we simulate CSF epidemics using the four alternative control strategies. For 
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herds with minor and major within-herd infections to zero to simulate epidemics in a DPLA 
with a PS control strategy. The mean of the different epidemiological criteria is the same in 
both simulations, the only difference being in the number of minor infected farms resulting in 
carrier piglets (results not shown). 
5.3.2 Contact reduction 
The effect of adopting the new contact matrix is shown in Table 5.1, simulating an epidemic 
in a DPLA using the EU strategy in the 3 months after the first detection and the PS strategy 
thereafter. Fewer animal and transport contacts result in fewer infected and detected farms for 
medium and large-scale epidemics, although epidemic duration is not much shorter. 
Table 5.1 Effect of the changed contact matrix in a DPLA area on the simulated results, given 
the EU strategy as control measure for the first 3 months and followed by the PS-
strategy: mean effects and effects for the simulations ranked 5, 50 and 95 according 
to the corresponding epidemiological outcome 
Effect of pig population density 
£ach variant, 100 replications are performed. We present results at the 5th, 50th and 95th 
percentile of various output parameters. 
The first infected farm (index farm) for the DPLA simulations is located in Boekel, in the 
iSouth West region which has the highest pig density of the Netherlands. The PS, DD or ICT 
strategies reduce the length and the size of the simulated epidemics by more than 75% 
compared to the EU strategy (Table 5.2). These three strategies reduce the number of 
susceptible herds in the close neighbourhood of an infected herd, and as a consequence fewer 
farms are infected via local spread. The DD strategy results in epidemics that are smallest in 
size and length. However, with this strategy, a large number of pig farms have to be 
preventively slaughtered whereas with ICT, only infected and detected farms are slaughtered 
for control purposes. 
IThe index farm for the SPLA simulations is located in Berkel en Rodenrijs in the province of 
South Holland. For SPLA epidemics, all control strategies seem to be similarly effective 
(Table 5.2). Reducing the number of susceptible herds in the close neighbourhood of an 
infected herd has little or no impact, because there are hardly any neighbouring farms within 
the endangered radius. As long as the epidemic remains in a SPLA, the spread of the virus is 
strongly linked to movement contacts. 
5.3.3.2 Economic results 
[Two alternative definitions of epidemic size are used: length of the epidemic in days and the 
jnumber of detected farms6. All 100 replications are ranked according to each of these criteria, 
i The average of the three replications centred on the 5 t h , 50 t h and 95 t h percentiles of "size" 
represent "small", "medium" and "large" epidemics respectively. 
The economic welfare changes of the different stakeholders for small, medium and large 
epidemics for both definitions of size are shown for the DPLA region in Table 5.3 and for the 
SPLA region in Table 5.4. 
| For all four strategies, the reduction in national supply is not matched by a fall in total 
j demand when export continues from non-quarantine zones. Pig prices outside quarantine 
zones rise. Hence, producers collectively gain and consumers lose. We assume a 50 % 
6 We assume throughout that there are no false positive test results. If false positives occur, then the size of 
epidemics in terms of both duration and number of "detected" farms is likely to be greater. 
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Table 5.2 Effects of different control strategies, given different control strategies applied and different densely populated pig areas: effects for the 
simulations ranked 5,50 and 95 according to the corresponding epidemiological outcome (new contact matrix) 
Strategy 
Percentile 
Minimum required by the 
EU 
+ Preventive slaughter + Emergency vaccination 
Delayed destruction Intra-community tradea) 
5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95% 
DPLA (Boekel) 
# Infected 65 170 963 9 38 92 9 29 69 10 34 73 
- minor 12 29 169 1 6 13 1 5 14 2 8 17 
- minor & carrier 0 1 4 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
- major 52 139 792 7 32 68 6 24 57 6 26 59 
# Detected 65 166 923 4 25 65 4 19 50 10 33 73 
# Preventive slaughtered - - - 40 113 281 134 375 971 - - -
# Vaccinated - - - - - - 84 249 781 173 419 1079 
Duration (days) 235 373 787 65 127 210 60 96 135 93 a) 139a) 171a) 
Infected due to: 
- Local spread 57 150 877 6 32 71 6 22 48 7 28 52 
- Direct animal contact 0 3 10 0 2 10 0 2 10 0 2 10 
- Transport contact 0 3 7 0 2 7 0 2 6 0 2 6 
- Professional contact 3 15 75 0 2 8 0 1 6 0 1 6 
SPLA (Berkel en Rodenrijs) 
# Infected 2 5 24 2 5 16 2 5 13 2 5 16 
- minor 0 1 3 0 1 3 0 1 2 0 1 3 
- minor and carrier 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
- major 1 5 20 1 4 13 1 4 12 1 4 13 
# Detected 2 5 24 1 3 11 1 3 10 2 5 16 
# Preventive slaughtered - - - 12 22 52 16 32 104 - - _ 
# Vaccinated - - - - - - 0 0 54 8 31 157 
Duration (days) 54 100 201 50 67 140 50 64 123 54 a ) 84 a ) 136a) 
Infected due to: 
- Local spread 0 1 12 0 1 6 0 1 5 0 1 6 
- Direct animal contact 0 1 4 0 1 4 0 1 4 0 1 4 
- Transport contact 0 1 4 0 1 4 0 1 4 0 1 4 
- Professional contact 0 1 4 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 
a) In the case of the intra-community trade scenario we have to add 120 days extra for the imposed post-vaccination zone. 
Table 5.3 Economic welfare analysis of two different trade scenarios, given the EU, the PS, the DD and the ICT strategy in a DPLA: economic welfare 
analysis in 106 EUR for a small, medium and large sized epidemics, ranked on the length of the epidemic, respectively on the number of 
detected farms 
Scenario EU strategy PS strategy DD strategy ICT strategy 
Epidemic size small medium large small medium large small medium large small medium large 
Trade bans imposed on the quarantine zones only 
a) Ranked on the length of the epidemic 
Welfare change in PS 318 488 914 79 169 261 84 204 359 107 182 235 
Welfare change in CS -198 -316 -558 1^5 -102 -171 •49 -129 -230 -63 -109 -142 
Public funds -125 -191 -351 -25 -61 -102 -26 -74 -162 -37 -69 -90 
Net welfare effect -5 -19 5° 9 6 -12 8 1 -32 7 5 -3 
b) Ranked on the number of detected farms 
Welfare change in PS 276 495 869 83 288 411 96 185 275 151 242 357 
Welfare change in CS -178 -320 -533 -49 -166 -254 -58 -113 -181 -89 -145 -211 
Public funds -104 -201 -338 -27 -111 -175 -31 -65 -108 -55 -96 -155 
Net welfare effect -6 -26 -2 8 11 -17 7 7 -14 7 1 -9 
Trade bans imposed on the quarantine zones combined with a total export ban on all Dutch live pigs 
a) Ranked on the length of the epidemic 
Welfare change in PS -200 -160 -167 -295 -273 -249 -283 -167 -9 -296 -262 -268 
Welfare change in CS 230 262 520 218 237 249 208 143 55 231 231 264 
Public funds -107 -162 -297 -23 -55 -91 -24 -70 -152 -33 -62 -79 
Net welfare effect -77 -60 56" -100 -91 -91 -99 -94 -107 -98 -92 -83 
a) Ranked on the number of detected farms 
Welfare change in PS -336 -119 -91 -292 -146 -12 -269 -201 -91 -306 -200 -67 
Welfare change in CS 351 219 410 216 167 78 200 173 94 264 194 111 
Public funds -88 -170 -286 -24 -100 -160 -29 -61 -101 -49 -87 -142 
Net welfare effect -72 -69 33 b -100 -80 -94 -98 -89 -99 -91 -93 -97 
a) Fewer farms in quarantine zones for replication 95 leads to much lower control expenditure, resulting in a positive net welfare effect. 
b) A large number of farms were in quarantine zones. As a consequence, the price drop for finisher producers was more than compensated by the lower 
piglet prices. Finisher producers collectively gained and piglet producer collectively loss, resulting in a total low negative welfare effect of pig producer. 
Table 5 . 4 Economic welfare analysis of two different trade scenarios, given the EU, the PS, the DD and the ICT strategy in a SPLA: economic welfare 
analysis in 1 0 6 EUR for a small, medium and large sized epidemics, ranked on the length of the epidemic, respectively on the number of 
detected farms 
Scenario EU strategy PS strategy DD strategy ICT strategy 
Epidemic size small medium large small medium large small medium large small medium large 
Trade bans imposed on the quarantine zones only 
a) Ranked on the length of the epidemic 
Welfare change in PS 8 8 1 9 8 2 8 2 0 9 1 1 1 9 7 H 1 0 
Welfare change in CS - 5 - 4 - 9 - 5 - 1 5 - 1 1 - 5 - 6 - 1 1 - 4 - 6 - 5 
Public funds -l a - 1 - 6 -l a - 7 - 6 -l a - 2 - 5 -l a - 2 - 3 
Net welfare effect 3 2 4 3 5 4 3 3 3 2 3 2 
c) Ranked on the number of detectedfarms 
Welfare change in PS 7 7 4 9 8 9 2 2 9 1 1 2 6 7 9 3 9 
Welfare change in CS - 4 - 4 - 2 5 - 5 - 5 - 1 3 - 5 - 7 - 1 5 - 4 4 - 2 1 
Public funds -r - 1 - 1 4 -l a - 1 - 6 -r - 2 - 7 - 1 " - 2 - 1 1 
Net welfare effect 2 2 9 3 2 3 3 3 5 2 3 7 
Trade bans imposed on the quarantine zones combined with a total export ban on all Dutch live pigs 
a) Ranked on the length of the epidemic 
Welfare change in PS - 3 7 3 - 4 2 9 - 5 4 7 - 3 6 3 - 3 5 6 - 4 6 9 - 3 6 3 - 3 7 8 - 4 4 5 - 3 8 0 - 4 0 3 - 4 6 8 
Welfare change in CS 2 6 4 3 2 6 4 6 5 2 5 4 2 5 7 3 7 8 2 5 3 2 7 2 3 5 0 2 7 2 3 0 0 3 7 1 
Public funds -l a - 1 - 5 -r - 7 - 5 -l a - 2 - 5 -l a - 2 - 3 
Net welfare effect _ -no - 1 0 4 - 8 8 - 1 1 0 - 1 0 6 - 9 6 - 1 1 0 - 1 0 8 - 1 0 0 - 1 0 9 - 1 0 6 - 9 9 
b) Ranked on the number of detectedfarms 
Welfare change in PS - 4 0 2 - 4 1 4 - 4 7 8 - 3 6 3 - 3 8 1 - 4 4 7 - 3 6 3 - 3 7 2 - 3 9 7 - 3 7 7 - 4 0 6 - 4 1 1 
Welfare change in CS 2 9 5 3 0 9 4 0 6 2 5 4 2 7 4 3 5 4 2 5 3 2 6 5 3 0 1 2 6 8 3 0 1 3 2 8 
Public funds -r - 1 - 1 2 -r - 1 - 6 -l a - 2 - 6 -r -1 - 1 2 
Net welfare effect - 1 0 7 - 1 0 6 - 8 5 - 1 1 0 - 1 0 9 - 9 8 - 1 1 0 - 1 0 9 - 1 0 1 - 1 1 0 - 1 0 6 - 9 5 
a) Less than 1 million euro. 
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contribution from the EU budget towards the total extra expenditure on controlling the 
epidemic. However, if the EU contribution were lower, the extra expenditure from Dutch 
public funds would increase, resulting in a larger negative net welfare effect for the Dutch 
economy. In the case of a DPLA, the PS, DD and ICT strategies result in smaller economic 
welfare changes for all stakeholders than the EU strategy. Epidemics in a SPLA are smaller 
in size and length than epidemics in a DPLA, with lower welfare changes for producers and 
consumers. 
With an export ban on live pigs, a segment of demand is removed from the Dutch market. 
When the epidemic is small, the fall in demand outweighs the small reduction in pig supply 
due to movement restrictions and so prices fall. Producers lose surplus. With an increased 
number of affected farms (large epidemics in size and/or length), a larger share of the pig 
population is taken out of the market and so the drop in simulated market prices is smaller. 
This leads to the unexpected result that, with a total export ban, SPLA epidemics cause larger 
negative net welfare effects than epidemics in a DPLA although SPLA epidemics are on 
average smaller in size and length. The changes in the surpluses of piglet, finisher and 
breeding stock producers depend on whether the farms are situated inside a quarantine zone 
or not (results not shown). In Chapter 4, we present details of the distribution of welfare 
changes across the industry for the two trade scenarios. 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show that government expenditure to control the epidemic increases with 
the size of the epidemic. Animal welfare slaughter compensation takes the largest share of 
total government expenditure on control programs. These payments are highly related to the 
length of the epidemic and the number of farms in quarantine zones. 
When exports are banned, slaughterhouses gain as more animals are slaughtered domestically 
and final consumers gain due to the decreased prices (details not shown). For both these 
stakeholders, the welfare change is negative when foreign trade continues from non-
quarantine zones. 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
In all the simulations shown, the index farm is always a multiplier farm. To check the 
sensitivity of the results to this assumption, the farm type of the index farm was changed to 
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be either a finisher, a multiplier-finisher or a breeding farm in each region. The impact of the 
index farm type is negligible, although there is a slight tendency for smaller epidemics when 
it is a finisher farm (on average a lower number of movement contacts) and larger epidemics 
when it is a breeding farm (on average a higher number of movement contacts). 
Sensitivity analysis performed by varying key parameters generally had little impact on the 
results. Only contact and local spread transmission probabilities had a large impact on the 
simulated results. Two studies on transmission probabilities (Stegeman et al., 1998, 2002) are 
currently available, both based on data from the Dutch CSF epidemic. The first of these 
studies was preliminary, and our new infection probabilities are based mainly on the second 
(Stegeman et al., 2002). A change in the estimation method as well as more data (Stegeman 
et al, 2002) in the second study led to downward corrections by 80 to 95 per cent of all 
estimated transmission probabilities. We did not use the point estimates from Stegeman et al. 
(2002), because a worst-case epidemic of 42 detected farms (using our old contact matrix), or 
32 detected farms (with the new contact matrix) was deemed far too small. Only by doubling 
the 95% confidence interval of Stegeman et al. (2002) for all transmission probabilities (local 
spread and contacts) were we able to reproduce larger epidemics (see Appendix XI). Extra 
bio-security measures and the control measures implemented during the Dutch CSF 
epidemics may have biased the estimated transmission probabilities downwards and therefore 
a doubling of the estimates may be justified. Additionally, we corrected the transmission 
probabilities 15% upwards because we also simulate minor within-herd outbreaks and 
Stegeman's analysis was based on large within-herd outbreaks only. 
In how far these adjustments are justified for local spread is questionable, therefore 
sensitivity analysis was necessary. In the case of a SPLA, the value of the transmission 
probabilities for local spread are of minor importance for the size and the length of an 
epidemic (results not shown), whereas for a DPLA the simulated epidemic is larger in size 
and with a longer duration when the parameters for local spread are doubled (Appendix XT). 
The factors that determine local spread are still unknown apart from the inverse relationship 
between the distance to an infected farm and the probability of becoming infected. Staubach 
et al. (1997) estimated a relative risk curve for neighbouring farms, depending on the distance 
to an infected source farm. The decrease in the risk of infection as distance increased is not 
linear. For sensitivity analysis, we forced our transmission probabilities to follow an 11-step 
"curve" similar to that described by Staubach et al. (1997). This reduced the duration and size 
of the simulated epidemics (Table 5.5), compared to our original 3-step decline in local 
spread parameters. 
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Table 5.5 Effects of functional form of local spread transmission function, given the PS strategy 
in a DLPA area: Mean effects, effects for the simulations ranked 5,50 and 95 
according to the corresponding epidemiological outcome 
Scenario 
Percentile/ Mean 
3-Step functiona) 11-Step function w 
Mean 5% 50% 95% Mean 5% 50% 95% 
# Infected 46 9 38 92 33 7 29 75 
# Detected 29 4 25 65 21 3 18 49 
# Preventive si. 136 40 113 281 110 37 98 230 
Duration (days) 134 65 127 210 116 63 111 186 
Infected due to: 
- local spread 36 6 32 71 25 5 23 53 
- animal contact 3 0 2 10 3 0 2 7 
- transport contact 3 0 2 7 2 0 2 6 
- professional 3 0 2 8 2 0 1 8 
a) Following Stegeman et al. (2002), transmission probabilities for local spread were set at three 
levels, depending on the distance from the infected source herd: 0-500,501-1000 and 1001-2000 m. 
b) We forced the transmission probabilities into an 11-step function approximating the continuous 
non-linear curve fitted empirically by Staubach et al. (1997). The areas under the 3-step and 11-
step functions were the same. 
5.4.2 Carrier piglets 
The inclusion of carrier piglets added a vertical transmission route to the simulation model. 
The number of simulated minor within-herd outbreaks with carrier piglets is rather low, 
regardless of whether vaccination is used or not. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
probability of moving carrier piglets from infected areas into susceptible areas is small 
although, were this to happen, the effects could be devastating. In a vaccinated pig population 
where the vaccinated pigs are not killed but traded, carrier piglets are hard to detect and extra 
serological screening (assuming a reliable test is available) may be needed to detect them. 
Imposing extra-long movement restrictions, such as the so-called post-vaccination zone (see 
Chapter 2) may be another valid measure to convince trading partner that everything is being 
done to reduce the risk of spread by carrier piglets outside the area. 
5.4.3 Frequency of contacts 
The new Dutch pig transport legislation aims to reduce the spread of future epidemics. Our 
simulations assume a reduced number of transport contacts off the farm compared to Jalvingh 
et al. (1999). These results indicate that a reduced number of animal contacts can 
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significantly reduce the spread of the virus. Even so, we might still overestimate the number 
of farm contacts per infected farm and so overestimate the size of the simulated epidemics. 
This is because, in InterCSF_v3, all contacts are randomly drawn and no fixed trading 
partners are assumed. The current legislation, however, puts a maximum on the number of 
contact herds resulting in a relatively small number of fixed trading relationships. Even 
without reflecting this, our results already clearly show the potential of less frequent animal 
transport between farms for reducing the size of future epidemics. 
5 . 4 . 4 Different control strategies applied in a DPLA respectively a SPLA. 
The probability of transmission by local spread, as well as the form of the transmission curve, 
both have an impact on the size and the length of an epidemic in a DPLA (see Appendix XI), 
whereas for a SPLA local spread is of little importance due to the absence of close 
neighbouring farms. The assumptions made in InterCSF_v3 summarise current knowledge as 
far as possible, but have a large impact on the simulated results. Which factors influence the 
local spread of the virus, and how, is still an on-going research question. 
For a SPLA, the standard EU strategy is always sufficient to control and eradicate the 
epidemic whereas for a DPLA, the EU strategy is generally insufficient. Additional control 
measures that decrease the number of susceptible herds in the close neighbourhood of an 
infected farm are needed in order to reduce the size and the length of the epidemic. 
Emergency vaccination strategies are risk averse strategies as their worst-case replications are 
smaller in size than for the PS strategy. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Our analysis indicates that when a CSF epidemic remains located in a SPLA, the standard EU 
strategy is also economically optimal, whereas for a DPLA, the ICT strategy seems 
economically most attractive, assuming no export trade ban. With the ICT strategy, the 
changes in producer and consumer surplus are the lowest. Extra expenditure to control and 
eradicate the virus is also the lowest of all simulated strategies. No extra control costs for the 
post-vaccination zone are included, but based on the existing identification and registration 
system in the Netherlands, those costs are likely to be rather low. 
Ethical reasons favour the ICT strategy as only infected herds are slaughtered and rendered. 
However, acceptance of this strategy by EU trading partners, as well as by retailers and final 
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consumers, is highly questionable. As long as vaccinated animals are present, the country's 
reduced pig health status may cause the loss of some important trading markets. Moreover, 
; although the Netherlands trades more than 70 % of reared pigs (either as live animals or as 
meat) mainly within the EU (Pluimers et al., 1999), a reduced health status in the Netherlands 
may be seen by non-European countries as a reduced health status of the EU as a whole. As a 
consequence, Danish pig meat that is now mainly exported outside the EU could be dumped 
on the European market. 
During the 2001 FMD epidemic, the discussion about whether to slaughter vaccinated 
animals and sell them on the Dutch market was abruptly ended by reservations from major 
Dutch retailers about selling meat from vaccinated animals and recognition of the short-term 
logistic problems of guaranteeing strict separation of meat originating from vaccinated 
animals and from non-vaccinated animals (Jan Klaver (PVE), personal communication, 
October 2001). As long as the political and the public acceptance of vaccination is 
! questionable (due to lack of a reliable diagnostic test, insufficient markets for vaccinated pig 
meat or tough logistic problems), the risk of an export ban on live pigs favours the option of 
preventive slaughter. However, in future epidemics overwhelming public and media pressure 
may force the adoption of the DD strategy whereby pigs are first vaccinated but are later 
slaughtered and rendered as there is no market available. 
Regarding the specific research questions addressed in this paper, we can report that the 
impact of carrier piglets on the size and the length of an epidemic is rather low. Moreover, if 
j the new Dutch pig transport legislation is applied correctly, it will certainly lead to a 
reduction of disease spread in future CSF epidemics. 
Most important, our work shows that the pig density in the area of the initial outbreak is 
relevant to the evolution of the epidemic and the choice of optimal control strategy. In a 
SPLA, the EU strategy is in most cases sufficient to eradicate the disease, whereas in a DPLA 
additional control measures are necessary. The simulation evidence indicates that any control 
measures that lead to a total export ban of all live Dutch pigs should be avoided. Therefore, 
given current political and public levels of acceptance, we conclude that the PS strategy is 
economically the most rational if a CSF epidemic occurs in a DPLA whereas the EU strategy 
is sufficient in a SPLA. Accordingly, future epidemic control policy decisions should be area-
specific and based on pig density. 
Finally, this work shows the need for more insight into transmission probabilities and the 
mechanism of local spread, in order to refine the accuracy of InterCSF_v3. 
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Appendix X Input parameters of InterCSF_v3 
Table X-l Probabilities used in InterCSFa) 
Probability of minor outbreak (given infection) on a non-vaccinatedfarmsb) 
Multiplier farms 0.14 
Finisher farms 0.18 
Mixed or breeding farms 0.16 
Probability of a minor (rather than major) outbreak on a vaccinated and maximum protectedfarmb) 
All farm types 1.00 
Probability of carrier piglets (given a minor outbreak) on a non-vaccinatedfarmb) d) 
Multiplier and breeding multiplier farms (only sows and piglets) 0.12 
Mixed farms 0.06 
Probability of detection via clinical signs on a non-vaccinated farm given a major within-herd 
infection^ 
Multiplier, mixed and breeding farms 0.85 
Finisher farms 0.80 
Al-station 0.75 
Transmission probabilities for movement contacts (given infection) per contact type 
Direct animal contact (high risk contact) 0.277 
Transport contact (medium risk contact) 0.048 
Professional contact (low risk contact) 0.03 
Transmission probabilities for local spread per day in a radius of:c> 
0-500m 0.0122 
501 - 1000 m 0.004 
1001-2000 m 0.00003 
a) A detailed description of all input parameters is available on request from the first author. 
b) Based on calculations done by Don Klinkenberg (ID-DLO). A detailed description (in Dutch) is 
available from the first author on request. 
c) The 95% confidence interval estimates of Stegeman et al. (2001) were multiplied by 2 and 
corrected for the probability of minor outbreaks (assuming a probability of minor outbreaks of 15 
%) in order to reach our calibration goal. 
d) The probability of carrier piglets on vaccinated farms with a minor outbreak was reduced by 50 
%, according to the findings of Dewulf et al. (2001). 
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Appendix X Input parameters of InterCSF_v3 (suite) 
Table X-2 Probability of detection in the event of vaccination, relative to the time since infection 
on an (undetected) infected farm 
Time between infection Probability of detection related to control event vaccination (diagnosis 
entrance and date 2 days later) for all three farm types (sow, sow and finisher and 
vaccination finisher only) 
(days) Vaccination daya 1 week after vaccination 
Minor outbreak (infection source = direct animal contact) ' 
0 - 1 4 (7 -21) c Ö Ö511 
>14 (>21)c 0 0 
Major outbreak " 
0 -14 0.25 0.90 
15-28 0.90 0.95 
29-42 0.99 1.00 
>42 0.99 1.00 
a) We assume a clinical inspection prior to vaccination. 
b) After-vaccination detection (1 week after vaccination) is based on clinical signs only. 
c) We assume that in the case of a minor outbreak not caused by introduced animals, the 
probabilities are the same as for a direct animal contact but delayed by one week. 
d) If a farm with a minor outbreak is vaccinated in the first 1 -2 weeks after infection, we may expect 
a few infectious animals on the farm. If such an infectious animal is vaccinated as one of the first 
animals, infection may be spread by the vaccination team to the following animals. 
e) Same as described in Chapter 2. 
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Table X-3 Probability of detection for various control events relative to the time since infection on an (undetected) infected farm and for a vaccinated 
farm, depending on the time since infection and the farm-specific vaccination status 
Probability of detection by control event (diagnosis date 7 days after event) 
Time since Traced contacts1 Surveillance Preventive slaughter End-screening/ Welfare slaughter °'e 
infection (3 km radius) b b,c,d intermediate screening c , d 
(days) NVf rvg VIh NV rvg VIh NVf VIh NV* rvg VIh NVf rv8 VIh 
Major outbreak on multiplier, mixed and non-sow farms (as in Chapter 2)" 
0 - 1 4 0 0.9 0 0 0.9 0 0 0.9 0 0 0.9 0 0 0.9 0 
15-21 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 i 0 0.25 1 0 0 i 0 
22-28 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 i 1 0.25 1 1 0 i 1 
29-42 1 1 1 0.25 1 0 1 i 1 0.5 1 1 0 i 1 
>42 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 
Minor outbreak on multiplier farms (only sows) (infection source = = direct animal contact) ' 
0 - 1 4 0 0.5" 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5" 0 0 0.5" 0 0 0.5 b 0 
15-21 0 0C 0 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0C 0 0 0C 0 
22-28 0.3 0.7c 0.7 0 0 0 0.3 0.7c 0.7 0.3 0.7c 0.7 0.3 0.3 e 0.3 
29-42 0.3 0.7° 0.7 0 0 0 0.3 0.7c 0.7 0.3 0.7° 0.7 0.3 0.3° 0.3 
>42 0.3 0.7° 0.7 0 0 0 0.3 0.7C 0.7 0.3 0.7C 0.7 0.3 0.3e 0.3 
Minor outbreak on mixedfarms (infection source = : direct animal contact) ' 
0 - 1 4 0 0.5 b 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5b 0 0 0.5" 0 0 0.5" 0 
15-21 0 0° 0 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0° 0 0 0 e 0 
22-28 0.3 0.4e 0.4 0 0 0 0.3 0.4C 0.4 0.3 0.4° 0.4 0.3 0.3e 0.3 
29-42 0.3 0.4C 0.4 0 0 0 0.3 0.4e 0.4 0.3 0.4C 0.4 0.3 0.3e 0.3 
>42 0.3 0.4° 0.4 0 0 0 0.3 0.4C 0.4 0.3 0.4C 0.4 0.3 0.3e 0.3 
Minor outbreak on non-sow farms (infection source = direct animal contact) ' 
0 - 1 4 0 0.5b 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5" 0 0 0.5 b 0 0 0.5 b 0 
15-21 0 0° 0 0 0 0 0 0C 0 0 0C 0 0 0 e 0 
22-28 0.3 0.3C 0.3 0 0 0 0.3 0.3C 0.3 0.3 0.3° 0.3 0.3 0.3e 0.3 
29-42 0.3 0.3° 0.3 0 0 0 0.3 0.3C 0.3 0.3 0.3C 0.3 0.3 0.3e 0.3 
>42 0.3 0.3° 0.3 0 0 0 0.3 0.3e 0.3 0.3 0.3° 0.3 0.3 0.3e 0.3 
a) In contrast to Chapter 2, detection from tracing is not only based on clinical inspection but also partly on serology. All other probabilities for a major 
within-herd outbreak are the same as in Chapter 2. 
b) Based on clinical inspection. 
c) Mainly based on serology, assuming 3 infected pigs for minor within-herd outbreak. 
d) We assumed 100% sample size in vaccinated herds. For non-vaccinated farms we assumed a sample size of minimum 25 % of all sows and minimum 5 % 
of all other pigs (RW, 2000), using standard herd-sensitivity formulae (Noordhuizen et al, 1997). 
e) We assumed a sample size of 10% (RW, 2000), using standard herd-sensitivity formulae (Noordhuizen et al., 1997). 
f) NV: Control event happens on a non-vaccinated farm, already infected. 
g) rV: Control event happens after vaccination on a farm already infected before vaccination. 
h) VI: Control event happens after vaccination on a farm, infection after vaccination. 
i) We assume that in the case of a minor outbreak not caused by introduced animals, the probabilities are the same as for a direct animal contact, but delayed 
by one week. 
Appendix XI Calibration of InterCSF_v3 
Effects of different transmission probabilities, given the contact matrix of Jalvingh et al. (1999), the epidemic starts on an infected farm in Boekel (DPLA), 
the EU strategy as control measure for the first 3 months, followed by the PS strategy: mean effects and effects for the simulations ranked 5,50 and 95 
according to the corresponding epidemiological outcome. 
Scenario 
Transmission probabilitiesa 
Mean/Percentile 
# Infected 
- minor 
- minor and major 
- major 
# Detected 
# Preventive slaughter 
Duration (days) 
Infected by: 
- local spread 
- animal contact 
- transport contact 
- professional contact 
Base 
Doubling of the upper 
limit of the 95 % 
confidence interval for all 
transmission probabilities 
Alternatives 
Point estimation 
Point estimation values 
for all transmission 
probabilities 
95% confidence interval 
Upper limit of 95% 
confidence interval for all 
transmission probabilities 
Reduced local spread 
Doubling of the upper limit 
of the 95 % confidence 
interval for movement 
contacts only; 
Upper limit of the 95 % 
confidence interval for local 
spread 
mean 5% 50% 95% mean 5% 50% 95% mean 5% 50% 95% mean 5% 50% 95%" 
296 
49 
1 
245 
254 
324 
245 
65 
9 
0 
55 
57 
64 
178 
231 
38 
1 
190 
197 
258 
239 
752 
125 
5 
617 
638 
887 
321 
17 
3 
0 
14 
16 
15 
141 
244 56 189 645 13 
17 2 12 43 1 
15 2 13 33 1 
19 2 14 54 0 
2 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
65 
1 
0 
0 
0 
15 42 37 6 31 75 81 10 56 219 
2 6 6 1 5 12 13 1 10 32 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
12 36 31 5 26 66 67 9 45 185 
14 38 34 6 29 73 73 10 52 196 
8 55 38 0 28 109 105 0 58 471 
150 205 167 100 172 210 189 133 187 250 
11 34 28 3 25 57 53 6 39 126 
1 5 3 0 2 10 11 0 6 32 
1 3 3 0 2 9 10 1 7 27 
0 2 2 0 1 6 6 0 5 18 
a) The transmission probability values are based on Stegeman et al. (2002), corrected for a 15% probability of minor within-herd outbreaks. 
Effect of pig population density 
(times/52 weeks) Animal Transport 
Multiplier Piglets off 32 1 2 
Gilts on 5 0 2 
Finishers off 10 0 1 
Sows off 13 0 3 
Finisher Piglets on 9 0 2 
Finishers off 17 0 1 
Mixed Piglets off 2 1 2 
Gilts on 3 0 2 
Finishers off 26 0 1 
Sows off 10 0 3 
Breeder Piglets off 20 1 2 
Gilts off 20 3 2 
Gilts on 2 0 2 
Finishers off 17 0 1 
Sows off 13 0 3 
AI Finishers off 13 0 4 
Note: 
It is determined how many animal transports occur on or off an infected farm each day by drawing 
from a Poisson distribution of animal transports per day whose average is the relevant frequency 
given in Table XII-1. If an animal transport occurs, the destination farms of the related animal and 
transport contacts are generated in InterCSF. It was assumed that no animal contacts between farms 
can occur if animals are transported to the slaughterhouse, but that the truck may be used for other 
transports that day resulting in transport contacts. Based on the highly structured Dutch industry, it 
was additionally assumed that farms do not sell animals to a random other farm type. For example, 
95% of animal contacts from a multiplier go to a fattener, 1% to another multiplier and 4% to a mixed 
farm. Similar patterns are summarised for all farm types in Table XII-3. For transport and person 
contacts, a random receiving pig farm of any type within the selected distance class was drawn. 
Distance classes per contact type are shown in Table XII - 2. It was assumed that each day on average 
0.2 professional-person contacts occurred from any pig farm to another pig farm (Nielen et al., 1996). 
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Appendix XII Contact matrix, distance classes and destination distribution, specific 
to the Dutch pig sector (based on analysis of the 1999 Dutch 
! identification and registration data by Mounts et al., 2001) 
Table XTI-1 Contact matrix 
FarmType Transport type Frequency Contact type 
Chapter 5 
Appendix XII Contact matrix, distance classes and destination distribution, specific 
to the Dutch pig sector (suite) 
Table XII-2 Probability that a simulated contact happens in a specific distance class, depending 
on the contact type 
Contact type Distance class (in km) 
0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 30-60 60-100 100-150 
Animal and transport 0.305 0.208 0.135 0.085 0.101 0.115 0.041 0.12 
Person 0.65 0.15 0.15 0.025 0.025 0 
Table XII-3 Destinations of direct animal contacts (in percentages) 
From \ To Multiplier Finisher Mixed Breed Al-station 
Multiplier 1 95 4 -
Finishera - - - -
Mixed 12 75 10 3 -
Breed 31 34 21 14 -
Al-stationa - - - -
a) In the case of a finisher or an Al-station all animal contacts off farms are directed to 
slaughterhouses. 
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Abstract 
A sector-level market and trade model and a spatial, stochastic, temporal epidemiological 
simulation model are used to simulate the Dutch pig market during a CSF epidemic. The 
effects of supplementary measures to reduce the piglet supply during an epidemic, namely an 
insemination ban, abortion of sows and the killing of young piglets, are studied. It is assumed 
that trade from non-quarantine zones continues. Changes in the economic welfare of different 
stakeholders are measured, as well as the net welfare effect for the Dutch economy. 
Economic results do not support the use of measures to reduce piglet supply. Moreover, the 
use of such measures is not a solution to problems of shortage of rendering capacity. 
6.1 Introduction 
During the 1997-8 Dutch Classical Swine Fever (CSF) epidemic (hereafter referred to as the 
Dutch CSF epidemic), an insemination ban and the killing of very young piglets were 
imposed in much of the infected area to reduce overcrowding on farms. These supplementary 
measures were also seen as a solution to the problem of insufficient rendering capacity, 
which became evident in April 1997 (Pluimers et al., 1999). Pig farming is highly specialised 
and intensive in the Netherlands, where breeding, multiplication, and fattening are usually 
carried out on separate farms. Producers do not have facilities to house animals longer than is 
necessary for their normal production cycle, therefore they need to deliver pigs frequently to 
other farms and/or to slaughterhouses. Once the transport ban was enforced, most farms 
became overstocked with pigs within a few weeks (Pluimers, et al, 1999). Overstocking leads 
to cannibalism and fighting. Furthermore, pen floors may break due to the over-weighted 
animals. The authorities, supported legally and financially by the European Commission, 
implemented a programme to buy out pigs from overstocked farms (hereafter referred to as 
welfare slaughter). Because regulations prevent the marketing of these animals for human 
consumption, the carcasses were rendered (Pluimers, et al, 1999). 
After the Dutch CSF epidemic, these supplementary measures were the subject of on-going 
discussion. The Dutch authorities favoured the measures, and offered them to farmers again, 
on a 'voluntary' basis, during the Dutch 2001 FMD epidemic (LNV, 2001). In this case, 
farmers could participate in welfare slaughter schemes only if they stopped insemination for 
four months and aborted their pregnant sows. By contrast, farmers were hostile to the 
msemination ban, preferring the killing of young piglets, which was seen as having a less 
disruptive impact on herd management. However, veterinarians opposed the killing of young 
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piglets for ethical reasons, preferring an insemination ban. In a court action brought by 
farmers, the court concluded that the msemination ban imposed during the Dutch CSF 
[epidemic was illegal (Agrarisch Dagblad, 2001). Moreover, the European Union (EU, 2000) 
concluded that the insemination ban applied by the Dutch authorities should not be repeated 
in the future, because large-scale synchronised insemination of sows at the end of the ban led 
to a disturbance of the piglet market in 1998. 
Until now, the epidemiological and economic effects of an insemination ban, abortion and/or 
the killing of young piglets have not been studied. Here we analyse these effects, comparing 
the use of one, two or all three supplementary measures with a situation where none is used. 
The goal of the paper is to describe the epidemiological consequences, particularly in terms 
of disease spread, and the economic consequences as measured by direct programme costs 
and the extent of disruption to the piglet market. 
i 
6.2 Modelling framework and sensitivity analysis 
6.2.1 Modelling framework 
6.2.1.1 General 
The modelling framework comprises a spatial, stochastic, dynamic epidemiological model 
(InterCSF_v3), developed by Jalvingh et al. (1999) and further adapted in Chapter 5 1, and a 
four-part economic model described in detail in Chapter 4. 
! InterCSF_v3 simulates the daily spread of the disease from infected farms through three 
contact types (animals, vehicles and persons) and through local spread up to 2000 m. All 
Dutch pig farms are known by their geographical co-ordinates, their farm type and their stock 
numbers. Control measures such as diagnosis of infected farms, slaughter of infected farms, 
movement control areas, tracing, preventive slaughter and emergency vaccination may also 
be simulated on a daily basis. 
\ A micro-economic model (EpiPigFlow) converts the daily output from InterCSF_v3 into a 
weekly flow of piglets, which becomes an input into DUPIMA, a partial equilibrium model 
of the Dutch pig market. DUPIMA simulates weekly market behaviour and trade flows at 
sector level. A second micro-economic model (EpiCosts) uses output from InterCSF_v3 and 
1 In 1997 Jalvingh et al. (1999) developed InterCSF, based on InterSpread (Sanson, 1993; Jalvingh et al., 1995), 
to analyze the Dutch CSF epidemic. In Chapter 5 we adapted InterCSF towards a generic CSF model. 
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the simulated market prices from DUPIMA to calculate the expenditure incurred by the 
Dutch authorities in controlling the epidemic. Furthermore, EpiCosts calculates the changes 
in producer surplus of pig producers inside the quarantine zones. An Excel worksheet 
integrates the results of EpiCosts and DUPIMA to calculate the economic welfare changes of 
producers and consumers (slaughterhouses, the processing industry, retailers and final 
consumers), and the extra expenditure of the Dutch health authorities. The economic welfare 
changes of the different stakeholders aggregate to the net economic welfare change for the 
Dutch economy. 
6.2.1.2 The three supplementary animal welfare measures 
The adoption of an insemination ban will stop the birth of piglets on sow farms 115 days after 
the start of the measure and will stop the supply of growers (25-kg-piglets) 185 days after the 
start of the measure. Aborting pregnant sows from day 0 until day 40 of pregnancy (LNV, 
2001) will stop the birth of piglets 75 days after implementation and will stop the supply of 
growers 145 days after implementation. By contrast, the killing of young piglets at around 10 
days of age will not interrupt the flow of newborn piglets on a farm, but will stop the supply 
of growers 2 months after implementation. 
If all three measures are implemented together, the killing of young piglets can be applied 
only as long as newborn piglets are born and the abortion of sows will take place only as long 
as there are mseminated sows. Moreover, we assume that the abortion of sows is always 
combined with an insemination ban, resulting in at most a single abortion event per sow until 
the ban is lifted. 
We assume that the three supplementary measures are lifted at the same moment as the 
quarantine zone and that sows are re-mseminated gradually, leading to a normal supply of 
growers after 185 days (115 days pregnancy and 70 days for rearing). If only the killing of 
very young piglets is used, a normal supply of growers from the farms involved is restored 
after 60 days. 
An insemination ban and the abortion of sows also prevent the possible birth of carrier piglets 
(piglets infected as a foetus that spread the CSF virus throughout their lives). The absence of 
carrier piglets, due to one or more of these measures, effectively eliminates all routes of 
spread related to carrier piglets. 
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We assume that slaughtered 10-day-old-piglets are compensated at the rate of 61% of the 
weekly piglet price, as in the Dutch CSF epidemic. Compensation payments for sows under 
an msemination ban are also based on those paid during the Dutch CSF epidemic (Meuwissen 
et al., 1999). For simplicity we assume the same compensation payments for aborted sows. 
The variable costs saved by not producing piglets or not raising growers, as well as the 
compensation payments paid, are included when calculating the economic welfare change for 
piglet producers inside a quarantine zone. 
6.2.1.3 Simulated scenarios 
In our simulations, the first infected farm is always situated in a densely populated livestock 
larea (DPLA)2. In Chapter 5 we found that a larger epidemic will occur in a DPLA than in a 
sparsely populated pig area. In all simulations, control measures are adopted comprising 
stamping-out infected herds, tracing all contacts, setting up quarantine zones (protection and 
surveillance zones) around infected herds with movement restrictions and preventive 
slaughter on all farms in a radius of 750 to 1000 m around a detected herd. This corresponds 
to the PS (preventive slaughter) strategy described in Chapter 5. Inside the quarantine zone, 
the frequency of different control events (surveillance and serological screening) is based on 
the Dutch animal health authorities contingency plan for a future epidemic (RW, 2000). In 
the case of a long-lasting movement standstill, welfare slaughter of hogs and growers to 
avoid overcrowding is always assumed. 
The PS strategy serves as the Base strategy for our comparative evaluations. Three alternative 
I scenarios are simulated. In Alternative 1 (favoured by the Dutch government) we assume that 
insemination prohibition, sow abortion and the killing of young piglets are all adopted within 
imovement standstill areas. In Alternative 2 (favoured by the veterinarians) only an 
insemination ban and sow abortion are used in addition to the base strategy. In Alternative 3 
| (favoured by the Dutch farmers), the only measure adopted to reduce stock numbers within 
1 quarantine areas is the killing of young piglets. For all simulations, a partial trade ban 
(imposed on quarantine zones only) is assumed (Chapter 4 and 5). 
6.2.2 Sensitivity analyses 
6.2.2.1 Destruction capacity 
Killing very young piglets was seen in the Dutch CSF epidemic as a solution to the shortage 
of rendering capacity (Pluimers et al., 1999). Pigs were slaughtered on the farm, in the case of 
control measures (infected and preventively slaughtered farms), and in designated 
2 In this study the only livestock species considered are pigs. 
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slaughterhouses, in the case of welfare slaughter. In the first months of the Dutch CSF 
epidemic, all carcasses were rendered. Hence, the rendering capacity rather than the 
slaughtering capacity was the limiting factor. Our simulations assume that welfare slaughter 
of "healthy" pigs (hogs and growers) always takes places in specific slaughterhouses and 
welfare slaughtered pigs are rendered only when capacity is available. Control measures have 
priority over available destruction capacity (killing and rendering), assuming maximum 
capacity of 5 farms per day in the first week rising to 15 farms per day from the third week 
onwards (Capacity-base). If limited destruction capacity were used for both control measures 
and welfare slaughter, less capacity would be available for control measures possibly 
resulting in larger epidemics. Therefore, we perform two sensitivity analyses: the destruction 
capacity for control measures was held at a maximum of 5 farms per day (Capacity-low A) 
and alternatively the adoption of the three supplementary measures increases destruction 
capacity available for control measures from 5 to 10 farms per day from approximately 4 
months into the epidemic (Capacity-low B). 
6.2.2.2 High risk period 
The period between the first farm in a region becoming infected and the first detected case in 
that region is called the high-risk period (HRP). The HRP is one of the most important 
parameters for deternrining the size of an outbreak because it defines the period in which the 
virus can circulate freely and is able to infect pig herds (Horst et al., 1998). For all scenarios 
we randomly draw a HRP from a truncated lognormal curve (21-100), with 49 days as mean 
(HRP-base). For sensitivity analyses we displaced the whole curve left (HRP-short) and right 
(HRP-long) by 14 days to obtain shorter and longer HRPs with, as possible consequences, 
smaller or larger epidemics. The Base and three Alternative scenarios are simulated with the 
shorter and longer HRPs. 
6.2.2.3 Clinical signs 
The probability of detection based on clinical signs is decreased by 10% for all farms and for 
the whole epidemic. 
6.2.2.4 When to decide to implement such measures? 
Our hypothesis is that using supplementary measures to reduce pig numbers would only 
make sense when a large epidemic is expected. Therefore, we use the epidemics simulated 
under the PS strategy to see if and when a large epidemic might be predicted, based on the 
number of detected farms to date. InterCSF_v3 output provides the daily number of detected 
farms. The cumulative detected cases by the end of the first week and the sixth week after 
detection are calculated. We examine the correlation between those two criteria and the 
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length of the epidemic. We checked, for each replication, whether a threshold level of 5, 10 
or 15 detected farms within the first week, or of 40, 50 or 60 detected farms within the first 6 
weeks, was met. We repeated this procedure for all 100 replications of PS (HRP-base), as 
well as for PS (FIRP-short) and PS (HRP-long). All 100 replications were ranked according 
to the epidemic length and divided into quarters. For each quarter the number of replications 
ihat met the threshold is reported. We further reported the number of replications that met the 
threshold and that were ranked according to the epidemic length to be among the 5 or 10 
longest. 
6.2.2.5 Cyclical variation 
We calculated the economic net welfare effects using a high pig price year (model calibrated 
to produce 1996 price levels in a non-epidemic situation) and a low pig price year (model 
calibrated to produce 1999/2000 price levels). 
63 Results 
6.3.1 Epidemiological results 
InterCSF_v3 was used to perform 100 replications of each scenario. All replications began 
with the same infected multiplier farm in an area with the highest pig density in the 
Netherlands (see figure 6.1), but thereafter the epidemics developed differently because of the 
stochastic nature of the model. 
When comparing the base scenario with Alternatives 1, 2 and 3, assuming the base HRP, we 
find no difference in the size and/or the length of the simulated epidemics, msemination 
prohibition, abortion and/or the killing of young piglets thus have no influence on disease spread. 
16.3.2 Economic results 
6.3.2.1 General 
To summarise the economic results according to size of epidemic all replications are ranked 
according to length of the epidemic in the base scenario. The averages of the three 
replications centred on the 5 t h , 50 t h and 95* percentile represent "small", "medium" and 
"large" epidemics respectively. The mean of the last 5 ranked replications represents the 
"worst case" epidemic. Since the epidemiological outcomes are exactly the same for all four 
[scenarios, so too are the rankings of the replications. 
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Figure 6.1 Pig and pig farm density in the Netherlands in an area with a radius of 10 km around each pig farm, whereby the arrow points at the index 
farm. 
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Table 6.1 surnmarises the economic welfare effects for the different stakeholders (pig 
producers, consumers3 and public funds) and the net economic welfare effect for the Dutch 
economy, relative to a non-epidemic situation. These effects are calculated for a low and a 
high pig price year. Although there are some small differences in the different economic 
Welfare effects between a low and a high pig price year the general conclusion is the same, 
therefore, only the results for the low pig price year are shown. 
For all four scenarios (PS strategy, Alternative 1, 2 and 3) we observe that in general the 
reduction in national supply is not matched by a fall in total demand. Therefore, pig prices 
outside quarantine zones rise. Hence, as found in Chapter 4, consumers lose and producers 
gain collectively, although the overall gain to pig producers hides the fact that producers 
inside quarantine zones lose. Moreover, pig producers inside a quarantine zone are not a 
homogeneous group, being either piglet, hog or breeding stock producers. If piglet producers 
are not destocked, they may continue in production and sell their ready-to-deliver piglets for 
welfare slaughter. In this case, they may gain as well. Piglet farms that are destocked because 
of control measures receive no compensation for their idle capacity. However, when 
production on piglet farms is interrupted because of measures to reduce livestock numbers for 
welfare reasons, we assume that they receive compensation to cover part of their losses. For 
Specialised fattening farms (hog producers), welfare slaughter leads to empty stables after 
approximately 4 months under quarantine restrictions. Idle capacity; whether due to 
depopulation after detection, preventive slaughter or welfare slaughter may cost some pig 
farmers their business. 
6.3.2.2 Piglet supply disruption 
All three supplementary measures were lifted at the same moment as the quarantine zone. 
Depopulated infected and preventively slaughtered farms were assumed to restock gradually 
after the lifting of the quarantine zones regardless of the scenario simulated. However, piglet 
farms where production was interrupted by measures under Alternatives 1, 2 or 3 need some 
additional time after the lifting of the quarantine zone before being able to supply the market 
^gain with growers. Hence, larger welfare changes for producers and consumers result due to 
a longer-lasting disruption of the piglet supply. Alternative 3 (killing of young piglets) 
Showed the smallest decrease in net economic welfare and the least additional time before 
normal supply was restored. After the end of the epidemic Alternative 1 needed the most 
additional time before supply was normalised. 
* Under consumer we group slaughterhouses/processing industry; retailers and final consumers. 
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Table 6.1 Changes (in million Euro) in producer surplus (PS), consumer surplus (CS), Dutch public funds and the net welfare of small, medium, large and 
worst case epidemics (ranked according to the length of the epidemic) for four scenarios, assuming a trade ban imposed on the quarantine zones 
only and a low pig price year. 
Scenario 
Epidemic size 
PS-strategy (Base) Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 
small med. large worst small med. large worst small med. large worst small med. large worst 
- Low pig price year 
Welfare change in PS 79 169 261 313 99 224 322 374 87 203 320 374 91 196 283 339 
Welfare change in CS -45 -102 -171 -203 -62 -175 -312 -362 -45 -136 -270 -318 -62 -145 -237 -274 
Dutch public funds -25 -61 -102 -125 -30 -74 -117 -139 -27 -67 -112 -135 -28 -68 -111 -133 
Net welfare effect 9 6 -12 -15 6 -24 -108 -127 14 -1 -62 -79 1 -16 -65 -68 
j Supplementary measures to reduce piglet supply 
Scenario Base Reduced destruction capacity 
Capacity-low A Capacity-low B 
Mean/ Percentile mean 95% 100% mean 95% 100% mean 95% 100% 
# Infected 46 92 244 62 95 1031 57 95 750 
# Detected 29 65 150 45 70 962 39 70 619 
Duration (days) 134 210 280 138 226 444 136 219 331 
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6.3.2.3 Direct costs 
Table 6.1 shows the Dutch share of the programme expenditure, which was equal to 50 % of 
the total programme costs. Total expenditure increases with the size of the epidemic. 
Compensation payments for welfare slaughter schemes are always the largest share of all 
costs. These payments are highly related to the length of the epidemic and the number of 
| farms in quarantine zones. With the use of supplementary measures to reduce piglet supply 
[the total programme costs are higher than with the PS strategy, even for the worst-case 
epidemics. This is because the slight fall in compensation payments for destocked infected 
and preventively slaughtered farms, and in organisation costs, is outweighed by additional 
compensation payments for the supplementary measures for reducing piglet supply. 
6.3.3 Sensitivity analyses 
6.3.3.1 Destruction capacity 
When the destruction capacity allocated to control measures is reduced by competition from 
welfare slaughter carcasses, we obtain larger epidemics (Table 6.2). Allowing the three 
supplementary measures for reducing piglet supply to increase the destruction capacity 
available for control measures from 4 months onwards (Capacity- low B) has an effect 
relative to the Capacity-low A scenario only for the worst case epidemics, but still results in 
larger epidemics than in the base scenario. Table 6.2 shows the mean, the 95 and the 100 
percentiles for several output parameters based on 100 replications of InterCSF_v3. 
Table 6.2 Effects of varying destruction capacity (farms/day) available for control measures: 
average effects, and effects for the simulations ranked 95 and 100 according to the 
corresponding epidemiological outcome. Base: week 1 = 5 farms/day; week 2 = 10 
farms/day and from week 3 = 15 farms/day. Scenario A: 5 farms/day; Scenario B: week 
1-17 = 5 farms/day and from week 17=10 farms/day. 
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Figure 6.2, based on the longest epidemic from our 100 replications, illustrates that welfare 
slaughter can cause a huge logistic problem. The large number of pigs slaughtered in the first 
weeks, regardless of the scenario simulated, is greatly in excess of our calculated reduction in 
destruction capacity of approximately 10 farms/day. Consequently, if carcasses of pigs 
slaughtered due to control measures are not given priority over those arising from welfare 
slaughter, even larger epidemics than simulated under scenarios A and B would result. 
Figure 6.2 shows that Alternative 1 begins to reduce the total number of pigs slaughtered for 
welfare reasons in week 10 compared with the PS strategy. But in Alternative 1 a huge 
number of young piglets is also killed. Even more young piglets are killed under Alternative 
3 (killing of young piglets only). Alternative 2 involves no Mling of young piglets, but the 
insemination ban plus abortion reduces the number of pigs welfare slaughtered compared to 
the PS strategy only from week 20-21 onwards. In all the alternative scenarios, the highest 
weekly incidence of welfare slaughter occurs before any of the supplementary measures for 
reducing piglet supply show an effect. In other words, the duration of the simulated 
epidemics is too short to allow any benefits from these measures. 
6.3.3.2 HHP 
Changing the average HRP has the predicted impacts on epidemic size and length (Table 
6.3). All results show the mean, the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles for several output 
parameters based on 100 replications of InterCSF_v3. Results are exactly the same for the 
PS-strategy as well as for Alternative 1 ,2 and 3. 4 
6.3.3.3 Clinical signs 
A 10 % lower probability of detection based on clinical signs throughout the epidemic results 
in a slightly higher average number of infected farms, 48 versus 46 (base PS strategy), and a 
slightly longer average epidemic, 141 versus 134. Because serological screening is used 
monthly on farms situated in a quarantine zone, the reduced clinical detection rate is probably 
covered by detection based on serology. 
4 When we forced the model to simulate really large epidemics (for example, by increasing transmission 
probabilities by a factor of 1.5), we found a slight impact of the supplementary measures for the largest 
replications only. The effect was a slightly smaller epidemic. Alternatives 1 and 3 had a slightly larger impact 
than Alternative 2. 
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Figure 6.2 Number of pigs and of young piglets welfare-slaughtered and rendered per week for the 
longest epidemic of the base scenario. The arrow indicates the first week in which the 
number of welfare slaughter pigs is lower with the Alternative than with the PS strategy. 
Panel A: PS strategy versus Alternative 1; B: PS strategy versus Alternative 2; C: PS 
strategy versus Alternative 3. 
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6.3.3.4 Detected cases as a prediction for epidemic length? 
Results are exactly similar for the PS strategy as well as for Alternative 1, 2 and 3, therefore 
we show only results for the PS strategy. For the scenario with the base HRP we find a 
significant positive correlation between the two criteria and the length (in days) of an 
epidemic, with the number of detected cases after 6 weeks having a higher correlation 
coefficient (0.54) than the number of detected cases within 1 week (0.45). A higher positive 
correlation (0.72 and 0.89) is found between the two criteria and the size of an epidemic 
measured in terms of the number of detected farms. Table 6.4 shows that the overall 
probability at least 5 cases in the first week is 0.37. This probability is, however, 0.7 for the 
10 largest epidemics and 1 for the 5 largest epidemics. For a long HRP, these indicators are 
less decisive. When a short HRP is assumed, none of the replications reach these thresholds. 
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Epidemiological effects 
Adult pigs show less clear clinical signs than young pigs (Depner et al., 1996). If measures 
are used to interrupt the flow of piglets, the number of young piglets on the farm will 
decrease and therewith the probability of clinical detection. And yet, assuming a lower 
probability of clinical detection for the whole epidemic led to only a slight increase in the 
number of infected farms and in the length of the epidemic. Moreover, these measures 
decrease the number of young animals only over time, so clinical detection remains high at 
the beginning of the epidemic. Combined with the monthly serological screening, we 
conclude that these strategies do not seriously hamper the detection of infected farms. 
6.4.2 Economic effects 
The use of one, two or all three supplementary measures had a more negative economic 
impact on the Dutch pig sector than the PS strategy alone. All measures raised the number of 
piglet producers out of production for a longer period and caused a longer disruption of the 
Dutch piglet supply beyond the end of the epidemic. Our assumption of gradual restocking 
and re-msemination probably results in an underestimation of the likely piglet supply 
disruption. Furthermore, at the end of an epidemic the restrictions are lifted from a huge 
number of farms (figure 6.3), which together may have a significant market effect, resulting 
in a long-lasting cycle of market disruption. However, with the framework used here, we are 
not able to reproduce such long-lasting market disruption effects. 
Table 6.3 Effects of varying the length of the HRP, given the PS strategy: average effects, and effects for the simulations ranked 5, 50 and 95 according to 
the corresponding epidemiological outcome. 
Scenario Base HRP Shorter HRP Longer HRP 
Mean/Percentile Mean 5% 50% 95% Mean 5% 50% 95% Mean 5% 50% 95% 
# Infected farms 46 9 38 92 22 2 18 53 83 25 68 192 
# Detected farms 29 4 25 65 13 1 11 32 56 14 46 142 
# Preventive slaughtered 136 40 113 281 72 27 58 154 246 80 203 575 
Duration (days) 134 65 127 210 109 50 104 176 145 93 138 213 
Table 6.4 Number of replications for HRP-base and HRP-long, given the PS strategy, that meet various thresholds regarding number of detected farms 1 
week and 6 weeks after the first detection. 
Scenario Base HRP Long HRP 
Criterion After 1 week After 6 weeks After 1 week After 6 weeks 
Threshold >5 > 10 >40 >50 >5 > 10 > 15 >40 > 50 > 60 
1-25 ranked replications 3 0 0 0 16 7 0 4 2 0 
26-50 ranked replications 7 0 0 0 22 9 2 9 6 2 
51-75 ranked replications 13 2 2 0 22 13 6 14 9 6 
76-100 ranked replications 14 5 5 2 20 15 8 14 10 6 
Total 37 7 7 2 80 44 16 41 27 14 
10 largest replications 7 3 3 1 8 6 5 6 5 2 
5 largest replications 5 2 2 0 4 2 1 2 1 1 
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All three measures are intended to stop the supply of growers during the epidemic and as 
such also the supply of hogs. However, this effect shows up only late in time and hence can 
be of no, or only minor importance, in reducing the number of welfare slaughtered healthy 
pigs. Thus, the compensation payments for regular welfare measures are hardly reduced. 
These compensation payments comprise the biggest share of public expenditure occasioned 
by the epidemic. The extra compensation paid for very young piglets killed and/or for sows 
under an insemination ban or aborted just increase total compensation paid. Thus, using these 
supplementary measures increases the total programme costs of an epidemic. 
Figure 6.3 Number of farms per day becoming free of restrictions (longest simulated epidemic). 
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6.4.3 Welfare slaughter and limited destruction capacities 
Logistic and ethical reasons may favour the combined insemination ban and the abortion of 
sows, since it avoids later killing of piglets or hogs. In contrast, killing young piglets will not 
reduce the number of animals killed but will reduce only the total tonnage of killed pigs. 
However, this measure does not disrupt the sow herd management. Therefore, the killing of 
young piglets, as favoured by farmers, may solve some logistic problems as well as later 
animal welfare problems, although it may raise ethical objections. 
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However, a lower piglet supply inside quarantine zones due to the use of these supplementary 
measures shows up at the earliest 2-3 months after adoption. The often acute shortage of 
destruction capacity at the beginning of an epidemic, due to competition for rendering 
between carcasses slaughtered due to control measures and those due to welfare slaughter 
[schemes, will not be solved by using such additional measures. Therefore, other options are 
jneeded to solve the capacity problem. Designation of specific slaughterhouses inside 
[quarantine zones for welfare slaughter and storage of welfare slaughtered carcasses until 
[rendering capacity is available, from the beginning of an epidemic, is probably the best 
option for overcoming a shortage in destruction capacity exacerbated by welfare slaughter. 
[On-farm killing capacity and rendering capacity would then be reserved in priority for 
destruction due to control measures. In the Dutch CSF epidemic, specific slaughterhouses 
were designated for welfare slaughter but as welfare slaughtered pigs were rendered 
simultaneously with slaughtered pigs due to control measures, rendering capacity was 
insufficient. Only later during the epidemic was the problem partly solved by storing the 
•welfare slaughtered carcasses in cold stores (Pluimers, et al., 1999). 
[Other options that might reduce the number of pigs slaughtered and rendered under the 
[welfare slaughter option are: a smaller radius for quarantine zones, a shorter quarantine zone 
period, or, as applied first in Belgium in the 1994 CSF epidemic (Vanthemsche, 1995), 
controlled slaughter of pigs in the 3-10 km zone for market outlets. Controlled slaughter 
means slaughtering in designated slaughterhouses where the meat is marked and can be sold 
[afterwards as fresh meat inside the EU. The first two options may be risky as they could 
favour the spread of the disease, especially as long as the epidemic is not under control. 
[However, the commercialisation as fresh meat of meat from controlled slaughter, assuming 
I strict sanitary controls, involves only minimum risk as the probability that an infected farm 
will not be detected is rather small. Although this option requires some complicated logistics, 
it would reduce the number of carcasses to be rendered as well as compensation expenditure. 
Furthermore, it may reduce the short-run market disruption due to imposition of quarantine 
jzones, since fewer pigs will be taken out of the market. 
6.4.4 Timing of the implementation decision 
This study supports our hypothesis that additional measures should only be implemented 
when an extremely large epidemic is expected. In Chapter 5 we showed that the pig density 
around the first detected outbreaks is a good indicator of whether a large epidemic might be 
expected (figure 6.1). In this study, where all outbreaks begin in a high density area, we 
found a positive correlation between the number of detected farms in the early weeks and 
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epidemic size. The more cases detected in the first 6 weeks, the more likely the epidemic is to 
be large. Besides pig density and number of early detections, other indicators are needed to 
give a better forecast of epidemic size. The length of the HRP could be a good indicator. 
Certain indicators may be more reliable than others for predicting a particular dimension of 
epidemic "size". 
6.5 Conclusions 
The use of an insemination ban, the abortion of sows and the killing of very young piglets 
had no impact on the size and the length of the epidemic. Whether pig prices were high or 
low, these measures resulted in higher direct costs and greater disruption to piglet supply on 
farms after the lifting of all restrictions. However, ethical and logistic reasons may favour 
some of the measures. Our study gives an indication of the overall cost to society of these 
measures, so that decision-makers can weigh these costs against public acceptance. In any 
case, an msemination ban is recommended for ethical reasons in the case of an emergency 
vaccination campaign when all vaccinated herds have to be ultimately slaughtered and 
rendered (Chapter 2). 
Our study indicates that, on economic grounds, these additional measures should be used 
only when an extremely large epidemic is expected, and they should also be implemented 
from the very start of the epidemic. Future research is needed to help find indicators of the 
expected size of an epidemic at a very early stage. 
Finally, our study shows that control measures (stamping-out infected herds and preventively 
slaughtering neighbouring farms) should have a priority claim on destruction capacity. 
Decision-makers should be aware of the need for alternative solutions to dispose of animals 
that are killed and rendered for welfare reasons. 
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7.1 Introduction 
This final chapter is devoted to a general discussion of the results obtained in this thesis and 
the methods used. The objectives of the thesis were: 1) to further develop an available 
epidemiological model that simulates the spread of the virus between farms and permits a 
comparison of control measures of interest; 2) to develop an economic model that calculates 
not only the direct control costs of the animal health authorities but also the mdirect costs for 
Dutch society as a whole, whereby different market scenarios are considered; and 3) with the 
help of these models, to analyse possible control strategies that might be applied in an 
epidemic and to give recommendations, on epidemiological and economic grounds, on which 
control strategies to apply in future epidemics. Objective 3 was the most important part of 
this study, whereas the development of an epidemiological and an economical framework 
was necessary in order to be able to fulfil this purpose. This chapter, therefore, discusses the 
results reported in previous chapters in relation to policy-making for the control of classical 
swine fever (CSF) epidemics (hereafter referred to as "policy-making"), section 7.2. In 
section 7.3 the applied modelling framework and its main restraints are briefly discussed. 
Finally, the main conclusions of this thesis are summarised in section 7.4. 
The current EU policy to eradicate CSF virus from its territory was taken as standard situation. In 
this thesis various measures to control CSF epidemics were analysed, whereby eradication was 
the main goal. Ethical and animal welfare reasons were not considered as it was and is nearly 
impossible to impute a monetary or other measurable value due to different moral judgements 
concerning ethical and animal welfare problems. Therefore, only the epidemiological and 
economic aspects of various control measures were analysed. The Dutch contingency plan for 
future CSF epidemics foresees the use of additional preventive slaughter from the very beginning 
(RVV, 2000). Therefore, when comparing the various control strategies in this thesis, additional 
preventive slaughter was always considered as part of the base control strategy. 
7.2 Discussion of results with special attention to policy making 
7.2.1 Economic considerations 
Results of Chapters 4 and 5 allowed the conclusion that as long as trade continued from non-
quarantine zones1 Dutch producers collectively gained from the epidemic. This result was 
1 By a "quarantine zone", we understand the protection zone (0-3 km) plus the surveillance zone (3-10 km), 
since movement restrictions are installed inside those zones 
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independent of the size of the epidemic. It occurred because producers outside quarantine 
zones benefited from the higher prices caused by lower supply, and because the loss of some 
[producers inside a quarantine zone was moderated by compensation payments for welfare 
slaughter. With a trade ban on live pigs and no increase in exports of pig meat, market price 
I was weaker and so the gain of non-quarantined producers no longer outweighed the losses of 
other producers; collectively, producers lost. However, the total producer loss in this situation 
was inversely related to the size of the epidemic: the larger the epidemic, the greater the 
shortfall in marketable supply and hence the smaller the downward pressure on market price. 
Policy makers should always be aware of the welfare changes of all stakeholders involved 
when making a decision. In this study, the welfare changes for producers were generally 
found to be in the opposite direction to the welfare changes for consumers (slaughterhouses / 
processing industry, retailer and final consumer). Furthermore, the size of welfare changes 
depends partly on when the epidemic occurs in relation to the pig cycle. At the top of the pig 
cycle, when prices are high, welfare losses are more pronounced. This can be seen by 
comparing the welfare effects reported in Chapter 4 (measured against a non-epidemic 
scenario with high pig prices, as anticipated for 1997-98) and those given in Chapter 5, which 
are measured against a non-epidemic scenario with low (1999) prices. The smaller welfare 
changes for all stakeholders calculated in Chapter 5 are also due to the smaller size of the 
simulated epidemics, which is mainly due to the newly incorporated contact matrix. 
i 
Compensation payments for animal welfare slaughter schemes formed the major share of the 
total programme costs, and vaccination costs, if applied, were only marginal. It is worth 
| noting that without the assumption of a significant contribution from the EU budget (50% or 
more), the net welfare losses for the Netherlands would have been much greater. Furthermore 
we assumed for simplification that the Dutch public funds came entirely from Dutch 
taxpayers, whereas in reality the Dutch pig sector was and is partly involved in financing 
control costs. In the 1997/1998 Dutch CSF epidemic (hereafter referred as the Dutch CSF 
epidemic) the contribution by the sector was only marginal in comparison to the total animal 
health expenditures for controlling the epidemic. However, in future epidemics the sector's 
contribution will be larger (Meuwissen et al., 2002). As a consequence, the animal health 
expenditures, which were now considered to come entirely from Dutch public funds, will 
have to be partly considered as a change in economic welfare of producers. Nevertheless, the 
net economic welfare effect will stay the same. 
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2 In the case of CSF, only one livestock species is considered, namely pigs 
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7.2.2 Geographic based control strategies 
The main conclusion from Chapter 5 was that policy decisions should always be based on 
geographic areas that were defined with respect to pig and/or pig farm density. Berentsen et 
al. (1990), Garner et al. (1995b) and Mahul and Durand (2000), found similar conclusions for 
the case of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) epidemics. As long as a CSF epidemic remained 
located in a sparsely populated livestock2 area (SPLA) stamping-out infected herds combined 
with quarantine zones (EU-strategy) was sufficient to control and eradicate the epidemic and 
was also economically feasible (Chapter 5). In a densely populated livestock area (DPLA), 
however, additional control measures were necessary and economically feasible. This is 
similar to the fmdings of Mahul and Durand (2000), who found that the implementation of 
emergency vaccination in a region with a high livestock density might be optimal in the case 
of an FMD epidemic. Such additional control measures reduced the number of susceptible 
herds, resulting in smaller epidemics in both size and length (Chapters 2 and 5). 
7.2.3 Additional control measures 
Emergency vaccination and/or preventive slaughter (PS-strategy) in the neighbourhood of an 
infected farm were such additional control measures. Two emergency vaccination strategies 
were simulated, the delayed destruction strategy (DD), whereby all pigs on vaccinated farms 
will be destroyed but later in time, and the intra-community trade strategy (ICT), which 
assumes intra-community trade of vaccinated pig meat. Both simulated emergency 
vaccination strategies were at least as effective as the PS-strategy (Chapters 2 and 5), 
assuming a reliable diagnostic test and no relaxation of other control measures. The largest 
simulated epidemics for both emergency vaccination strategies were not as large as the 
largest simulated epidemics under the PS-strategy. However, the large number of 
preventively slaughtered farms in the DD-strategy was a negative aspect of the DD-strategy 
compared to the PS-strategy. In the ICT-strategy on the other hand, no farms were 
preventively slaughtered. ICT avoided the destruction (slaughtering and rendering) of a large 
number of healthy pigs. In addition, ICT would avoid also some ethical and animal welfare 
objections. Nevertheless, political factors, third countries' reactions and public opinion might 
change policy-makers' preferences. 
General discussion 
7.2.4 Supplementary measures to reduce later animal welfare problems 
An insemination prohibition, forced abortion of sows and/or the killing of very young piglets, 
used as supplementary measures to reduce later animal welfare problems (hereafter referred 
as supplementary animal welfare measures) in combination with the PS-strategy, had no 
impact on the size and the length of the epidemic (Chapter 6). Moreover, the effects of such 
supplementary animal welfare measures showed up only far behind the simulated epidemics, 
resulting in a longer lasting and larger disruption of the piglet supply after the end of the 
epidemic. Consequently, their use was economically irrational, although political and ethical 
reasons might still favour such measures. Only in the case of an extremely large epidemic and 
when supplementary measures are adopted from the very beginning, may some economic 
effect be expected. 
Additionally, the use of supplementary animal welfare measures did not reduce the number of 
pigs slaughtered and destroyed via animal welfare slaughter schemes in the beginning of an 
epidemic, although, this was one of the arguments for their use (Pluimers et al., 1999). The 
effects of such supplementary measures showed up too late in time, and as such did not help 
j to overcome a potential shortage in rendering capacities at the start of the epidemic. 
7.2.5 Destruction capacities and animal welfare slaughter 
Results of Chapter 6 showed that the available rendering capacities should be reserved for pig 
carcasses of infected premises and preventively slaughtered farms. A shortage in killing and 
rendering capacities triggered by the simultaneous destruction of a large number of "healthy" 
pigs for animal welfare reasons should be avoided. Those pigs should be slaughtered 
: elsewhere, for example in specifically defined slaughterhouses, and after slaughter they might 
be stored and later rendered. 
i Additionally, ethical, animal welfare and public acceptance as well as economic reasons 
require new solutions in order to decrease the number of slaughtered and destroyed healthy 
pigs for animal welfare reasons. Options that might reduce the number of slaughtered and 
rendered pigs are a reduction in the quarantine zone radius or a shortening of the time period 
over which restrictions are imposed. However, these two options are risky as they may favour 
the spread of the disease, whereas the commercialisation of meat from controlled slaughter as 
fresh meat on the community market (Vanthemsche, 1995), assuming strict conditions of 
sanitary control measures, involves only a minimum risk. Serological screening and 
surveillance applied before slaughter should reduce the probability of slaughter from an 
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infected but not yet detected farm. Besides, infected but undetected pig meat could lead to 
infection of other pigs only if fed to pigs via swill. Controlled slaughter presumes some heavy 
logistic requirements but on the other hand would reduce the number of pigs rendered as well 
as the animal health authority expenditure (fewer compensation payments). Furthermore, it 
may weaken the market disruption, as a smaller number of pigs will be taken out of the 
market. More research is needed here to gain better insight into 1) the risk of spreading the 
disease by the measures listed here and 2) the economic effects of such measures. 
7.2.6 When to implement stricter measures? 
Especially in densely populated pig areas, a good forecast of the epidemic size at the 
beginning of an epidemic would help policy makers to chose the most accurate and 
appropriate control measures. If necessary, the addition of control measures, such as 
emergency vaccination and preventive slaughter, or even the use of supplementary animal 
welfare measures should be implemented right from the very beginning of an epidemic. 
Mahul and Durand (2000) also found that the earlier additional "emergency vaccination" was 
applied in the case of an FMD epidemic in Brittany, the less expensive this strategy was 
predicted to be. Consequently, a continued tendency towards stricter control measures during 
the on-going epidemic could be avoided, leading to more clearly defined management tasks 
and less confusion between the different partners involved in the control. Quick and 
adequately applied control measures might help to convince farmers, traders, slaughterhouses 
and other partners to co-operate and thereby to reduce frauds. In contrast, less strict control 
measures at the end of an epidemic might allow farmers to restock gradually before the last 
restrictions are lifted, possibly resulting in fewer market disruptions. Results of Chapter 5 
show that the pig density around the first detected outbreak was a good indicator of whether a 
large epidemic might be expected. In Chapter 6, a positive correlation between the number of 
detected farms in the early weeks and the epidemic size was found. Another indicator could 
be the estimated length of the high-risk period (Chapter 6). Certain indicators may be more 
reliable than others. Therefore more research is needed 1) to predict at the very beginning of 
an epidemic the possible size; and 2) to forecast the future course and the possible end of the 
on-going epidemic. 
7.2.7 Financial appraisal or economic welfare analysis? 
In Chapter 2 we applied a financial analysis, similar to those of Meuwissen et al. (1999) and 
Nielen et al. (1999). This financial analysis included only direct control costs and 
consequential losses of farmers and related industries wittrin quarantine zones, but ignored 
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losses further down the chain. Moreover, no trade reactions were considered. On the other 
hand, the economic welfare analysis performed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 considered all the main 
stakeholders involved in the Netherlands, and involved simulating different possible trade 
scenarios. By comparing results of Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, we demonstrate for the PS, the 
DD and the ICT-strategies the shortcomings of such a financial appraisal. From Chapter 2 it 
was concluded that the ICT-strategy was economically the most attractive in a DPLA. 
However, a total trade ban on live pigs might be a possible consequence when applying an 
emergency vaccination strategy. Without any economic analysis of such a possible trade 
; restriction and without a consideration of all stakeholders affected, the possible consequences 
for society as a whole will remain only best guesses. Therefore, in the economic welfare 
analysis in Chapter 5, we simulated two trade scenarios: a partial trade ban imposed only on 
quarantine zones; and a national export ban on live pigs. Only with a partial trade ban 
imposed on quarantine zones was the ICT-strategy economically the most attractive in a 
DPLA, similar to Chapter 2. However, the current political and public acceptance of this 
strategy raises the risk of a total export ban on live pigs, resulting in much larger negative net 
welfare effects for the Dutch economy (Chapter 5). As a consequence, all control measures 
that lead to a total export ban of all live Dutch pigs should be avoided. From Chapter 5 we 
therefore concluded that as long as political and public acceptance of vaccination are 
questionable, the risk of an export ban on live pigs would favour preventive slaughter (PS-
strategy). 
Thus, simulating different trade scenarios and considering the welfare changes of all affected 
j stakeholders, economic welfare analysis allowed us to make recommendations that were 
based on economic as well as on epidemiological grounds. Showing separately the net 
welfare effects for the whole national economy, as well as the welfare effects for each 
individual' stakeholder (producers, consumers and the public funds) provided detailed 
information upon which policy makers can base their own value judgement. 
7.3 The applied models 
7.3.1 General 
The modelling framework comprises a spatial, dynamic, stochastic, epidemiological model, 
as well as an economic framework, including a partial equilibrium market and trade 
simulation model. Figure 7.1 gives an overview of the overall framework (as was also done 
in Chapter 4). 
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Figure 7.1 The modelling framework 
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The modelling framework presented here can be a useful tool for the Dutch policy makers. 
This modelling framework could help them to prepare during CSF-free times for "war" 
(epidemic) times. During an epidemic, the modelling framework might also be used for 
advice. Yet the actual version, which consists of 5 individual parts, is not very user-friendly 
and is also time demanding. However, the modelling framework could help policy makers: 1) 
to gain better insight into the development of possible CSF epidemics; 2) to gain better 
insight into the direct and indirect costs, including the possible net welfare effect for the 
whole Dutch economy, depending on the trade restrictions imposed; 3) to draw up 
geographically dependent contingency plans. 
j 7.3.2 Epidemiological model 
The aim of the epidemiological model was to simulate the spread of the virus between farms 
and to compare the epidemiological effects of the different control measures. A father 
requirement was to model spatial heterogeneity, allowing us to model control measures with 
effects on specific herds in a population. 
InterCSF, a spatial, stochastic, dynamic simulation model that was developed by Jalvingh et 
al. (1999), seemed to fulfil the desired requirements. However, the modelling aim of 
InterCSF was to simulate the specific Dutch CSF epidemic. To get a more generic 
epidemiological model, InterCSF was adapted. The adaptations to InterCSF_v3 were 
described in Chapter 5. Consulting literature and asking people from the field was a first step 
of model validation, according to Law and Kelton (1991). After verification of the newly 
incorporated mechanisms, InterCSF_v3 had to be validated anew as well as calibrated 
(Chapter 5). However, the simulated output could not be compared with real data as there 
was only one recent epidemic in the Netherlands. Therefore, sensitivity analysis was 
performed. According to Law and Kelton (1991) sensitivity analysis is one of the most useful 
j tools of validation. Sensitivity analysis was applied, before and after calibration, to the 
different input parameters by increasing and/or decreasing their values. The impact of the 
different parameter changes was rather small except for the parameters describing contact and 
local spread transmission. When calibrating, the calibration goal could only be obtained by 
doubling the recently estimated transmission probabilities of Stegeman et al. (2002), without 
any further manipulation of the other input parameters. Therefore, the transmission 
probabilities were the most uncertain point in the whole validation process of this simulation 
model and more research is needed here. Furthermore, the frequency of routine non-epidemic 
movement contacts also had a large impact on the simulated epidemics (Chapter 5). Reducing 
the frequency of routine non-epidemic movement contacts also decreased the simulated 
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epidemics in size and length. However, forcing farmers to reduce their routine non-epidemic 
contacts will constrain farmers in their entrepreneurial independence. 
Spatial, stochastic and dynamic simulation models, such as InterCSF_v3, are suitable for 
simulating other diseases. Similar models were developed, for example, to simulate FMD 
epidemics (Morris et al., 2001; Mourits et al., 2002) and bovine herpesvirus type I epidemics 
(Vonk Noordegraaf et al. (2000)). Alternatives to our spatial, stochastic and dynamic 
simulation model are mathematical models and state-transition simulation models. The state-
transition simulation model approach was used by e.g. Berentsen et al. (1992) on FMD 
without stochastic elements, whereas implementing stochastic elements in the state-transition 
models, Durand and Mahul (2000) simulated FMD epidemics, and Garner and Lack (1995a) 
simulated FMD, sheep pox and CSF. Garner and Lack (1995a) simulated only one strategy: 
stamping-out of infected herds and installing quarantine zones, in the case of a CSF epidemic 
occurring in Australia. Mathematical modelling was used by e.g. Ferguson et al. (2001) for 
FMD and Klinkenberg et al. (2001) for CSF. Klinkenberg et al. (2001) simulated different 
control strategies for a densely populated pig area. The general conclusion of Klinkenberg et 
al. (2001), that transmission through transport should be avoided and a sufficient number of 
susceptible herds should be removed, is consistent with our findings. However, mathematical 
models and state-transition simulation models do not consider spatial heterogeneity. 
Consequently, neither model approach is suitable to compare different control measures with 
effects on specific herd situations in a population. 
7.3.3 Economic modelling framework 
The second objective of this thesis was to develop an economic model to calculate the direct 
control costs for the animal health authorities as well as the indirect costs for Dutch society as 
a whole in relation to a non-epidemic situation, by considering different market scenarios. 
In contrast to the epidemiological model, no model was available in our group. Financial 
analysis was not considered, except for Chapter 2, because this kind of analysis constitutes 
only partial analyses at the national level and may therefore, according to Bennett (1992), be 
inappropriate as a basis for national disease-control programme decisions. The shortcomings 
of such a financial analysis in the case of CSF policy making was already discussed in section 
7.2.7. When looking at a national level, three modelling approaches are mainly of interest: 
general equilibrium model, partial equilibrium model and an input-output matrix. Economic 
welfare analysis was used, for example by Ebel et al. (1992), Miller et al. (1996) and 
Andersson et al. (1997). All three used a partial equilibrium based welfare analysis to analyse 
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the social benefits of eradication programmes of diseases (Pseudorabies or Aujeszky's 
disease) in pigs. Buijtels and Burrell (2000), on which Dupima, a partial equilibrium sector-
level simulation model, was based, used a partial equilibrium sector trade model to simulate 
pig producers' surplus changes in the Netherlands, assuming different trade scenarios. On the 
i other hand, Garner and Lack (1995b) and Mahul and Gohin (1999) used an input-output 
matrix to analyse the indirect losses of an FMD epidemic on a national economy as a whole 
through the interaction between the economic sectors, simulating different trade restrictions. 
I Buhr et al. (1993) and Crooks et al. (1994) analysed the macro-economic implications of 
improved animal health (no contagious diseases) using multi-sector models, in which they 
focused on long-run improvements. 
Input-output analysis assumes fixed input-output coefficients, perfectly elastic factor 
supplies, and exogenously detenrnned final demands. The main limitation of the input-output 
analysis is that it does not include price effects. For a partial equilibrium based welfare 
analysis the main limitation is that it only considers price changes in a single market (i.e. pig 
production chain) and does not include effects on other sectors of the economy. General 
equilibrium or multi-sector models analyse the economy-wide effects and the interactions 
between the different markets. A problem shared by all three methodologies is that they 
require large amounts of data. More sophisticated models, such as general equilibrium 
models, require much more data and time than partial equilibrium models. 
In this research project we assumed that in the case of a CSF epidemic, welfare changes 
outside the meat production chains, if occurring, would be rather small and of minor 
importance. This is not the case in an FMD epidemic, where the recreation and tourist sector, 
j for example, might be badly affected by imposed movement restrictions. On the meat 
production chains, however, more knowledge was needed. 1) Are there likely to be adverse 
consumer reactions due to a disease outbreak? 2) Which market(s), i.e. meat production 
chain(s), will be affected and are there important spillovers onto other markets? This was 
essential knowledge for us as model builders but it is also important for policy makers before 
taking any decision. Results of Chapter 3 showed that there was no adverse consumer 
reaction due to the Dutch CSF epidemic. Further, no significant substitution between pork 
and other meat was found, allowing the consideration of the pig market only. In addition, 
during the Dutch CSF epidemic large pig price fluctuations were observed in a short-run 
period. Therefore, an economic welfare analysis seemed to be the appropriate method to use, 
using a sector-level partial framework. 
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The estimation of the behavioural equations for Dupima, the verification, validation and 
calibration of Dupima were described in full detail in Chapter 4, as well as the assumptions 
made on the different stakeholders involved for the economic welfare analysis. Nevertheless, 
there are three important assumptions, which fit in this Chapter: the Dutch public funds 
(section 7.2.1), restocking of depopulated farms and the non-Dutch stakeholders. 
A gradual restocking of empty farms was the main assumption made about the aftermath of 
our epidemics. This assumption may be unrealistic. Small fattening pig producers in 
particular tend to restock their fattening farms all at once (all-in all-out system), although 
larger farms tend to have a more continuous flow of tradable pigs. Sow farms are more 
limited by expensive farrowing places. Consequently, in the case of simultaneous non-
gradual restocking of a huge number of empty farms after the quarantine zones were lifted, 
greater temporary market disruption than simulated might be expected. 
In this research project we do not consider economic welfare changes outside the 
Netherlands. However, in the case of a CSF epidemic in the Netherlands and with only trade 
restrictions imposed on the Dutch pig market, the pig supply outside the Netherlands is 
reduced, resulting in economic welfare changes for non-Dutch pig producers and non-Dutch 
consumers. Moreover, a country specific decision might lead to trade restrictions also being 
imposed on other countries, e.g. the whole European Union (EU). For example, if 
regionalisation is not fully recognised world-wide, or especially if emergency vaccination has 
been used, a reduced health status in the Netherlands may be seen by non-European countries 
as a reduced health status for the whole EU. Consequently, other European pigs (mainly 
Danish) may also be excluded from the world-wide trade and may therefore be mainly sold 
only within the intra-European market. If these changes on the European pig market were 
also to have an important spillover effect on the Dutch pig market, pig prices would be lower 
than predicted by our model. Therefore, in the field of contagious animal diseases, future 
economic analyses might need to focus also, in addition to the country concerned, on a supra-
national level, such as the EU. 
Nevertheless, the economic modelling framework described here is a useful tool for an 
economic evaluation of a CSF epidemic and might also be used for other contagious diseases, 
assuming a short-run effect and that only one market would be affected. In the case of more 
markets being affected, such as for FMD, the partial sector approach might be too simplified 
and other economic modelling approaches might be more appropriate 
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7.4 Main conclusions of this thesis in brief 
- Ignoring the economic welfare changes of consumers, which are usually in the opposite 
direction to the economic welfare changes of producers, might be misleading. Therefore 
indirect costs of all stakeholders should be considered when policy decisions to control a 
contagious disease are taken. 
- If trade continues from non-quarantine zones during a CSF epidemic, producers 
collectively gain and consumers collectively lose. Where there is a trade ban on live pigs 
and no increase in exports of pig meat, market price is weaker and so the gain of non-
quarantined producers no longer outweighs the losses of other producers; collectively, 
producers lose and consumers gain. 
- All control measures that lead to a total export ban of live Dutch pigs should be avoided. 
Therefore, as long as vaccination is not officially accepted in the market, the PS-strategy 
is economically the most rational if a CSF epidemic occurs in a DPLA whereas the EU-
strategy remains appropriate in an SPLA. 
- Policy decisions to eradicate CSF epidemics should be made according to geographical 
circumstances, i.e. the pig density in the infected area. 
- A reduction of the regular, non-epidemic frequency and number of animal contacts 
between farms reduces the simulated epidemics in size and length. 
- Rendering and on-farm killing capacities should be prioritised for the killing and 
rendering of pigs on infected premises and preventive slaughtered farms during an 
epidemic. 
- The implementation of supplementary measures to reduce later animal welfare problems, 
such as msemination prohibition, forced abortion of sows, and killing of very young 
piglets, has no impact on the size and the length of an epidemic. 
- Better knowledge of CSF transmission mechanisms is crucial for epidemiological 
modelling and is desired for economic modelling, to analyse and compare the effect of 
various control measures. 
- The combination of epidemiological and economic models was and is a useful tool to 
give decision-makers insight into the epidemiological as well as the economic effects of 
the various measures for controlling a contagious disease like CSF. 
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Introduction 
Classical swine fever (CSF) is a viral disease of pigs. In countries where CSF is endemic, it is 
common practice to vaccinate pigs against the disease to avoid serious losses. However, pigs 
vaccinated with the conventional vaccine cannot be distinguished from infected pigs and 
therefore importing countries do not usually allow the import of live pigs or fresh pig 
products from countries that vaccinate against CSF. 
In the EU, CSF has been largely eradicated from the pig population and preventive 
vaccination was banned in the 1990s. In the case of an epidemic, current EU policy requires 
stamping-out of animals on infected premises and the installation of quarantine zones 
(protection and surveillance zones). Trading partners may close their borders on sanitary 
grounds depending on the control measures used. Recent epidemics in Belgium, Germany 
and the Netherlands have demonstrated that these control measures might not be sufficient to 
eradicate the disease quickly. Therefore other approaches are required for future epidemics. 
The objectives of this research are: 1) to develop a generic epidemiological model that is able 
to simulate spread of the virus from farm to farm and permits a comparison of control 
measures of interest; 2) to develop an economic model that calculates not only the direct 
control costs of the animal health authorities but also the indirect costs for Dutch society as a 
whole, whereby different market scenarios are considered; and 3) with the help of these two 
models, to analyse possible control strategies that might be applied in an epidemic and to give 
some recommendations, on epidemiological and economic grounds, about which control 
strategies to apply in future epidemics. 
Emergency vaccination strategies 
As a result of current public sector debate and requests from private industry, this study starts 
with an evaluation of two alternative emergency-vaccination strategies with a marker vaccine 
that could have been applied in the 1997/98 Dutch CSF epidemic (Chapter 2). In strategy 1, 
vaccination would only be applied to overcome a shortage in destruction (killing and 
rendering) capacities. Destruction of all pigs on vaccinated farms distinguishes this strategy 
from strategy 2, which assumes intra-community trade of vaccinated pig meat. 
The spread of CSF between farms through local spread and 3 contact types (animal, transport 
and person contacts) is simulated in a modified spatial, temporal and stochastic simulation 
model, InterCSF. Disease spread is affected by control measures implemented through 
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different mechanisms. Economic results are generated by a separate model that calculates the 
direct costs (including the vaccination costs) and consequential losses for farmers and related 
industries subjected to control measures. 
The comparison (using epidemiological and economic results) between the different 
emergency-vaccination strategies with an earlier simulated preventive-slaughter strategy 
leads to the conclusion that both emergency-vaccination strategies are scarcely more efficient 
than the non-vaccination strategy for the Dutch CSF-epidemic. Vaccination strategy 2 
(involving the continuation of intra-community trade) is the least costly of all three strategies. 
Preferences shifts for meat and fish 
Although pig production takes place in specialised units that generally do not share any fixed 
factors with other types of livestock production, there may be interaction between pork and 
other meats at consumer level. Before being able to build an economic model to calculate the 
direct and the indirect costs of developments in the pig sector for Dutch society as a whole, it 
is important to investigate whether changes in retail supply of pork will have indirect effects 
on demand and profitability of other meats. Hence some knowledge of Dutch consumer 
behaviour regarding demand for meat and fish is needed. Therefore, in Chapter 3 the 
preferences of Dutch consumers for meat and fish are investigated. The 1990s were marked 
by several crises of confidence in beef due to BSE. The empirical investigation of consumers' 
preferences takes account of changing tastes among meats due to BSE by using a switching 
almost ideal demand system. Structural changes in demand between January 1994 and May 
1998 are separated out into underlying trends, irreversible preference shifts triggered by the 
I BSE crisis of March 1996, and a 'panic' reaction against beef in the month of the crisis itself. 
However, no evidence is found for an adverse consumer reaction to pork due to the 1997/98 
Dutch CSF epidemic in the Netherlands. Furthermore, no evidence on substitution between 
pork and other meat is found. 
i 
Welfare effects of controlling the 1997/98 Classical Swine Fever epidemic 
In Chapter 4 the 1997/98 Dutch CSF epidemic is simulated, using a spatial, stochastic 
epidemiological simulation model that implements the control measures as applied in the 
1997/98 Dutch CSF epidemic. Using a newly developed sector-level market and trade model, 
the Dutch pig market is simulated, assuming different trade scenarios. Economic welfare 
changes of producers and consumers, and government costs are calculated. In a medium-
sized epidemic, Dutch pig producers' surplus increases by EUR 454 million without an 
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export ban, although producers within quarantine areas lose. Consumer surplus falls by EUR 
463 million. With a ban on live pig exports, pig producers' collective loss is EUR 251 million 
whereas consumers gain EUR 111 million. Government costs are also lower when exports are 
banned. The economic net welfare effects for the Dutch economy relative to a non-epidemic 
situation are EUR -297 million without an export ban and EUR -394 njillion with an export ban. 
Effect of pig population density 
In Chapter 5, CSF epidemic scenarios that might occur in the Netherlands are simulated, 
starting in different regions, using an adapted and more generic, spatial, stochastic and 
temporal epidemiological simulation model, InterCSF_v3. Different control measures, 
current EU legislation, and preventive slaughter or an emergency vaccination strategy 
(delayed destruction and intra-community trade) as additional control measures are 
considered for controlling these CSF epidemics. Dutch pig market reactions are simulated for 
CSF epidemic circumstances in the Netherlands using a sector-level market and trade model. 
For all strategies we consider two different trade scenarios: partial trade ban for the 
quarantine zones only or a total export ban on all Dutch live pigs. Adding up the economic 
welfare changes for the different stakeholders (pig producers, consumers and government) 
results in the economic net welfare effect for the Dutch economy. 
Economic and epidemiological results suggest that current EU legislation is enough to 
eradicate an epidemic in a sparsely populated pig area. By contrast, additional control 
measures are necessary if the outbreak begins in an area with high pig population density. 
The economic consequences of using preventive slaughter rather than emergency vaccination 
as additional control measures depend strongly on the expected reactions of the trading 
partners. Furthermore, reducing the number of animal movements reduces the size and length 
of epidemics in areas with a dense pig population. 
Supplementary measures to reduce piglet supply 
In Chapter 6, a sector-level market model and a generic, spatial, stochastic, epidemiological 
simulation model are used to simulate the epidemiological and economic effects of the use of 
supplementary measures to reduce later animal welfare problems. Such supplementary 
measures are insemination prohibition, forced abortion for pregnant sows and the killing of 
young piglets. Adding up the economic welfare changes of the different stakeholders (pig 
producers, consumers and government) results in the net economic welfare effect for the 
Dutch economy. 
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Economic results reject the use of such supplementary measures. Besides, the use of these 
supplementary measures is no real solution to overcoming a shortage in rendering capacities. 
Discussion and conclusions 
Chapter 7 discusses the general insights obtained by this research project. The main focus is 
on the contribution of the conclusions to nature policy decisions. Model assumptions and 
limitations are additional subjects discussed. 
The main conclusions of this thesis are: 
- Ignoring the economic welfare changes of consumers, which are usually in the opposite 
direction to the economic welfare changes of producers, might be misleading. Therefore 
indirect costs of all stakeholders should be considered when policy decisions to control a 
contagious disease are taken. 
- If trade continues from non-quarantine zones during a CSF epidemic, producers 
collectively gain and consumers collectively lose. Where there is a trade ban on live pigs 
and no increase in exports of pig meat, market price is weaker and so the gain of non-
quarantined producers no longer outweighs the losses of other producers; collectively, 
producers lose and consumers gain. 
- All control measures that lead to a total export ban of live Dutch pigs should be avoided. 
Therefore, as long as vaccination is not officially accepted in the market, the PS-strategy 
is economically the most rational if a CSF epidemic occurs in a DPLA whereas the EU-
strategy remains appropriate in an SPLA. 
- Policy decisions to eradicate CSF epidemics should be made according to geographical 
circumstances, i.e. the pig density in the infected area. 
- A reduction of the regular, non-epidemic frequency and number of animal contacts 
between farms reduces the simulated epidemics in size and length. 
- Rendering and on-farm killing capacities should be prioritised for the killing and 
rendering of pigs on infected premises and preventive slaughtered farms during an 
epidemic. 
- The implementation of supplementary measures to reduce later animal welfare problems, 
such as insemination prohibition, forced abortion of sows, and killing of very young 
piglets, has no impact on the size and the length of an epidemic. 
- Better knowledge of CSF transmission mechanisms is crucial for epidemiological 
modelling and is desired for economic modelling, to analyse and compare the effect of 
various control measures. 
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- The combination of epidemiological and economic models was and is a useful tool to 
give decision-makers insight into the epidemiological as well as the economic effects of 
the various measures for controlling a contagious disease like CSF. 
i 
Samenvatting 
Samenvatting 
Inleiding 
Klassieke varkenspest (KVP) is een virusziekte bij varkens en wilde zwijnen. Om grote 
verliezen te voorkomen, worden in landen waar KVP endemisch is de varkens preventief 
ingeënt. Echter, met het conventionele vaccin zijn ingeente varkens serologisch niet van 
besmette varkens te onderscheiden. Om die reden weigeren veel landen de invoer van 
varkens en varkensvlees uit landen waar tegen KVP ingeënt wordt. 
Binnen de EU is KVP grotendeels uitgeroeid in de varkenspopulatie en is sinds begin 
negentiger jaren het preventieve enten verboden. In het geval van een KVP epidemie zijn de 
EU richtlijnen als volgt: het doden en vernietigen van de besmette veestapels ("stamping-out") 
en het instellen van quarantainegebieden (beschermingsgebied en toezichtsgebied). 
Handelspartners kunnen uit zootechnische overwegingen hun grenzen sluiten, afhankelijk van 
de besloten maatregelen. Recente KVP epidemieën in België, Duitsland en in Nederland 
hebben aangetoond dat deze basis EU maatregelen niet voldoende zijn om de ziekte snel uit 
te roeien. Daarom zou in toekomstige epidemieën een andere benadering nodig kunnen zijn. 
De doelstellingen van dit promotie onderzoek waren: 1) het ontwikkelen van een generiek 
epidemiologisch model, dat zowel de verspreiding als de bestrijding van het virus simuleert; 
2) het ontwikkelen van een economisch model dat de bestrijdingskosten berekent, maar ook 
de indirecte kosten voor de Nederlandse maatschappij, rekening houdend met verschillende 
markt scenario's; en 3) met behulp van deze twee modellen verschillende maatregelen ter 
bestrijding van een KVP epidemie analyseren om aan de hand daarvan aanbevelingen voor 
toekomstige KVP epidemieën te kunnen doen. 
Noodentingsstrategieën 
De publieke discussie en een aanvraag van de farmaceutische industrie maakten dat dit 
onderzoek begint met een evaluatie van twee noodentingsstrategieën met een marker vaccin, 
uitgewerkt voor de 1997/98 Nederlandse KVP epidemie (Hoofstuk 2). In de eerste strategie 
("delayed destruction") wordt vaccinatie alleen toegepast om een tekort aan 
ruimingscapaciteit te voorkomen. Destructie van alle varkens van gevaccineerde bedrijven 
onderscheidt deze strategie van de tweede strategie. In de tweede strategie ("intra-community 
trade") wordt verondersteld dat het vlees van de geënte varkens binnen de EU gewoon 
verhandeld kan worden. 
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Met behulp van aanpassingen in een temporeel, ruimtelijk en stochastisch simulatie model, 
InterCSF, is de verspreiding van KVP gesimuleerd via 3 contact typen (dieren, transport en 
personen) en via lokale verspreiding. De verspreiding van de ziekte wordt beïnvloed door de 
gesimuleerde bestrijdingsmaatregelen. Economische resultaten zijn vervolgens in een apart 
model berekend. Dit model berekende de bestrijdingskosten (inclusief de vaccinatiekosten), 
maar ook de verliezen van boeren en van toeleverende en verwerkende bedrijven in het 
quarantainegebied. 
Beide gesimuleerde strategieën zouden niet veel sneller tot het uitdoven van de Nederlandse 
KVP epidemie geleid hebben, vergeleken met een eerder gesimuleerde preventief ruimen 
strategie. Bij deze preventief ruimen strategie werden direct alle varkensbedrijven binnen een 
straal van één kilometer rondom elk getroffen bedrijf geruimd. De "intra-community trade-
strategie" was uiteindelijk het goedkoopste alternatief. 
Preferentie verschuiving voor vlees en vis 
Terwijl de varkensproductie in gespecialiseerde bedrijven plaatsvindt waardoor de vaste 
productiefactoren bijna uitsluitend in de varkensproductie benut kunnen worden, kan er bij de 
consumenten wel een wisselwerking tussen varkensvlees en ander vlees bestaan. Voor het 
ontwikkelen van een economisch model om de directe en indirecte kosten van 
ontwikkelingen in de varkenssector in Nederland te berekenen was het belangrijk om effecten 
van veranderingen in vraag en aanbod van varkensvlees in de detailhandel te bestuderen. 
Kennis over het koopgedrag met betrekking tot vlees en vis van de Nederlandse consument is 
hiervoor noodzakelijk. In hoofdstuk 3 zijn de preferenties van de Nederlandse consumenten 
voor vlees en vis onderzocht. De negentiger jaren waren gekenmerkt door een aantal 
vertrouwenscrises in rundvlees door BSE. Met behulp van een "switching almost ideal 
demand" systeem zijn in empirisch onderzoek de consumenten preferenties berekend. 
Structurele verandering in de vraag tussen januari 1994 en mei 1998 is uitgesplitst in een 
trendeffect, een onomkeerbare verschuiving in preferentie veroorzaakt door de BSE crisis 
vanaf maart 1996 en een "paniek" reactie tegen rundvlees in de maand van de crisis. Er is 
geen bewijs gevonden voor een negatieve consument reactie op varkensvlees door de 
1997/98 KVP epidemie in Nederland. Bovendien kon ook geen bewijs voor substitutie van 
varkensvlees aangetoond worden. 
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Welvaartseffecten van de bestrijding van de 1997/98 KVP epidemie 
Met behulp van een temporeel, ruimtelijk en stochastisch simulatie model, is in hoofstuk 4 de 
1997/98 Nederlandse KVP epidemie gesimuleerd, inclusief de werkelijk toegepaste 
maatregelen. De economische welvaartseffecten voor producenten, consumenten en de 
overheid zijn berekend met een nieuw simulatiemodel voor de structuur van de 
varkenssector, de handelsstromen en verschillende markt scenario's. In een middelgrote 
epidemie waarbij de varkensproducenten buiten het quarantaine gebied met productie en 
handel door kunnen gaan, neemt de gezamenlijke welvaart van de producenten met 454 
Miljoen EURO toe, hoewel binnen de quarantaine gebieden verschillende producenten 
verliezen lijden. De welvaart van de consumenten daalt met 463 Miljoen EURO. In het geval 
dat de export van levende varkens stopt, verliezen de producenten gezamenlijk rond de 251 
Miljoen EURO, terwijl de consument er globaal 111 Miljoen EURO op vooruit gaat. Ook 
zijn in dit geval de uitgaven voor de staatskas lager. Voor de Nederlandse samenleving als 
geheel bedraagt het economisch netto welvaartseffect van een KVP epidemie een verlies van 
297 Miljoen EURO als enkel de handel in de quarantaine gebieden vervalt en, in het geval 
van een compleet export verbod voor levende dieren, een verlies van 394 Miljoen EURO. 
Invloed van de varkensdichtheid 
In hoofdstuk 5 worden, met behulp van een verbeterd temporeel, ruimtelijk en stochastisch 
epidemiologisch simulatie model, InterCSF_v3, KVP epidemieën gesimuleerd die beginnen 
in verschillende varkensdichte gebieden in Nederland. Diverse bestrijdingsmaatregelen, zoals 
de huidige EU richtlijn, de preventieve raiming strategie en de noodentingsstrategie 
("delayed destruction" en "intra-community trade") zijn hiermee gesimuleerd. De 
economische welvaartsveranderingen op de Nederlandse varkensmarkt zijn weer door een 
sector simulatiemodel in kaart gebracht. Twee verschillende marktscenarios zijn gesimuleerd: 
in het eerste scenario gaan bedrijven buiten het quarantaine gebied door met handel; in het 
tweede scenario stopt de export in levende varkens vanuit heel Nederland. De economische 
welvaartseffecten van de verschillende getroffen partijen (producenten, consumenten en 
overheid) tellen samen op tot het netto welvaartseffect voor de Nederlandse samenleving. 
Economische en epidemiologische resultaten suggereren dat de huidige EU richtlijn 
voldoende is om een KVP epidemie in een gebied met weinig varkensbedrijven uit te roeien. 
In een varkensdicht gebied zijn er zeker additionele maatregelen nodig. De rentabiliteit van 
preventief ruimen ten opzichte van een noodentingsstrategie is zeer sterk afhankelijk van de 
te verwachten marktreacties van de handelspartners. 
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Aanvullende maatregelen ter reductie van latere dierwelzijn problemen 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een varkenssector marktmodel en een stochastisch, temporeel, 
ruimtelijk simulatiemodel gebruikt om de epidemiologische en de economische gevolgen van 
aanvullende maatregelen ter reductie van latere dierwelzijn problemen te analyseren. Zulke 
aanvullende maatregelen zijn: een inseminatie verbod; het aborteren van drachtige zeugen; en 
het doodspuiten van jonge biggen. 
Zulke aanvullende maatregelen bleken geen economisch voordeel op te leveren en hadden 
ook geen effect op het epidemiologische verloop van een epidemie. Bovendien reduceerden 
deze aanvullende maatregelen de enorme aantallen op te kopen dieren niet of nauwelijks. 
Discussie en conclusies 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden de algemene conclusies uit dit onderzoek besproken. De nadruk ligt 
daarbij op de mogelijke toepassing en ondersteuning van beslissingen bij toekomstige KVP 
uitbraken. Model aannames en model beperkingen zijn verdere discussie punten. 
De belangrijkste conclusies uit dit proefschrift zijn: 
- Als de economische welvaartsverandering van de consument, die meestal tegengesteld is 
aan de welvaartsverandering van de producent, niet in overweging wordt genomen, kan 
dat tot foute conclusies leiden. Daarom moeten bij beslissingen met betrekking tot KVP 
bestrijding welvaartseffecten van alle getroffen partijen (producenten, consumenten, 
overheid) in beschouwing genomen worden. 
- Wanneer tijdens een KVP epidemie de export doorgaat buiten de quarantaine gebieden, 
dan gaan de producenten er economisch op vooruit en de consumenten verliezen. 
Wanneer er een totaal export verbod voor levende varkens is zonder een extra toename 
van de varkensvlees export, dalen de binnenlandse varkensprijzen. De consequentie is dat 
varkensproducenten buiten de quarantaine gebieden de verliezen van de 
varkensproducenten binnen de quarantaine gebieden niet meer goed kunnen maken. 
Producenten verliezen en consumenten gaan er op vooruit. 
- Alle bestrijdingsmaatregelen die tot een totale export stop voor levende varkens leiden 
moeten vermeden worden. Met de huidige politieke en publieke acceptatie is daarom 
preventief ruimen de meest economische optie in een dichtbevolkt varkensgebied, maar 
voor een dunbevolkt varkensgebied zijn de huidige EU richtlijnen voldoende. 
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Politieke beslissingen met betrekking tot bestrijding van KVP epidemieën zouden 
afhankelijk moeten zijn van geografische kenmerken zoals varkens- of varkensbedrijven-
dichtheid in het besmette gebied. 
Een reductie van de dier- en de transportbewegingen in periodes zonder epidemie zou tot 
kleinere en kortere epidemieën leiden. 
Tijdens een epidemie mogen de dodings- en vernietigings-capaciteiten pas met laagste 
prioriteit benut worden voor de opkoop van varkens wegens dierwelzijn problemen. 
Aanvullende maatregelen ter reductie van latere dierwelzijn problemen, zoals een 
inseminatie verbod, aborteren van drachtige zeugen en het doodspuiten van jonge 
biggen, hebben geen invloed op het epidemiologische verloop van een KVP epidemie. 
Betere kennis over de transmissiemechanismen van KVP is noodzakelijk voor 
epidemiologische modellen en wenselijk voor economische modellen, zodat de effecten 
van de verschillende bestrijdingsmaatregelen beter geanalyseerd en vergeleken kunnen 
worden. 
De koppeling van epidemiologische modellen aan economische modellen is nuttig om 
een beter inzicht te krijgen in de effecten van de verschillende bestrijdingsmaatregelen 
bij een KVP epidemie en zo de besluitvorming te ondersteunen. 
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Die Europäische Schweinepest (ESP) ist eine bedeutende Viruskrankheit bei Schweinen. In 
Ländern, in denen ESP endemisch ist, wird die Schweinepopulation in der Regel 
flächendeckend prophylaktisch geimpft, um größere Ausfälle zu vermeiden. Mit dem 
konventionellen Impfstoff lassen sich jedoch geimpfte Schweine nicht von infizierten 
Schweinen unterscheiden. Aus diesem Grunde verweigern die meisten Länder den Import 
von lebenden Schweinen und Schweinefleisch aus solchen Ländern, in denen gegen ESP 
geimpft wird. 
ESP ist in der Hausschweinepopulation der EU weitgehend ausgerottet und prophylaktisches 
Impfen ist seit Anfang der 90iger Jahren untersagt. Im Falle eines ESP-Seuchenausbruches 
verlangt die derzeitige europäische Seuchenpolitik das Keulen und Vernichten der infizierten 
Herde, sowie die Ausweisung von speziellen Quarantänegebieten (Sperr- und 
Beobachtungsgebiet). Handelspartner könnten aus hygienischen Gründen abhängig von den 
getroffenen Bekämpfungsmethoden ihre Grenzen schließen. Die jüngsten ESP-
Seuchengeschehen in Belgien, Deutschland und den Niederlanden gezeigt, dass die 
derzeitigen Bekämpfungsmethoden nicht immer ausreichend sind, um die Epidemie 
möglichst schnell zum Erlöschen zu bringen. Bei zukünftigen Epidemien werden deshalb 
wohl andere Vorgehensweisen erforderlich sein. 
Die Zielsetzungen dieser Arbeit sind: 1) Die Entwicklung eines allgemeinen 
epidemiologischen Modells, das die Verschleppung des Virus von Betrieb zu Betrieb 
simuliert und es ermöglicht, verschiedene Bekämpfungsmethoden zu vergleichen; 2) die 
Entwicklung eines ökonomischen Modells, das unter Berücksichtigung von verschiedener 
Marktszenearien die anfallenden Kosten der Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen berechnet, sowie auch 
die indirekten volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten ausweist; 3) mit Hilfe dieser beiden Modelle 
sollen verschiedene Bekämpfungsmethoden analysiert werden und anhand von 
epidemiologischen und ökonomischen Erkenntnissen Empfehlungen zur Bekämpfung 
zukünftiger ESP-Seuchen abgeleitet werden. 
Notimpfungsstrategien 
Am Anfang dieser Studie stand - bedingt durch die öffentliche Diskussion und Nachfragen 
von Seiten der Privatwirtschaft - die Simulation von zwei möglichen Notimpfungsstrategien 
mit einem markierten Impfstoff, der 1997/98 bei Ausbruch von ESP in den Niederlanden zur 
Anwendung hätte kommen können (Kapitel 2). Die erste Nolimpfungsstrategie, „delayed 
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destraction", hat zum Ziel, ein Defizit an verfügbaren Tötungs- und Vernichtungskapazitäten 
zu verhindern, indem die geimpften und nicht nachweislich erkrankten Bestände erst zu 
einem späteren Zeitpunkt per „stamping-out" vertilgt werden. Die Tötung und Vernichtung 
aller Schweine aus geimpften Beständen unterscheidet diese Strategie im wesentlichen von 
der zweiten Strategie, der „intra-community-trade-Strategie". In dieser wird angenommen, 
dass das Fleisch geimpfter Tiere auf dem europäischen Markt vermarktet werden kann. 
Mit Hilfe des modifizierten, räumlichen, zeitlichen und stochastischen Simulationsmodells, 
InterCSF, wird die Verschleppung des ESP-Erregers zwischen den Betrieben simuliert. Die 
Verschleppung des ESP-Erregers kann örtlich bis zu einem Radius von 1 km erfolgen, sowie 
über längere Abstände via Tier-, Fahrzeug- und Personenverkehr. Die getroffenen 
Bekämpfungsmethoden beeinflussen die Verbreitung der Krankheit. Sämtliche Kosten der 
Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen, einschließlich aller Impfkosten, sowie etwaige Verluste der 
Schweineproduzenten und der nachgelagerten Industrie in den Quarantanegebieten, wurden 
in einem separaten Model errechnet. 
Der Vergleich der beiden Bekämpfungsstrategien zeigt, dass beide Notimpfungsstrategien 
kaum effizienter gewesen wären, als die zuvor simulierte „preventive slaughter-Sttategie" 
(d.h. zusätzliches Keulen aller Schweinebeständen im Umkreis von 1 km um eine infizierte 
Herde). Von allen drei ist die „mlxa-community-trade-Strategie" jedoch die kostengünstigste 
Alternative. 
Veränderungen der Konsumentenpräferenzen von Fleisch und Fisch 
Obwohl die Schweineproduktion in spezialisierten Betrieben stattfindet, und die fixen 
Produktionsfaktoren fast ausschließlich in der Schweineproduktion eingesetzt werden, so 
könnte auf der Konsumentenebene doch eine Wechselwirkung zwischen Schweinefleisch und 
anderem Fleisch bestehen. Bevor jedoch ein ökonomisches Modell, das die direkten und 
indirekten Kosten von Entwicklungen im Schweinesektor für die ganze niederländische 
Gesellschaft berücksichtigt, entwickelt werden kann, ist es wichtig zu untersuchen, ob 
Veränderungen im Schweinefleischangebot des Einzelhandels indirekte Effekte auf die 
Nachfrage und die Wirtschaftlichkeit von anderen Fleischarten haben können. Kenntnisse 
über das Kaufverhalten der niederländischen Verbraucher im Bezug auf Fleisch und Fisch 
sind dazu notwendig. Deshalb wurden in Kapitel 3 die Präferenzen für Fleisch und Fisch der 
niederländischen Verbraucher untersucht. Die neunziger Jahre waren, bedingt durch BSE, 
durch Vertrauenskrisen im Hinblick auf Rindfleisch gekennzeichnet. Die empirische 
Untersuchung der Konsumentenpräferenz berücksichtigt die teilweise durch die BSE-Krise 
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entstandenen Geschmacksveränderungen für die einzelnen Fleischsorten durch die 
Verwendung eines „switching almost ideal demand (AID)" Systems. Strukturelle 
Veränderungen der Konsumentenpräferenzen zwischen Januar 1994 und Mai 1998 werden 
unterschieden in einen zu Grunde liegenden Trend, eine irreversible Präferenzenverlagerung, 
ausgelöst durch die BSE Krise im März 1996, und eine ,,Panilcreaktion" auf Kosten der 
Rindfleischnachfrage im Monat der Krise. Wir konnten keinen Beweis für eine gehemmte 
Schweinefleischnachfrage erbringen, der auf den ESP-Seuchenausbruch in den Niederlanden 
in den Jahren 1997/98 zurückzuführen wäre. Darüber hinaus fanden wir keinerlei Beweise für 
die Substitution von Schweinefleisch durch andere Fleischsorten. 
Wohlfahrtseffekte durch die ESP-Seuche von 1997/98 
Im Kapitel 4 simulieren wir die ESP-Seuche in den Niederlanden von 1997/98 einschließlich 
der angewandten Bekämpfungsmethoden mit einem dynamischen, räumlichen und 
stochastischen epidemiologischen Simulationsmodell. Mit Hilfe eines neu entwickelten 
sektoralen Handels- und Marktmodells wurde das Geschehen auf dem niederländischen 
Schweinemarkt unter Annahme verschiedener Marktszenarien simuliert. Ökonomische 
Wohlfahrrveränderungen bei Produzenten, Konsumenten und dem Staat wurden berechnet. 
Im Falle einer mittelschweren ESP-Seuche und einer begrenzten Handelssperre stieg der 
Produzentenüberschuss auf 454 Millionen EURO, obwohl innerhalb der Quarantänegebiete 
einige Produzenten Verluste erlitten. Der Konsumentenüberschuss dagegen fiel um 463 
Millionen EURO. Im Falle eines Exportstopps von lebenden Schweinen ging den 
Schweineproduzenten ein Überschuss von insgesamt 251 Millionen EURO verloren, 
wohingegen der Konsumentenüberschuss um 111 Millionen EURO stieg. Im Falle eines 
Exportverbotes für lebende Schweine sind die Staatskosten niedriger. Für die niederländische 
Wirtschaft beträgt der ökonomische Wohlfahrtsverlust gegenüber einer ESP-seuchenfreien 
Situation im Falle der begrenzten Handelssperre 297 Millionen EURO, und im Falle eines 
Exportverbotes für lebende Schweine 394 Millionen EURO. 
Einfluss der Schweinedichtheit 
Mit Hilfe eines verbesserten räumlichen, dynamischen und stochastischen epidemiologischen 
Models, InterCSF_v3, wurden in Kapitel 5 ESP-Seuchen in Gebieten mit unterschiedlicher 
Schweinedichte simuliert. Die Anwendung von verschiedenen Bekämpfungsmethoden, wie 
der derzeitigen EU-Seuchenpolitik, der „preventive slaughter" Strategie und/oder einer 
Notimpfung („delayed destruction" und „mtra-corrmimity-trade-Strategien") wurden für den 
Fall einer ESP-Seuche simuliert. Des weiteren wurde mit Hilfe des sektoralen Handels- und 
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Marktmodells das Geschehen auf dem niederländischen Schweinemarkt simuliert. Zwei 
unterschiedliche Handelsszenarien wurden simuliert: Ein Handelsverbot allein in den 
Quarantänegebieten, sowie ein Exportverbot für lebende Schweine. Die ökonomischen 
Wohlfahrtsveränderungen auf Seiten der verschiedenen betroffenen Parteien 
(Schweineproduzenten, Konsumenten und Staat) zusammen ergeben den gesamten 
ökonomischen Nettowohlfahrtseffekt für die Niederlande. 
Ökonomische und epidemiologische Ergebnisse suggerieren, dass die aktuelle EU-
Seuchenpolitik ausreicht, um eine ESP-Epidemie in einem Gebiet mit geringer 
Schweinedichte auszulöschen, ha einem Gebiet mit hoher Schweinedichte hingegen sind 
jedoch zusätzliche Maßnahmen erforderlich. Die Wirtschaftlichkeit der „preventive 
slaughter-Strategie" gegenüber einer Notimpfungsstrategie ist sehr stark abhängig von der zu 
erwartenden Handelsreaktion. Außerdem führt in Gebieten mit hoher Viehbesatzdichte eine 
allgemeine Reduktion des Tier- und Fahrzeugverkehrs zu kleineren und kürzeren 
Seuchenausbrüchen. 
j 
Ergänzungsmaßnahmen zur Reduzierung des Ferkelangebotes 
In Kapitel 6 wurden ein sektorales Handels- und Marktmodell, sowie ein räumliches, 
stochastisches und dynamisches epidemiologisches Simulationsmodell benutzt, um die 
epidemiologischen und ökonomischen Folgen von begleitenden Maßnahmen zur Vermeidung 
; von späteren Problemen des Wohlbefindens der Tiere zu untersuchen. Solche 
Ergänzungsmaßnahmen waren ein Besamungsverbot, die Abtreibung bei trächtigen Sauen, 
sowie das Töten von sehr jungen Ferkeln. Die Aufsummierung der ökonomischen 
! Wohlfahrtsveränderungen der betroffenen Parteien (Schweineproduzenten, Konsumenten und 
Staat) führte zum Nettowohlfahrtseffekt für die niederländische Volkswirtschaft. 
Wirtschaftlich ist die Anwendung solch begleitender Maßnahmen nicht. Außerdem 
reduzieren diese die enorme Anzahl an Schlachtungen, welche aus Problemen des 
Wohlbefindens der Tiere erfolgen, kaum oder gar nicht. 
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Diskussion und Schlussfolgerung 
In Kapitel 7 werden allgemeine Schlussfolgerungen, die aus der Studie gewonnen werden 
konnten, diskutiert. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Ausrichtung der Seuchenpolitik bei zukünftigen 
ESP-Seuchenausbrüchen. Notwendige Modellannahmen, sowie Modelleinschränkungen, sind 
weitere Diskussionspunkte. 
Die wichtigsten Schlussfolgerungen dieser Studie sind: 
- Werden Wohlfahrtsveränderungen auf Seiten der Konsumenten, die sich gewöhnlich 
entgegengesetzt zu den Wohlfahrtsveränderungen der Produzenten verhalten, nicht 
berücksichtigt, so könnte dieses zu falschen Schlussfolgerungen führen. Deshalb sollten 
im Falle einer Entscheidung über die Bekämpfung einer Seuche Wohlfahrtsveränderungen 
aller betroffenen Parteien (Produzenten, Konsumenten, Staat) beachtet werden. 
- Wenn der Handel im Falle eines ESP-Seuchenausbruches, außerhalb der Quarantäne-
gebiete keinen Beschränkungen unterliegt, dann erwirtschaften Schweineproduzenten in 
der Summe einen Überschuss, wohingegen die Konsumenten verlieren. Im Falle eines 
Exportverbotes von lebenden Schweinen werden ohne eine gleichzeitige Erhöhung der 
Exportmengen von Schweinefleisch niedrige Marktpreise erzielt. Die Konsequenz ist, 
dass die Schweineproduzenten außerhalb der Quarantänegebiete die Verluste der 
betroffenen Schweineproduzenten nicht wettmachen können; Produzenten erleiden einen 
kollektiven Verlust und Konsumenten gewinnen. 
- Alle Bekämpfungsmethoden, die zu einem Exportverbot von lebenden Schweinen führen, 
sollten vermieden werden. Die derzeitige politische und öffentliche Akzeptanz lässt den 
Schluss zu, dass in einem Gebiet mit einer hohen Schweinedichte im Falle eines 
Seuchenausbruchs die „preventive slaughter"-Strategie die wirtschaftlichere Strategie ist. 
Dahingegen ist in einem Gebiet mit geringerer Schweinedichte die derzeitige EU-
Seuchenpolitik ausreichend. 
- ESP-Seuchenpolitik sollte an geographische Gegebenheiten, d.h. Schweinedichte oder 
Schweinebetriebsdichte, gebunden sein. 
- Eine allgemeine Reduzierung des Tier- und Fahrzeugverkehrs in seuchenfreien Zeiten 
fuhrt zu kürzeren Seuchenausbrüchen, sowie eine geringere Anzahl infizierter Betriebe. 
- Im Falle einer Seuche sollten die Tötungs- und Vernichtungskapazitäten in aller erster 
Linie zur Schlachtung und Vernichtung von Schweinen aus infizierten und präventiv 
geschlachteten Betrieben benutzt werden. 
- Begleitende Maßnahmen zur Vermeidung von späteren Problemen des WoUbefindens 
der Tiere, wie z.B. ein Besamungsverbot und die Abtreibung bei trächtigen Sauen, sowie 
die Tötung junger Ferkel, haben keinen Einfluss auf das Seuchengeschehen. 
Zusammenfassung 
- Für die epidemiologischen Modelle sind bessere Kenntnisse über verschiedene ESP-
Verschleppungsmechanismen notwendig, und im Falle der ökonomischen Modelle 
wünschenswert, um die Folgen der verschiedenen Bekämpfungsmethoden besser 
analysieren und vergleichen zu können. 
- Die Koppelung von epidemiologischen an ökonomische Modelle war und ist nützlich, um 
einen besseren Einblick in die Wirkungsweise von den verschiedenen Bekämpfungs-
methoden bei Seuchen zu erhalten und somit den Entscheidungsprozess zu erleichtern. 
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